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I. INTRODUCTION
The water crisis in Palestine is not one that appears often
in the headlines outside the Middle East.' The killing and
wounding of unarmed demonstrators and the demolition of
homes by Israeli (and now Palestinian) authorities are dramatic
and visibly outrageous violations of Palestinian human rights.
In contrast, a dried up well, an open sewage canal, or the lack of
a system of piped clean water cannot compete for a spot on the
nightly news. We can quickly forget the misappropriation or
misuse of groundwater, precisely because it involves a subterra-
nean resource which easily escapes even our initial notice. 2
This disregard is unfortunate; historic Palestine is one of the
world's most water-stressed regions and the deteriorating qual-
ity and limited capacity of the region's water resources are of
paramount importance to all residents of the area.
1 One exception to this general rule is the coverage of the September 1995
Taba accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. See, e.g.,
Israel Says Reached Water Breakthrough with PLO, REUTERS (BC CYCLE), Aug. 25,
1995 (announcing "breakthrough" consisting of recognition of Palestinians' water
rights and increase in water allocation). This coverage, which repeated uncritically
the negotiators' claims about the advances made in the water sector, significantly
overstated the extent of the improvements. First, the recognition of future Pales-
tinian needs amounting to 70-80 mcmlyr, even if realized, would only bring per
capita Palestinian consumption to around one-third the Israeli level, from a cur-
rent level of approximately one-fourth. Of this amount, fully 58-68 mcm/yr is to
come from the Mountain Aquifer's Eastern basin, which is an endogenous water
source and therefore not properly the subject of an international agreement. See
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, ann. 3, art. 40, 6-7 (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs edition) [hereinaf-
ter Interim Agreement]. The Accord raised Palestinian consumption of shared wa-
ters by at most by 11.6 mcm/yr, an increase of around 20% from the present
Palestinian share. However, since this share is so small to begin with, the Pales-
tinian portion of common Palestinian-Israeli water resources that results from this
reallocation is in the neighborhood of 12% of the annual recharge. Furthermore,
this excess capacity, even if it exists, is of lower quality than the water that is
currently produced. Second, the "recognition" of Palestinian rights to water by the
Israelis is somewhat disingenuous and in reality a nonevent, given the manifold
bases for a Palestinian right to the natural resources in its territory. See AISLING
BYRNE, WATER: THE RED LiNE 13-25 (1994) (reproducing authority under interna-
tional humanitarian law, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and inter-
national water law supporting right of Palestinians to their natural resources,
including water). Furthermore, this recognition is not even complete, since the
Agreement does not mention the Jordan River, to which Palestine is a riparian.
2 See, e.g., RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAw: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 15-
61, 153-54 (rev. ed. 1988) (dedicating 45 pages to Israeli expropriation of West
Bank land and only one page to water expropriation).
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Israeli policies affecting Palestinian water have become a
major area of focus within the Palestinian community, though
this attention has come relatively recently.3 Importantly, the
parties to the conflict recognized the importance of the issue by
the inclusion, within the framework of the multilateral and bi-
lateral talks that followed the Madrid Middle East Peace Con-
ference, of a working group that dealt exclusively with the
question of water and the environment in the Middle East.4
Water has been a subject of the Israel-Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization Declaration of Principles, the Gaza-Jericho Accord,
and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, while water cutoffs and
shortages have impacted the lives of practically all residents of
the West Bank and Gaza, many Palestinians are unaware of the
parameters of the water problem, the quantities at stake, and
the long term impacts of the water crisis on Palestinian health,
agriculture, and ultimately independence. 5 An adequate reso-
3 Many Palestinian professionals and non-governmental organizations
(NGO's), both inside and outside Palestine, have dedicated themselves to study
and advocacy in the area of Palestinian water rights. Some of the Palestinian
NGO's specializing in this area include the Land and Water Institute, the Pales-
tinian Hydrology Group, the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees, the Ap-
plied Research Institute/Jerusalem, and the Agricultural Engineers Association.
See POLICY RESEARCH INC., WATER AND SANITATION 15 (1992). A bibliography of
predominantly Palestinian works in this area show that almost no Palestinian aca-
demic or scholarly attention predates 1980. See PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY
FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY: A BIBLIOG-
RAPHY 168-80 (1994).
4 The working group first met in May 1992, and includes delegations from
countries throughout the Middle East region (including Palestine and Israel), as
well as the United States, Europe, and Japan. For a more detailed presentation of
the progress of water negotiations in the multilateral and bilateral talks, see
Aaron T. Wolf, International Water Dispute Resolution: The Middle East Multilat-
eral Working Group on Water Resources, WATER INT'L, September 1995, at 141.
The aim of the multilateral group was "to promote regional cooperation in joint
management, conservation, and enhancing supply and data availability." See
SHARIF S. ELMUSA, THE WATER ISSUE AND THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1
(1993).
5 For example, when the Gaza-Jericho Accord, which led to the de jure recog-
nition by the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) of Israel's right to con-
tinue its present water policies in Gaza (at least during the interim period
envisaged by the Accord) effectively ended the possibilities for improvement in this
area until the end of this decade, very few people protested or reacted to the prob-
lem. Given the active movement that grew up around the campaign to free Pales-
tinian detainees when the Accord failed to liberate detainees, the lack of a similar
movement around the question of water indicates the relatively low priority that
5
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lution of the division of the shared water resources is of concern
to Israelis as well, since the bulk of the water used by that state
comes from resources shared with Palestinians. 6 Even within
the context of a negotiated political settlement, an unstable or
inequitable regional water management system could lead to a
reappearance of the water-related conflicts that has marked the
Middle East conflict in the past.7
Under the terms of the Declaration of Principles, the two
sides negotiated at the Permanent Status Negotiations,8 which
took place during the Wye River Talks. However, the water is-
sue9 remained unresolved at the conclusion of negotiations. In
any case, it is critical that the resolution of this problem be on
the basis of international legal norms and not on the basis of
one side's dominant bargaining power. Only a solution that is
just and equitable will serve the long-term interests of both par-
ties to this conflict. This Article attempts to provide a legal
analysis that will help the two sides come to a more complete
understanding of Palestine's rights to regional water resources.
The reason behind the focus on Palestine is two-fold. First, Pal-
estine, having endured decades of occupation, has experienced
infringements on its water that were sustained and considera-
ble. For it to be a viable country in the future, Palestine must,
at least in the short-term, have access to its rightful share of
water resources for its agricultural sector. In addition, in order
to make amends for past infractions, Palestine must seek com-
pensation for past misappropriation of its water resources. Fi-
the average Palestinian gives to creating a political solution to the water crisis in
that arid region.
6 See Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, Harnessing International Law to
Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT. RES. J.
543, 543 (1993). Approximately two-thirds of Israel's freshwater needs come from
the Jordan River (shared with Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) and the
Mountain Aquifer (shared with Palestine).
7 For a general discussion of the role that disputes over water has played in
the Middle East conflict, see Aaron Wolf, The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 NAT. RES. J. 919 (1992). See also ELMUSA, supra note
4, at 1-2 ("[in the Israeli-Palestinian context, water is a central ingredient, per-
haps only second to land, of the wider conflict between the two sides").
8 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, art. 5, reprinted in AL-HAQ, A HuMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF THE DECLA-
RATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT PRINCIPLES (Al Haq, Ramal-
lah 1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
9 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, at ann. 3, art. 40, 1.
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nally, the legal resources available to the Palestinian nation are
still quite limited, thus, this Article was written with the hope
that the research and conclusions it contains will be of use to
Palestinian negotiators in future negotiations.
This Article begins with a brief description of the physical
background of the water systems of the region and of the pat-
terns of human use and consumption, since a basic understand-
ing is critical to an analysis of the international legal issues.
Part III addresses, through a historical analysis, the attempts
by the area's governments to regulate water use through law.
Part IV analyzes the international legal status of Palestinian
water from within the framework of the law of belligerent occu-
pation. As an area under occupation by Israel, it is natural to
look to this body of law first. Two substantive areas regulated
by the Hague Regulations, the protection for movable and im-
movable private and public property of the occupied country,
and the duty to preserve local law, have the most significance
for the analysis of Israeli policies. Israeli policies have defeated
the original regime of private rights to water, abolished preex-
isting Jordanian institutions, incorporated Palestinian water
into Israel's national pool, and excluded any Palestinian role in
the management of water resources at a regional or national
level. It is shown by these actions that Israel has not only ille-
gally infringed upon Palestinian private property rights pro-
tected by international humanitarian law, but also radically
altered the laws and institutions of the preexisting water
regime.
After the international humanitarian law analysis, this Ar-
ticle identifies areas where this corpus fails to supply a com-
plete answer to some of its own imperatives. Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations commands the occupant to restore and en-
sure public order and civil life. To determine the meaning of
this provision in the context of prolonged military occupation,
many international jurists and the Israeli Supreme Court have
looked to the so-called Martens clause. This clause, located in
the preamble of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 calls on
parties to provide to civilians the protection of "the rule of the
principles of the law of nations" to fill in the gaps in the Conven-
7
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tion and Regulations.10 In particular, in the context of the
growing involvement of most states in the provision of services
and benefits to their citizens, many have seen the combination
of the Martens clause and Article 43 as requiring that long-term
occupants take into account the developing social and economic
needs of the occupied population.
Part V of this article outlines the principles that underlie
the rule of law by analysis, in particular, International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to
which Israel was either a signatory (since 1966) or a party
(since 1991) throughout the period of its occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza. Israel was, therefore, under an obligation first
not to undermine, and later to promote, the rights included in
the Covenant. These rights include the right of peoples to con-
trol their natural resources; the right to equal protection of the
Covenant; the right to earn a living; the right to an adequate
standard of living, including adequate housing; and the right to
health. This obligation, as argued by the author, extended to
Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)
during the period preceding the recent accords, and may well
apply even during the present transitional period.
This Article will show that: (i) Israel's monopolization of
control over Palestinian water deprived Palestinians of their
right to control their natural resources; (ii) that the wide and
institutionalized differences between Palestinian and Israeli ac-
cess to water and to water-related services and infrastructure
have given rise to a violation of Palestinians' equal protection
rights; (iii) their severe restrictions on Palestinian use of water
in agriculture contributed to the underdevelopment of that sec-
tor and therefore led to the violation of the right to earn a living;
and (iv) their neglect of Palestinian water-related infrastruc-
ture (drinking water networks, sewage systems, and waste
water treatment plants) has led to a violation of Palestinians'
right to an adequate standard of living and physical health.
The implications of this Part of the Article extend beyond
the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict. As a whole, the liter-
ature around economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights is un-
10 Regulations Annexed to the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Cus-
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derdeveloped and the ICESCR has not received anything
resembling the attention given to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This is despite the fact
that the post-war international human rights initiative of the
United Nations envisaged these two sets of rights "civil and
political on the one hand and economic, social, and cultural on
the other" as indivisible and interdependent. Unfortunately,
few human rights organizations currently monitor states' fulfill-
ment of the ESC rights they guarantee to persons under their
jurisdiction. In addition, few published works have attempted to
develop the meaning of the words "progressively take steps" or
"to the maximum of their available resources" or to define what
standards apply to various countries in measuring their provi-
sion of ESC rights. Finally, almost no one has attempted to de-
fine remedies for violations of these rights, or to develop
strategies for how to go about obtaining them beyond the polit-
ical realm. Thus, while this Article is a contribution to the de-
bate surrounding the Palestine question and attempts to
address the international legal norms implicated in this con-
flict, it is also intended to serve as a contribution to the emerg-
ing international movement to develop the understanding and
the interpretation and elaboration of ESC rights.
International humanitarian law is also indeterminate in
the partition of regional transboundary water resources. As
mentioned above, the Hague Regulations protect Palestinian
private immovable property. In the water sector, this is primar-
ily the Mountain Aquifer, a relatively large source of water un-
derlying the West Bank, and the Jordan Valley, two large
natural formations which Palestinians held communally under
Ottoman and later Jordanian law. The analysis is quickly com-
plicated by the fact that these are transboundary sources.
Israel and Palestine share the Mountain Aquifer; in the case of
the Jordan River, the riparians are Israel, Palestine, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. The Jordan River is subject to a customary
division of its waters dating from an American-led diplomatic
mission of the mid-1950's (the so-called Johnston Mission). De-
termining which parts of the River's waters the mission sug-
gested should go to the West Bank would provide the basis for
assessing the extent of Palestinian communal property expro-
priated by Israel. The Mountain Aquifer, on the other hand, is
9
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subject to no such agreement. To fill the void, this Article looks
to an emerging body of international law: the law of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses. Up until the
late 1960's, international jurists were the prime promoters and
developers of this body of law; since then, the United Nations
International Law Commission has haltingly yet steadily en-
gaged in the codification of principles governing the use of these
basins. This Article discusses the implications of this body of
law for the Israeli-imposed partition of the Mountain Aquifer.
This Article concludes with an assessment of the results and a
message to the negotiators who will resolve the question of
water between Palestinians and Israelis.
II. HYDROLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, AND HUMAN USES
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip's three main water
sources are the Jordan River, the Mountain Aquifer (a major
geological formation underlying the West Bank and central
Israel), and the Gaza Aquifer. The Jordan River is an interna-
tional river system in whose basin lie five countries: Lebanon,
Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine. Two of the Mountain Aqui-
fer's three basins are international, while the third is endoge-
nous to Palestine. As these are the main water resources upon
which Palestinians may legitimately draw, and since in any
case they constitute the majority of the region's water resources
and are the main subject of contention between Palestinians
and Israelis, this Article focuses exclusively on these sources.'1
In the case of both Israel and Palestine, the bulk of the
water resources consumed come from sources that are shared.
In a region that is scarce in water and characterized by a vari-
ety of conflicts stemming from a number of factors, the sharing
of water sources has served to exacerbate tensions and some-
times has even led to outbreaks of hostilities. As will be shown
below, Israel has exerted considerable military and political ef-
fort in order to capture the waters of surrounding countries and
Palestinians have seen their access to their own water severely
curtailed as a result.
11 By doing so, I ignore the Coastal Aquifer which, according to Israeli data, is
a domestic Israeli water resource. It contributes around 400 mcm/yr to Israel's
consumption needs (i.e., 25 percent of its total freshwater consumption). Other
sources, such as rainwater and surface runoff, are for the most part potential only.
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Human water use is commonly classified into three major
categories: agricultural, domestic, and industrial. Of these
three, Palestine and Israel make heaviest use of their water in
their respective agricultural sectors. This category accounts for
approximately seventy-five percent of the total national con-
sumption in these two countries. In an arid climate, water for
irrigation is a critical factor of production. Data on aggregate
consumption levels is summarized in Table 1:
TABLE 1. AGGREGATE ISRALEI AND PALESTINIAN WATER
USE-ALL WATER SOURCES (MCMVYR)
AGRICULTURE DOMESTIC INDUSTRL TOTAL
West Bank Palestinian 1 2  95-100 20-30 120-130
Gaza Palestinian 1 3  70 30 100
Total Palestinian 165-170 50-60 215-30
Israel 1 4  1327 96 367 1790
West Bank Settlers 1 5  53 12 6516
Gaza Settlers 1 7  12.5 2.5 12.5-17.5
Total Settlers 65.5 14.5 77.5-82.5
Total Israel and Settlers 1392.5 110.5 367 1,870
12 The figures for West Bank Palestinians include the Palestinians resident in
East Jerusalem.
13 See POLICY RESEARCH, INC., supra note 3, at 10.
14 Uri Davis, Arab Water Resources and Israeli Water Policies, in ISRAEL AND
ARAB WATERS 16, 16-17 (Abdel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyeh, eds. 1985).
15 See ABDEL RAHMAN TAMIMI, WATER: A FACTOR FOR CONFLICT OR
COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST? 7 (Arab Studies Society & Truman Research
for the Advancement of Peace, Jerusalem 1991).
16 Shuval states that Palestinian estimates range between 65 and 100 mcm/
yr. See Hillel Shuval, An Inventory of the Water Resources of the Area of Israel
and the Occupied Territories: Estimated Water Potential and Current Utilization,
in A PROPOSAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL MASTER WATER PLAN 73, 91-
92 (Karen Assaf et al. eds., 1993). A mid-1980s study estimated that the
consumption by West Bank settlers amounted to 40-50 mcn/yr, MERON
BENVENISTI & S. KHAYAT, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ATLAS (1986), though this
estimate was based on the much lower settler population of a decade ago.
17 The figures for total settler consumption are from ELMUSA, supra note 4, at
6. As the consumption of Gaza settlers is little known, I could not find break out
for agricultural versus nonagricultural consumption. Therefore, I split out the
midpoint for Gaza consumption between the two categories in the same proportion
11
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In general, the water sector in Palestine and Israel is in a
state of crisis. This situation is characterized by the overex-
ploitation of damageable water sources, the exhaustion of long-
term storage, the deterioration in water quality, and increasing
levels of demand driven by high population growth.' 8 However,
Palestinians are forced to bear a disproportionate share of the
burden, even though they have little institutional control over
the development or the solution of this crisis.
The figures and information in this Part are subject to sev-
eral caveats. First, estimates of water use may differ depending
on the source. The data on water supply and use, while in many
cases presented without a time dimension, fluctuate from year
to year. For example, a year with low rainfall would normally
give rise to higher-than-average demand figures (especially
from the agricultural sector) and lower-than-average supply
figures (since there is less rainwater to replenish groundwater
sources). Measurements of use by millions of consumers and
production by large and sometimes subterranean sources pres-
ent many technical difficulties. Further, the political nature of
this problem detracts from the objectivity of scientific "data"
and "facts."'19 The Israeli near-monopoly on the production and
distribution of water shared with Palestinians 20 also contrib-
utes to a large information imbalance in Israel's favor.
A. Mountain Aquifer
Physical Structure. The Mountain Aquifer lies underneath
almost all of the West Bank and most of central Israel.21 Not
18 See Jehoshua Schwarz, Israeli Water Sector Review: Past Achievements,
Current Problems, and Future Options, in COUNTRY EXPERIENCES IN WATER RE-
SOURCE MANAGEMENT 129, 133 (Guy Le Moigne et al., eds. 1992) (World Bank
Technical Paper No. 175).
19 See POLICY RESEARCH, INC., supra note 3, at 5-6 ("[iun the Occupied Territo-
ries, the intrusion of politics into discussions of water supply and demand affect
data collection, analysis and presentations, making it extremely difficult to deter-
mine what data are sufficiently accurate to use as the basis for discussion"). For a
systematic comparison of many of the estimates of water capacity from the various
sources, see id. at 8, 10. See also SARA Roy, THE GAzA STRIP SURVEY preface (1986)
(discussing difficulties in obtaining information on the Gaza Strip from official Is-
raeli sources and complaining of "specific military restrictions placed on Palestini-
ans prohibiting any form of research, survey, study or plan to be conducted on the
Gaza Strip").
20 See infra Part V.C.1.
21 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 550-52.
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only is it one of the largest water sources in the region, it also
provides the highest quality water. 22 This aquifer is fed primar-
ily by rainwater falling over the West Bank's mountainous
spine, which extends from the Jenin area in the north to the
Hebron area in the south.23 This series of mountainous peaks
averages about 700 millimeters of precipitation annually.24 The
rain that falls in this area and that avoids evaporation (ulti-
mately only twenty-five to thirty percent of the precipitation)
seeps downward through an area of permeable layers of soil and
rock (the recharge area) until it reaches an impermeable forma-
tion, and rests in a huge receptacle known as the Mountain
Aquifer. 25
The "storage area" is where the water entering through the
recharge area comes to rest. It is a huge box-shaped formation
with impermeable formations on all sides except for the "lid"
(the recharge area in the spine of the West Bank mountains).
The direction that the underground water takes once it enters
the soil is determined by the gradient of the underlying imper-
meable formation. This box contains three basins, delimited by
the ridges of the impermeable formation lying underneath the
aquifers. The three basins are: the Western Basin,26 lying in the
western part of the West Bank as well as in central Israel; the
Northeastern Basin,27 lying mostly under the north-central
West Bank; and the Eastern Basin lying in the eastern West





26 This basin is also known in the English and Hebrew literature as the
Yarqon-Tanninim Basin. The Arabic name is the El-Ouja-Al-Timsah Basin. See
HIsHAM AWARTANI, AL-'ABAR AL-ARTUWAZIYYAH FI AL-MANATIQ AL-FILASTINIYYAH AL-
MUHTALLAH [ARTESIAN WELLS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES] 14
(1992). I will use the less unwieldy name Western Basin.
27 Also called the Nablus-Gilboa or the Harod-Beisan Basin.
28 For schematic cross-sections of the underground formations and for a map
of the recharge area, storage area, and flow directions of underground water, see
Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 553-54, figs. 2-3.
13
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TABLE 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOUNTAIN
AQUIFER BASINS2 9
NORTHEASTERN
WESTERN BASIN BASIN EASTERN BASIN
Recharge Area(ki2)
Palestine* 1,400 650 2,150
Israel 400 50 50
Storage Area (kin2 )
Palestine* 50 650 1,950




Palestine* 25*** 25 61
Israel**31 335*** 115 39
Present Uses
29 But see ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 2 ("[s]ince 1967, Israel maintained and
actually increased its disproportionate exploitation of the water resources common
to it and the Palestinians . . ."). This contradicts Benvenisti and Gvirtzman's
assertions that Israel's use of the shared basins of the Mountain Aquifer did not
change since occupation of the West Bank. See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra
note 6, at 558-59. See also ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 28 (quoting Israel
Ministry of Agriculture's goal, as stated in its Master Plan for the Development of
the Occupied Territories, of supplying 90 mcm/yr to the settlements by 1990).
30 Practically all estimates for Palestinian consumption of West Bank
groundwaters, whether Palestinian or Israeli, agree on a West Bank Palestinian
consumption level of around 120-30 mcm/yr. What the sources disagree about to a
larger degree is total Mountain Aquifer production. One Palestinian expert
estimates, on the basis of West Bank rainfall data, a total annual recharge of 724
mcm/yr. See TAMIMI, supra note 15, at 6. Several authorities seem to agree on
figures in the range of 635 mcmlyr, of which some is saline and not readily usable
in agriculture or domestic uses. Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 555-60,
and ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 6.
Given the fact that Palestinian consumption is relatively well known, the
higher one's estimate of total recharge, the higher Israeli consumption is, and the
more lop-sided the distribution of water. The figures I have chosen here are near
the low end of the range, and thus put Israeli practices in a relatively positive
light.
31 Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 555-59. The authors rely almost
exclusively on Israeli sources. See id. at 555-56 nn.38-41, 558-59 nn.52-63. Where
numbers for recharge were not precisely specified, I made approximations based
upon Benvenisti and Gvirtzman's map. Id. at 554 fig. 3, and double-checked the
resulting numbers by duplicating the calculation the authors made concerning the
relative sizes of feeding and storage area. Id. at 557 n.47.
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NORTHEASTERN
WESTERN BASIN BASIN EASTERN BASIN
Palestine* -Irrigation in -Irrigation in Irrigation in
Qalqilya and north central Jordan Valley
Tulkarm West Bank region
-Domestic needs -Domestic needs
for western for eastern
West Bank West Bank
Palestinian Palestinian
towns and Towns and
villages (via villages.
Israel)
Israel** -Drinking water -Irrigation in -Irrigation for
for most of Beisan and settlements in
Israel's large Gilboa regions Jordan Valley
towns region
-General -Domestic needs
consumption for for settlements
settlements in in Jordan
central West Valley region
Bank region
For purposes of this table, Palestine effectively means the West Bank.
** "Israeli use" includes use by Israeli settlers and settlements on the West
Bank.
*** When splitting up the quantities between Palestine and Israel, Benvenisti
and Gvirtzman used the quantities pumped, and not consumed. The author
arrived at the 25 mcmlyr figure by subtracting the figures from 125 mcm/yr (the
number generally recognized as total West Bank consumption) the quantities
pumped within the West Bank for the Northeastern and Eastern Basins, as well
as an estimate for waters obtained from the use of cisterns and surface flow.
This is because some of the water pumped from the Western Basin by Israel is
then pumped back to Palestinian towns, including East Jerusalem, so Palestin-
ian consumption would show up in Benvenisti & Gvirtzman's breakdown as
Israeli "use."
Drainage. The three basins were once mainly drained by
springs, although now water leaves mainly via pumping wells.
Water from the Western Basin is pumped mainly in the storage
area, which lies in central Israel.32 At present, approximately
300 wells located to the west of the Green Line exploit most of
the capacity of the Western Basin.33 This is apparently the
most efficient place to drill these wells, as they can be shallower
and higher yielding than if they had been drilled in the moun-
32 See Shuval, supra note 16, at 82.
33 See id.
15
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tainous areas of the West Bank.34 The Israeli pumps, which
drain the Northeastern Basin, also lie within Israel.35
The Eastern Basin is the only one drained primarily by
springs. 36 It is also the one that saw the greatest increase in
exploitation following the Israeli occupation.3 7 For example,
Israel has dug, after its invasion, a series of deep bore wells,
some reaching 700 meters in depth, in the lower Cenomanian
Basin of the Eastern Basin in the West Bank.38 From these
wells, they have pumped 18 mcm/yr of an estimated annual ca-
pacity of 25 mcm/yr of fresh water to supply to Jewish settle-
ments in the Jordan Valley. 39 Furthermore, this fresh water
used to come out of the ground through springs in the Jordan
Valley; before its emergence it mixed with the brackish water of
deeper ground water strata.40 Thus, these new deep wells not
only take three-quarters of the Basin's water, but take it from
upstream, leaving the residue much more saline. Indeed, con-
current with the use of these deep wells, Palestinian wells in
the vicinity have gone dry or have experienced a reduction in
flow, while wells in the upper Cenomanian Basin have exper-
34 See id.
35 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 558-59. The Western Basin
was once drained by the Yarqon springs near Petah Tikvah (discharge originally
235 mcm/yr) and the more northerly Tanninim springs (discharge originally 100
mcmyr). Owing to the mining of the Western Basin, however, the water level has
dropped significantly, and most of the water that issues must now be pumped.
Currently, the waters of the Western Basin are for the most part pumped from
Israeli wells located in the Lod plain south of Petah Tikvah in central Israel and as
far as Beersheba in the south. The Tanninim waters are pumped from the Sharon
plain, also near the coast. The Northeastern Basin was once drained mainly by
springs in the Beisan (Bet She'an) Valley, the Gilboa springs along the margin of
the Beisan (Bet She'an) Valley, and from the Wadi Fariah springs near Nablus.
With the drop in the water level in this basin, the springs in the Beisan Valley
have experienced a sharp drop in flow, and this drop has been made up by the
pumping of wells in the Beisan and Gilboa areas north of the Green Line. See J.
Schwarz, Water Resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, in JUDEA, SAMA-
RIA, AND GAZA: VIEWS ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 81, 89-91 (Daniel J. Eleazar
ed., 1982).
36 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 89-91. The Eastern Basin is largely drained
by a number of smaller springs near the shores of the Dead Sea and in the Jordan
Valley, as well as further up the western bank of the valley. Id.






1998] NATURAL RESOURCES UNDER OCCUPATION 427
ienced an increase in salinity.41 In 1980, water consumption
"within Judea and Samaria"42 was derived from pumping from
the Jordan River (10 mcm/yr), wells (50 mcm/yr), and springs
(50 mcm/yr). 43
Water Quality. On the whole, the Mountain Aquifer's water
is much less saline and of much higher quality than that of the
Gaza Strip.44 Chloride concentrations near the replenishment
areas, where the water would probably be at its least chlorine
levels, averaged 25-40 parts per million in Jerusalem and the
northern West Bank and 60-80 ppm in Hebron in 1980. 4 5 At
the outlets, which issue the water, the chlorine concentrations
were somewhat higher but for the most part well below the
standard set by the World Health Organization of 1,500 mg/I
chlorides for drinking water.46 While the level of salinity is
lower than Gaza's, the West Bank's water is becoming more
saline.4 7
History. The Western Basin's waters flow westward across
the Green Line, ultimately finding their way to the Mediterra-
nean.48 Its two principal outlets have been the Ras el Ein (Rosh
Ha'ayin) Springs, which fed the El Ouja (Yarkon) River near
Jaffa/Tel Aviv, and the Timsah (Tanninim) Springs and River in
41 See id. Israelis have denied any causal link between these two occurrences.
One Israeli commentator stated that "in a number of cases," the Israeli authorities
admitted the impact of their wells on adjacent Palestinian wells, though they of-
fered replacement water from Mekorot. By doing so, they turned Palestinians
from owners to renters of their natural resources. As for the claim regarding the
upper Cenomanian Basins, some hydrologists state that an impervious strata be-
tween the two sub-basins does not allow for the salinity of one sub-basin to affect
the other, while others counter that the potential existence of fissures in this
strata could create interdependence. See Shuval, supra note 16, at 84-86.
42 Given the estimate of this figure (113 mcmyr) and the political ban on the
use of the word "Palestinian" in official Israeli circles in the early 1980s, this is
probably a reference to Palestinian consumption, although the author does not ex-
plicitly say this.
43 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 91.
44 See id. at 89-90.
45 See id.
46 See id. These exceptions are the Feshkha springs, located near the Dead
Sea and draining the Eastern Basin, with a salinity of 1000-5000 ppm chlorides;
the Tanninim springs in central Israel and draining the Western Basin, with a
salinity of 600-1000 ppm chlorides; and the wells in the Gilboa-Bet She'an areas
draining the Northeast Basin, with a salinity of 80-800 ppm chlorides. Id.
47 See infra Part II.C.
48 See Shuval, supra note 35, at 80.
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the North.49 Historically, Palestinians have made very little
use of these waters for agricultural or commercial purposes, and
most of the waters ultimately fed swamps in the areas adjacent
to the springs.50
Intensive use of these waters began in the 1920s and 1930s
with large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine. 51 These set-
tlers pumped water from the Yarkon River, and dug wells be-
tween Petah Tikva and Hadera to irrigate orange groves in the
area between Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva.52 A Jewish immigrant,
Dr. Pinchas Ruttenberg, was granted an exclusive concession to
use the El Ouja (Yarkon) River for the generation of hydroelec-
tric power and for irrigation by the British Mandatory Govern-
ment in 1920. 53 This license was later expanded to include the
exploitation of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers on March 5,
1926.54 The Mandatory Government also tapped the Ras el Ein
(Rosh Ha'ayin) Springs as the source of water for Jerusalem
and Jewish farmers used the remainder via springs, rivers, and
deep wells. 55 The main Israeli water project utilizing the aqui-
fer is a sixty-six-inch Yarkon-Negev pipeline completed in 1954
that pumped 200 mcmyr, effectively the flow of the Ras el Ein
springs, to the Naqab desert. 56 By the time of the Six-Day War,
the Israelis had fully exploited the aquifer.57
The waters of the Northeastern Basin of the Mountain Aq-
uifer flow naturally northward.58 These waters also cross the
Green Line and flow into the Beisan (Beit She'an) and Jezreal
valleys.59 Waters not used by Palestinian agriculturalists were
49 See id. at 81.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 73, 81.
53 See Shuval, supra note 16, at 81.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 82.
56 See id. at 81-82.
57 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 26. See also The Water Crisis: 25 Years
of Bad Management, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 3, 1990, at 8 (reproducing Israel State
Comptroller's summary of her report on Israel's water situation and stating that
"[i]n 1990, for the first time, the 'red lines' were wittingly crossed in the mountain
aquifer, the main multi-year reservoir and source of drinking water for most of the
large cities. ..).
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used by Jewish farmers in the 1930's.60 Like those of the West-
ern Basin, the Northeastern Basin's waters were pumped at a
rate equal to or exceeding annual replenishment. 61
The Eastern Basin drains naturally towards the Jordan
Valley and the Dead Sea.62 Before 1967, this Basin's waters
were used exclusively by Palestinian agriculturalists, with the
remainder flowing into marshes, the Jordan River, or the Dead
Sea. 63 With the arrival of the Israelis, these waters were more
intensively exploited as deep wells were dug to pump previously
unused fresh water. Most of the water extracted from these
wells is currently given to the Israeli settlers on the West
Bank.64
Israel's over-pumping of the Mountain Aquifer's Western
and Northeastern Basins have caused drops in the water levels
and consequently an increase in salinity. 65 These basins are
surrounded by other water-containing geological formations "in
both the vertical and horizontal planes" which contain saline
water.66 The decrease in the level of water in the fresh water
aquifers, or a decrease in the flow of water from fresh water
sources to brine sources, could in the words of one commentator
disrupt the "delicate hydrodynamic balance between the fresh
and saline water bodies. This balance is maintained as long as
the water table remains above the so-called red line."67 Even
before the intentional crossing of the red lines during the
drought in the late 1980s, the mining of the Western and North-
eastern Basins led to "creeping salination"68 averaging 1-2 ppm/
yr. In the early 1960s, Israel initiated means to limit the over-
pumping of these two basins, and began recharging this Basin




63 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
6 See id.
65 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 93-94.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 93.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 93-94.
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B. Jordan River
Physical Structure and Water Quality. The Jordan Valley
constitutes the other major water system, which is shared by
Palestine and Israel. The river originates in the Huleh Valley in
Israel (the Dan River, averaging 245 mcm/yr); the Lebanon Val-
ley in Lebanon (the Hasbani River, averaging 138 mcmlyr); and
the Golan Heights in Syria (the Banias River, averaging 121
mcm/yr).70 These three tributaries join in the Huleh Valley in
northern Israel, and flow into Lake Tiberias, 71 enclosed within
Israeli-controlled territory.72 The flow of springs and wadis in
the valley add to the waters of the upper Jordan River, bringing
the total annual rechargeable volume to around 650 mcm/yr.73
The Jordan River continues southward from Lake Tiberias in-
side Israeli territory until it reaches the Yarmouk River, whose
annual recharge averages has been estimated at between 400
and 500 mcm/yr.74 These waters of the Lake Jordan headwa-
ters are of high quality and low salinity and are, therefore, use-
ful for agricultural and domestic uses. However, Lake Tiberias,
fed with saline subterranean springs, has considerably higher
salinity (varying between 250-340 ppm as one moves
southward).75
The Yarmouk River is the Jordan River's main tributary,
with a catchment area of 7,252 km2 (eighty percent of which is
in Syria and the Golan Heights), and flows between Jordan and
Syria for 40 km before entering the Jordan River below Lake
Tiberias. 76 The Yarmouk River serves as the natural boundary
between Syria and Jordan.77 The waters of the Yarmouk River
are also low in salinity.78 The portion of the Jordan River south
of its connection with the Yarmouk River serves as the natural
border between Israel and Jordan, and further downstream be-
70 See WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT -OR COOPERATION? 17-19
(Thomas Naff & Ruth C. Matson eds., 1984).
71 Alternatively, the Sea of Galilee in English, or Lake Kinneret in Hebrew.
72 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 17-19.
73 See id.
74 See MIRIAM Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in
the Jordan River Valley 28 (1993); Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 25.
75 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 22-23.
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tween Jordan and the West Bank.79 Its terminus is the Dead
Sea. The water in the lower Jordan is quite brackish,80 coming
as it does from return irrigation flows and saline springs,
though one report estimates that approximately 100 mcn/yr of
this water could be rendered suitable for "development" pur-
poses through the use of the relatively inexpensive reverse-os-
mosis method. 81
TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN8 2
UPPER JORDAN LOWER JORDAN
RIVER AND LAKE RIVER AND DEAD
YARmoUK RIVER TIBERIAS SEA
Length (kin) 40 25 315
Drainage Basin (kin2 ) 7,252 1,00083 17,30084
Egypt 0 0 500
Israel 0 330 2,800
Jordan 1,450 330 12,000
Lebanon 0 330 0
Palestine* 0 0 2,000
Syria 5,802 0 0
Flow (mcm/yr) 400 65085 250-30086
Present Consumption
(mcm/yr)
79 See id. at 22.
80 But see Shuval, supra note 16, at 90 ("[tlhe winter flows [of the Jordan
River] are of better quality and can be used in the Jordan Valley since there is
agricultural production there year round...").
81 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 33-35.
82 All figures relating to Upper Jordan River and Lake Tiberias basin are
based on the map of the Jordan River basin. See Lowi, supra note 74, at map 2.1.
83 Professor Lowi states the size of the Jordan River basin as 18,300 km2 . See
id. at 20. This figure is obtained by subtracting the size of the upper Jordan River
basin. All figures related to the size of the lower Jordan River are based on map of
the Jordan River basin. See id. at map 2.1.
84 The sources of this water are as follows: Hasbani River (headwaters in
Lebanon): 138 mcmyr; Banias River (headwaters in Syria): 121 mcmlyr; Dan
River (headwaters in Israel): 245 mcm/yr; Upper Jordan basin (Israel and Syria):
150 mcm/yr. See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 17-20.
85 As this water is for the most part quite brackish, and since the Palestinian
side of the border was made a Closed Military Area by Israel, the actual use of
these waters is quite low, though some commentators believe that up to 100 mcm/
yr is recoverable from this source through a reverse osmosis process. See Shuval,
supra note 16, at 107.
86 This estimate depends on whether one accepts Israel's claim that it drains
40 mcm/yr into the lower Jordan, or the Arab claim that Israel draws all the
available capacity for its own purposes.
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UPPER JORDAN LOWER JORDAN
RIVER AND LAKE RIVER AND DEAD
YARMOUK RIVER TIBERIAS SEA
Israel 70 610-65087 10?88
Jordan 110-15089 0 0
Palestine 0 0 10?90
(West Bank)




Israel 25 400 C





Syria 90 42 C
Present Uses -Syrian Agricul- -380 mcm/yr -Palestinian Ghor
ture pumped by agriculture?
-Transported via Israel to south -Israeli settlers?
East Ghor Canal via National
to Jordanian Water Carrier
agriculturalists -Israeli consum-
on East Bank of ers in vicinity of
lower Jordan lake
-Israeli agricul- -Domestic and




Human Uses. Almost all of the flow of the upper Jordan
River and Lake Tiberias is used by Israel. 92 Israel's complete
usage is confirmed by both Israeli and Jordanian sources,
though these sources disagree on the amount of water that this
87 See Shuval,, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
88 For conflicting estimates for this figure, see Shuval, supra note 16, at 104-
05 (contrasting United States Army Corps of Engineers estimate with that of
Jordanian academic).
89 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 91 and accompanying text.
90 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 97-98, tbl. 4.4.
91 See id. at 25-28; Shuval, supra note 16, at 101-07. Like Benvenisti &
Gvirtzman, supra note 6, this author, where relevant, gives preference to Israeli
sources. See, e.g., Shuval, supra note 16, at 101 (relying on Tahal Consulting
estimate of Israeli withdrawals from Upper Jordan and Lake Tiberias to exclusion
of Jordanian Prof. E. Salameh). In some cases, where the texts were not explicit, I
made approximations; these are explicitly flagged.
92 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 33.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/3
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use represents. 93 Much of this water is fed into Israel's Na-
tional Water Carrier, which transports it to the Naqab desert
for irrigation purposes. 94 Most of the Yarmouk River's esti-
mated annual yield is diverted or planned for diversion for irri-
gation and hydro-electric power for Jordan and Syria.95 Syria
reportedly withdraws approximately 170 mcm/yr to irrigate ag-
ricultural lands in the vicinity of the Yarmouk River. 96 Jordan
withdraws 100 to 150 mcm/yr (depending on that year's climatic
conditions) to irrigate 12,000 hectares of agricultural lands
along the banks of the lower Jordan River and to supply some
drinking water to Amman. 97 Israel pumps 25 mcm/yr from the
Yarmouk for use by Israeli farmers on the banks of the River,
and in addition some 45 mcm/yr is diverted to Lake Tiberias
during the winter months.98 In any case, very little water is left
to flow into the lower Jordan. The lower Jordan River has a flow
of some 250-300 mcmlyr, which ultimately ends up in the Dead
Sea.99 It is estimated that up to 10 mcm/yr of Jordan River
water is used to supply Palestinian agriculture in the Jordan
Valley. 100 If this is the case, the water is probably obtained from
Mekorot Water Company installations in the valley, perhaps
from the two sites that Palestinians claim are used to pump
water for Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley. 101
History. Under the Ottoman Empire, the waters of the Jor-
dan were used for small-scale irrigation projects.10 2 In 1913,
93 See id. at 32 (reproducing Jordanian estimate of 650 mcm/yr and Israeli
estimate of 570 mcm/yr) (quoting E. Salameh, The Jordan River System, in JOR-
DAN'S WATER RESOURCES AND THEIR FUTURE POTENTIAL (A. Graber & E. Salameh,
eds. 1992)); Schwarz, supra note 18.
94 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 33.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 34. This water is extracted through the use of earthen dams in
the Yarmouk-s tributaries and wells in the Yarmouk groundwater basin. See id.
(quoting G. GRUEN, THE WATER CRISIS: THE NEXT MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (1992)).
This source reports that there is significant disagreement about the exact quanti-
ties withdrawn by Syria. While a 1987 Syrian-Jordanian pact allocated 170 mcml
yr, there are reports of an official Syrian document claiming that Syria withdrew
244 mcm/yr from the Yarmouk River in 1991, and planned to withdraw 366 mcml
yr by the year 2010. See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 34.
97 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 35.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 91.
101 See Shuval, supra note 16, at 89.
102 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 30-33.
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the Director of Public Works in Palestine, Georges Franghia,
first proposed a regional development program to use the river
for hydroelectricity production and for irrigation. ' 0 3 The coming
of the British Mandate ended the possibility of this plan's im-
plementation.' 0 4 Control over Palestine's water fell into the
hands of the British. In the uncertain climate and the tense at-
mosphere provoked by large-scale Jewish immigration and
their demands for water, the British did not engage in any ma-
jor developments. 10 5 However, in 1926, it did award a seventy-
year concession to a Jewish engineer, Pinhas Rutenberg, to use
the Yarmouk and the Jordan to produce hydroelectric power,
after turning down a similar request by a Christian Arab. 10 6
During the 1920's and 1930's, several regional water develop-
ment reports appeared, and they quickly began to take on polit-
ical overtones as they alternatively demonstrated or disproved
the feasibility of large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine. 0 7
The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine specified bor-
ders without regard to the region's water resources.'0 8
In the period following the establishment of the State of
Israel, both Israel and Jordan felt the need for a larger agricul-
tural sector. 10 9 Israel, for a variety of political, strategic, and
ideological reasons, 110 decided that it had to expand greatly the
agricultural sector as the only means of settling new, largely
unskilled immigrants and of establishing its own military and
political presence."' Jordan, burdened with the sudden influx
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees and limited by
its preexisting poverty and lack of economic development, also
felt that it required agriculture to settle and employ its greatly
expanded population." 2 However, Israel was far quicker to de-
velop the Valley. Very early on, its water developments in-
volved violations of the armistices, which it had signed with its





107 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 30-33.
108 See id. at 33.
109 See id.
110 See infra Part III.D.
111 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 33.
112 See id. at 34.
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zones and uprooted and displaced Palestinians from certain ar-
eas. 113 These developments provoked military exchanges and
diplomatic incidents between Israel and Syria.114 Ultimately,
because of Israel's military superiority, it was able to engage in
unilateral development projects, such as the draining of the
Huleh swamp above Lake Tiberias. 115
In October 1953, United States President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower appointed Eric Johnston as special ambassador to medi-
ate a comprehensive plan for regional development of the
Jordan River Basin." 6 The base plan included provisions for
the damming of several of the tributaries and headwaters of the
Jordan River to increase water capture; the generation of hy-
droelectric power; the construction of canals on the east and
west sides of the Jordan Valley, south of the Yarmouk for irriga-
tion purposes; and the construction of canal works in the valley
to take advantage of stream and precipitation flow in the val-
ley. 1 7 For the next two years, Johnston shuttled back and forth
between the Arab states and Israel to attempt to come to an
agreement.1 8 Finally, a Revised Unified Johnston Plan ("John-
ston Plan") was developed. 1 9 While the details have not been
released, we do know that the plan provided for supervision by
a Neutral Engineering Board.' 20 The quotas allocated to each
country are not known precisely, but the various sources come
close to one another in their estimates.' 21 Technical commit-
tees of Israel and the Arab League approved the plan, though in
the last instance the Arab League Council decided not to ratify
the plan on October 11, 1955 as the difficult political situation
in the region did not allow these countries to enter into an open
political agreement with Israel. 122 By 1956, American diplo-
mats had abandoned efforts to reverse this Arab rejection, and
113 See id. at 35.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 33-39.





121 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 79-114.
122 See id.
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by the time of the 1956 Suez War all talk of a regional develop-
ment plan ended. 123
In spite of this official rejection, however, the Arab states
"were determined to adhere to the technical details."124 This is
because the Arab riparian landowners, while unable to formally
recognize or enter into diplomatic relationships with Israel,
were nonetheless eager for a situation of tacit agreement which
would allow them to develop the Jordan Valley's waters without
threat of Israeli strikes.1 25 Thus, unilateral development of the
Jordan River ensued, most notably in construction of the Na-
tional Water Carrier system in Israel and in the initiation of the
Greater Yarmouk project in Jordan. 126 The first part of the lat-
ter project was the construction of the East Ghor Canal, which
by 1966 had been extended down to Wadi Zarqa. 27 The Israeli
National Water Carrier was designed to pump water from the
relatively water-rich north (in particular, from Lake Tiberias)
to the Naqab desert. 128 The Arab League attempted to thwart
this planned extra-basin transfer by attempting to divert some
of the water of the headwaters (in particular, from the Hasbani
and the Banias rivers) to the Yarmouk river, and to store this
new flow behind a new dam to be built at Mukheiba. 129 After
the Arab states began construction of the diversion works,
Israel protested that such a diversion would infringe upon Is-
raeli rights. 130 In a series of military strikes, Israel hit the di-
version works, and in April 1967 carried out air strikes deep
into Syria. 13' This hostility was an important factor in the
build-up to the Six-Day War.' 32
The Six-Day War provided tremendous hydrological bene-
fits to Israel. It occupied the Golan Heights and thus the Banias
headwaters of the Jordan River.' 33 This position also allowed it
123 See id.; Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 39-42; See supra tbl.3.
124 Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 41.
125 See id. at 43-44; See LowI, supra note 74, at 115-144.





131 See Lows, supra note 74, at 115-144.
132 See id; Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 43-44.
133 See Sharif S. Elmusa, The Jordan-Israel Water Agreement: A Model or an
Exception?, 24 J. PALESTINE STUD. 63, 71 (1995).
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to prevent any diversion of water from these headwaters to the
Yarmouk River.' 34 It completely surrounded Lake Tiberias. It
also occupied about half of the length of the Yarmouk River, as
opposed to only 10 km.' 35 This position forced Jordan to aban-
don the bulk of its Greater Yarmouk project, including the
Mukheiba and Maqarin Dams and the West Ghor Canal.' 3
6
Israel, by declaring the West Bank side of the Jordan River a
Closed Military Area, shut down Palestinian consumption of
Jordan River water, thereby destroying 140 pumps in the pro-
cess.' 37 Furthermore, in June and August 1969 Israel attacked
and put out of commission all of the East Ghor Canal in order to
pressure the Jordanian government to crush the Palestinian
guerilla movement in Jordan. However, in the 1970's, the Jor-
dan Valley Commission embarked on a seven-year Ghor devel-
opment program which saw the planning of the Maqarin and
King Talal Dams, smaller projects to capture water in the
wadis, and the construction of subsurface drainage water. 3 8
Once again, the Maqarin Dam plans had to be abandoned after
Israeli opposition caused funding to dry up. Similarly, in 1987,
when Jordan attempted to arrange financing for the al-Wihdah
(Unity) Dam on the Yarmouk River, a smaller version of the
aborted Maqarin Dam, the World Bank conditioned financing
on the agreement to the project of all riparians. 3 9 United
States low-level intervention on Jordan's behalf continued for
around one year before the Gulf War ended any hopes for a ba-
sin-wide agreement. 40
Meanwhile, Israel's occupation of the bank of the Yarmouk
opposite the intake point for the East Ghor Canal had allowed it
to stop efforts by Jordan to clear the silt and the rocks that had
accumulated at the mouth of the Canal.' 4 ' Jordan sought
American mediation in order to allow it to clear the build-up,





138 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 180-81.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 44-53.
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successful. 142 In the meantime, Israel has increased its con-
sumption of Yarmouk River water, so that it reached approxi-
mately 75 mcm/yr, in other words, multiples of its allocation
under the Johnston Plan. 143 Jordan's consumption is far below
its quota under the Plan.144 This is made possible by Israel's
military and political intervention to thwart Jordanian water
development. 145
While efforts at an overt regional settlement ultimately
failed, many have claimed that the final proposal for the parti-
tion of the waters "the so-called Johnston Plan" has come to be
recognized as the de facto guideline for the division of the
River's waters. 146 According to scholars of that period, the West
Bank "then under Jordanian control" received its own allocation
under the agreement. Israel's present consumption of Jordan
River water indicates that it consumes this West Bank alloca-
tion for its own purposes. 147 Present Israeli consumption of Jor-
dan River waters is currently around 690-730 mcm/yr, whereas
under the Johnston Plan its average annual take was around
425 mcm/yr.148 Israel is effectively consuming part or all of the
quotas allocated to Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank, since
the consumption of these countries is less than their quota
under the Plan.149 As explained above, this has almost always
been the direct result of Israeli military interventions designed
to thwart water consumption. 150
The recent Jordan-Israeli peace treaty is the first formal
agreement between Israel and an Arab state on the mutual use
of the Jordan River's waters.' 5 ' The accord promises to Jordan




145 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 171-91; Naff& Matson, supra note 70, at 44-53.
146 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 105 ("[tlhe Johnston Plan became the de facto




149 See supra tbl. 3.
150 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 171-91. See also Naff& Matson, supra note 70,
at 44-53.
151 See Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the
State of Israel, art. 6, ann. II, reprinted in JORDAN TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at 8.
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raeli-Jordanian water resources, though the amount promised
is still less than its quota under the Johnston Plan. 152 It is im-
portant to note that none of this increased amount comes from a
redistribution of the waters of the Jordan River among the two
riparian landowner's, but rather from the development of new
sources of water (such as increased use of the King 'abdallah
Canal and an impounding of the side wadis of the Jordan Val-
ley).153 Fully 23% of the new allocation comes from sources yet
to be determined. 154 Finally, the plan makes no mention of the
other riparian landowner's, especially the Palestinians, who
currently get none of the Jordan River waters and have the un-
fortunate situation of being not only the weakest party in the
basin but also the downstream riparian.155
C. Gaza Aquifer
The aquifer in Gaza consists of three stacked sub-aquifers
lying for the most part near the coast and sloping downwards in
a westerly direction. 156 These start a few meters below sea
level and can reach almost 100 meters in depth. 57 In addition,
a permeable layer exists under Gaza at a depth of 200-300 me-
ters, though this layer contains water that is too saline for
human consumption.1 58
It is estimated that the annual recharge to the aquifer from
rainfall to be on the order of 25 mcm/yr.159 However, this is on
the low end of the spectrum. Other estimates tend to cluster
around the 60 mcm/yr level.' 60 Similarly, estimates for the an-
152 See Elmusa, supra note 133, at 64, 69.
153 See id. at 67-68, 70-71.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See H.J. BRUINS & IR. A. TUINHOF, WATER IN THE GAzA STRIP: HYDROLOGY
STUDY PHASE I at 9-10 (1991).
157 See id.
158 See id. The study states that the salinity of the water in this aquifer de-
creases to 2000 mg/l outside of the Gaza Strip. The World Health Organization
(WHO) recommended upper limit for drinking water salinity is 600 mg/l. See id. at
13.
159 This estimate is from the Bruins & Tuinhof study. See id. at 11. The figure
is based on an estimate of 100 mcm/yr of rainfall on the Gaza Strip and a 25%
rainfall-to-recharge rate for semi-arid regions. Id. The authors of this study ques-
tion the validity of other sources' estimate of an annual replenishment of 40-80
mcmlyr, stating that they "provide no background to these figures." Id.
160 See, e.g., ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 6.
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nual water supply for Gaza vary widely. This is due to different
assumptions experts make about the availability and quantity
of four sources: aquifer replenishment from rainfall, ground-
water draining from the east, the infiltration of Gazan irriga-
tion run-off, and the infiltration of Gazan wastewater. 161
Whatever the replenishment rate, it is clear that at pump-
ing levels of 115 mcm/yr, this aquifer is being severely overex-
ploited. This chronic over-pumping has implications for the
aquifer's water quality and for the likelihood of long-term struc-
tural damage.
Drainage. In 1986, the natural groundwater aquifers of the
Gaza Strip were tapped by an estimated 2,195 boreholes, 162 of
which 2,150 were used for agricultural purposes.163 Three hun-
dred and fifty of these are located in the western part of the
Strip, are relatively shallow (4-20 m), and yield good quality,
non-saline water.' 64 The eastern part of the Gaza Strip con-
tains the great majority of the boreholes, which tend to be
deeper (25-90 m) and yield lower quality water (250-1,500 mg/l
of chlorides).165
Israel has dug a number of new wells on the Israeli side of
the border with the Gaza Strip, which Palestinians claim has
reduced the groundwater flow to the Gaza Strip.166 Israeli hy-
drologists have countered that these deep wells pump from
deeper strata which end up feeding the brackish aquifer under
the Gaza Strip; therefore, this pumping, while depriving Gaza
161 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 12. Experts disagree as to the
amount of water that avoids evaporation and actually recharges the aquifer. Dif-
ferences regarding the last three sources relate more to the desirability of its inclu-
sion. Groundwater draining westward into Gaza originated mostly from the
chemical-intensive agricultural sector in the Naqab desert. Runoff from Gazan ag-
riculture is high in pesticide, herbicide, and fertilizer residues. Untreated Gazan
human wastewater can introduce organic pathogens to groundwater. Therefore,
the inclusion of at least the last two should imply the construction of wastewater
treatment facilities that would make consumption of this water safe. Id. Ground-
water draining from the East is estimated to provide 5-10 mcm/yr; Gazan runoff
and wastewater are estimated to provide 10-20 mcmlyr. Id. Another expert quanti-
fies the amount properly treated Gazan wastewater effluent could contribute at 25-
30 mcmlyr. Id.
162 Schwarz estimated 1600 wells in 1980. See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 99.
163 See BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 155, at 22-23.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See Shuval, supra note 16, at 98.
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of a "few" mcm/yr, would also contribute to a drop in the salinity
of the aquifer. 167 However, given the interlocking and intercon-
nected nature of the various aquifers in and around the Gaza
Strip, there is a high likelihood that a reduction in any inflow of
water would contribute to an increase in the salinity of the aq-
uifer from which Gazans draw their water.168
Israel also has built dams and diversion wells in the Wadi
Gaza drainage basin that have reduced the flood water flow en-
tering the Gaza Strip area that otherwise would be used by Pal-
estinian farmers or contribute to the recharge of the aquifer.
169
One commentator has identified these dams as one of the major
causes of Gaza's water problems. 170 Israeli commentators point
out that the impervious clay strata under most of Wadi Gaza
would largely prevent the water from recharging the aquifer.1 71
Furthermore, they state that Israel takes only 2 mcm/yr from
this source, leaving most of the water to flow into Gaza.
1 72
Quality. Due to extensive over-pumping, the Gaza Aquifer
is threatened with salinification and long-term structural dam-
age. As the water level drops, saline seawater intrudes from the
Mediterranean and brackish water from the aquifer lying below
the freshwater aquifer seeps in as well. In addition, the intense
pumping of the aquifer, combined with the recharge of the aqui-
fer by irrigation and domestic water and the lack of any flush-
ing of water out to sea, has created a "semi-closed system" that
has seen a build-up of salts and nitrates. A damaged aquifer is
exceedingly difficult to repair.
As a result of this process, many of Gaza's artesian wells
have had to be closed because of an excessively high saline con-
tent. In total, about eighty-five percent of Gazan well water is
unfit for human consumption, according to WHO standards.1
73
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the
agency charged with the administration of the refugee camps
that house a third of Gaza's population, has conducted tests
that show that the wells in Breij, Nuseirat and Deir el-Balah
167 See id.
168 See id.




173 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 13.
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refugee camps, located in the central part of Gaza, as well as
Rafah refugee camp, located in the southern end of the Strip
along the Egyptian border, have salinity levels that exceed the
WHO guideline maximum, in some cases by around 100%.174
Salinity levels in the aquifer, already bad, are increasing at
a perceptible and rapid rate. 175 A study reported in 1980 indi-
cated that the salinity levels increased by 20 to 200 mg/ of chlo-
rides over a five-year period and that the salinity could go on
increasing at those rates if levels of over-pumping are
maintained. 76
The levels of nitrates (NO3-) in Gaza's groundwater are also
dangerously high.177 A 1988 UNRWA study has estimated that
the nitrates levels equal or substantially exceed the WHO-rec-
ommended maximum in several of Gaza's refugee camps.' 78
One study attributed these levels to "domestic pollution,"7 9
probably a reference to the lack of human waste treatment facil-
ities in many of Gaza's refugee camps.
History. Interestingly, Gaza's status as the most water-
stressed region in Palestine is a historical novelty. In fact, Gaza
was until this century known for its relatively abundant water
supply, attracting travelers, traders, and armies on their way
to, or coming from, the Sinai desert.180 This abundance only had
meaning in relation to the needs of the local population, which
until this century numbered in the few tens of thousands. With
the huge influx of refugees in 1948 and the explosive population
growth rate, the population in the Gaza Strip had risen to ap-
proximately 750,000 in 1990 and is projected to reach 1,000,000
in the year 2000.181
174 See BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 155, at 13. Particularly badly off are the
Deir el-Balah and Nuseirat refugee camps, with salinity levels around double the
WHO-recommended maximum. Id. at 12. Some of the UNRWA study samples re-
port significant ion imbalances, and thus may overstate the degree of anions such
as chlorides and nitrates. Id. at 11.
175 See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 93-94.
176 See id. (estimating increase in water salinity in Western Basin as 1-2 ppm!
yr on average and as 10 ppm/yr in worst-hit areas).
177 See BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 155, at 12.
178 See id. For a caveat to the reliability of these figures, see supra note 173.
179 BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 155, at 13.
180 See id. at 1.
181 See id. at 20.
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The water situation in the Gaza Strip began deteriorating
before the onset of Israeli occupation, as the pressure of an ever-
increasing population quickly exhausted the Strip's limited
water resources.18 2 As a result of the over-pumping, the water
table has dropped throughout the aquifer, leading to seawater
intrusion.183 This acceleration in the use of the groundwater
ended in the mid-1970s, as military authorities restricted the
drilling of new wells for agricultural purposes.18 4
Whatever problems existed in the past with regard to the
region's water resources, will only worsen in the future. "There
is no solution in sight for the water deficiency problem from the
natural water resources of the area .... Closing the gap be-
tween limited water resources and growing needs will, there-
fore, require large-scale development and huge investments of
capital and know-how." 18 5 The Gaza Strip, due to accidents of
location and because of its population, is experiencing the most
critical water problem in Palestine. It will undoubtedly serve as
the test case of the current political settlement's ability to re-
solve local water allocation problems.
Now that a basic understanding of the physical aspects of
the problem has been provided, the remaining sections will
present the legal analysis.
III. LocAL WATER LAW
For natural resources with economic, political, or strategic
importance, the legal regime of ownership and control rights
can be as important to an understanding of the resource's devel-
opment as its physical characteristics. As shown in Part IV.A
below, an understanding of local law permits the classification
of Palestinian water within the property typology of the Hague
182 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 32 (estimating that during Egyptian
occupation water was pumped at a rate of 120 mcm/yr, as compared to an annual
recharge rate of approximately 60-65 mcm/yr); see also Isam R. Shawwa, The
Water Situation in the Gaza Strip, in WATER: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? (G. Bas-
kin ed., 1992) (stating that between 1948 and 1967, "there was an inadequate con-
trol in the provision of permits for water drilling. As a result the number of bore
holes increased markedly. Farmers drilled and used as much water as they
wanted").
183 See ASSAF ET AL., supra note 16, at 32.
184 See DAVID KAHAN, AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES IN THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA (1967-1987) 25 (1987).
185 Sre Schwarz. supra note 35. at 100.
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Regulations. Once one has an understanding of the legal and
institutional structure of Palestinian water law, one can better
appreciate the fundamental nature of the changes that were
wrought by Israel during its occupation of the OPTs, as dis-
cussed in Part IV.B below.
A. Shari'a and Ottoman Law
Constrained by the aridity of their environment, societies
in the Middle East have long needed to regulate the use of
water. Given the predominance of Islam in these areas, and its
historical role in providing a comprehensive legal system to its
adherents, it is not surprising that water regulation is a compo-
nent of shari'a, or Islamic, law. The centrality and importance
of water regulation to Arab society is reflected in the fact that
the original meanings of shari'a is the "path to the water," or, at
an earlier time, "the law of water."18 6
Shari'a provided four basic principles of law:
1) Water is a gift of God, and belongs in principle to the commu-
nity. This creates a basic right of shafa (drink) in the
community;
2) Value added to water by labor in the form of retaining it in a
recipient and/or through distribution or conservation works
may create a qualified right of ownership. This is particularly
true for irrigation (right of shirb), and will also permit the ap-
propriation of water, which is carried by recipients;
3) Water sharing principles may vary according to local uses, but
the general trend is the acknowledgment of a right of prior ap-
propriation combined with the required distribution of surplus;
4) Liability attaches to withholding or misuse of water, including
for polluting or degrading water. l8 7
At the turn of the twentieth century, Palestine was part of
the Ottoman Empire. The Majalla, the great codification of Is-
lamic law that the Ottoman Empire promulgated in the areas
186 Chibli Mallat, The Quest for Water Use Principles: Reflections on Shari'a
and Customs in the Middle East, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL, POLITICAL
AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS 127, 128 (J.A. Allan & Chibli Mallat eds., 1995) [here-
inafter WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST].
187 Id. at 129-130.
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under its rule in 1883, regulated the use of water in Articles
1234-1326.181
The Majalla reproduced many of the principles of the Is-
lamic law of water mentioned above, in particular the commu-
nal-private ownership distinction. According to this scheme,
water in nature is free for use by the public.18 9 In particular,
water flowing underground is free for public consumption. 190
To become individually private, or mulk, property, the water
must be captured. 19 ' This can be achieved either directly, such
as by pumping the water out of the ground, or indirectly, such
as by placing a vessel out to catch rainwater, but in any case it
must be intentional. 192 Similarly, the water of rivers that do
not get divided into channels is free to use, although when a
river enters into channels, which are owned in shares, then that
river becomes mulk property as well. 193 There exists a principle
that anyone can make use of free property (such as water in
nature), provided that that use does not cause harm to others.
Similarly, a person may not interfere with another's efforts to
capture a free good. 194 All persons have a basic right to drink,
which trumps even mulk property rights. 195
The Majalla is still residual legislation in Palestine and
Jordan. 96 Through this and the influence of civil law systems
such as that of France, the general regime of water law in the
modern Middle East provides that the rights of the state or
community to water come first, whereas those of the individual
or corporations are residual. 197 This communal-private distinc-
tion underlay the water rights regime in both the West Bank
and Gaza at the time of the Israeli occupation in 1967.198 It is
critical, for purposes of the discussion of humanitarian law, to
188 Id. at 130.
189 See THE MEJELLE art. 1234 (C.R. Tyser trans., All Pakistan Legal Decisions
publ., 1967) [hereinafter MAJALLA].
190 See id. art. 1235.
191 See id. art. 1248.
192 See id. arts. 1248, 1250.
193 See id. arts. 1234-35, 1239-39, 1248.
194 See MAJALLA, supra note 188, at 1255.
195 See id. art. 1267-68.
196 See, e.g., Fouad B. Atalla, Jordan, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw at J-27, J-29 (Victor Knapp ed., 1971).
197 See Mallat, supra note 185, at 129-31.
198 See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 23.
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recall that under Ottoman law, this communal right to use and
capture does not mean that title was vested in the state or Sul-
tan.199 There existed a device for this kind of ownership; this
was the same mulk category discussed above.200 Thus, while
rights to free goods were communal, they were also private in
the sense that they did not belong to the state.
B. British Mandate Law
The Ottoman Empire collapsed on October 30, 1918, and
Palestine came under the control of Britain. Palestine came
under the mandate system developed by the League of Na-
tions.201 Palestine became an "A" Mandate (i.e., one of several
"communities that have reached a stage of development where
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally rec-
ognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to
stand alone"). 20 2 The League recognized the right of these re-
gions to sovereignty, which they would assume once it was pos-
sible to establish a national government. 20 3 In the meantime,
however, the Mandatory Power held that region's sovereignty in
trust.20 4 Therefore, the Mandatory Power had the right to en-
act legislation. 20 5
Water-related legislation enacted during the Mandate did
little to change the water ownership regime that existed during
the Ottoman era. Mandatory laws allowed for the continuation
and initiation of drinking and irrigation water production es-
tablishments. However, these establishments remained organ-
ized at the local level, with no provision made for national
planning. The major changes occurred in the creation of au-
thority, vested in the High Commissioner and persons under his
authority, to allow entry onto private land for the purposes of
199 See id.
200 See id. (describing Sultan's title to mulk lands obtained by virtue of his
conquest of area).
201 See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, 1.
202 Id. art. 22, 4.
203 See ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 42
(1978).
204 See id. (quoting decisions of the International Court of Justice and opinio
juris).
205 See id. at 43.
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water exploration, 20 6 to restrict pumping in areas used by
projects engaged in the production of water for domestic use,20 7
to undertake irrigation and other water-related development
schemes, 208 and to prevent flooding and erosion. 20 9 While these
laws differ in their effect, they all contain provisions that re-
quire the High Commissioner to provide notice to affected land-
owners and water consumers of any projects or actions
undertaken by the High Commissioner, and also to compensate
them for any harm they suffer. Also, should an affected prop-
erty owner wish to dispute the adequacy of compensation, the
laws make provisions for appeal to the High Commissioner.
C. Jordanian and Gaza Law
As Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, and as
Palestinians increasingly resisted overt Zionist ambitions in
Palestine, Britain became increasingly unwilling to administer
the country. Therefore, on February 14, 1947, Britain an-
nounced its intention to terminate its mandate over Palestine,
and referred the question to the newly formed United Nations.
On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly voted in favor of
the Palestine Partition Plan, which divided the country into
Arab and Jewish states. 210 Arab states, as well as Palestinians,
widely disputed the legitimacy of this plan, and fighting in the
area soon followed the General Assembly action. Arab irregu-
lars, and in 1948 regular armies, intervened (though none went
beyond the U.N. Partition Plan lines). On May 15, 1948, the
date of the completion of the British Mandate, Israel declared
its independence. By 1949, Israel and the surrounding Arab
states agreed on Armistice Lines that remained the de facto bor-
ders between Israel and the surrounding states until 1967. Jor-
dan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt incorporated the Gaza
206 See Law No. 2 of 1938, Law for the Exploration of Water Resources, 757
PALESTINE GAZETTE (Supp. 1), Feb. 10, 1938.
207 See Law No. 17 of 1937, Law for the Protection of Public Water Works, 711
PALESTINE GAZE'rE (Supp. 1), Aug. 19, 1937.
208 See Law No. 15 of 1942, (Surface) Water Distribution Law, 1204 (Supp. 1)
PALESTINE GAZETTE, June 24, 1942.
209 See Law No. 12 of 1941, Flooding and Erosion (Prevention) Law, PALESTINE
GAZETTE (Extraordinary Issue of May 1, 1941 Supp. 1), Mar. 10, 1941.
210 G-A- R.s. 181. U.N. GAOR. 2d Spss.. 121-50 IT.N. Dor- A/181 (1947).
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Strip as a separate administrative unit separate from the Egyp-
tian state's structures.
The question of whether Jordanian laws have legitimacy in
the West Bank is, therefore, not readily apparent from a theo-
retical perspective; nonetheless, many Palestinians accept the
legitimacy and applicability of at least some Jordanian laws (if
not the entirety of the Jordanian legal regime) in the West
Bank without controversy.2 11 There are two possible explana-
tions for the legitimacy of Jordanian law. The first is that the
nature of Jordan's administration of the West Bank rendered it
something more than a mere belligerent occupant, and there-
fore gave it some power to enact changes to the local law re-
gime. This first explanation is fraught with theoretical and
political difficulty. Another, more palatable explanation is that
Jordan, as a belligerent occupant within the traditional mean-
ing of the term, had the power to change the regime of local
laws if in doing so it served public order and the civil life of the
local population.212 Given the procedural background of the ad-
ministration of the Jordanian state as a whole and of the enact-
ment of legislation in particular, the laws that Jordan enacted
during the period of its occupation are of greater legitimacy
than those enacted in most other periods of occupation.
The process of Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, and
of its subsequent conduct of affairs, at least formally, has the
appearance of basic legitimacy.213 As mentioned above, Jor-
dan's forces crossed into the West Bank on May 18, 1948. The
western border of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as delim-
ited in the 1946 action by the Council of the League of Nations
211 For example, in his classic treatment of Israeli legal practices under occu-
pation, Raja Shehadeh, a leading Palestinian lawyer, accepts the applicability of
Jordanian law in the areas of land and water (among others) without question.
See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 64. "The law that applied to the West Bank when
Israel occupied it in 1967 was Jordanian law. The Jordanian courts had sole juris-
diction over all residents of the West Bank in civil and criminal matters." Id.
212 These are the powers of a belligerent occupant delineated under Article 43
of the Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention. See infra Part
IV.B.
213 For a brief overview of the process of the incorporation of the West Bank
into Jordan and the gradual process of replacement of Mandate law with
Jordanian law, see Walid al-'asali, The Legal System in the West Bank: 1948-67, in
AYY NITHAM QANOONI LI-FILASTIN? [WHICH LEGAL SYSTEM FOR PALESTINE?] at 11,
11-12 (Birzeit University Law Center eds., 1995).
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to grant independence to Trans-Jordan, was the Jordan River;
therefore, Jordan did not have sovereignty over the West
Bank.214 The next day, however, the forces declared their au-
thority in the West Bank pursuant to the Jordanian Defense
Law of 1935. On October 1, 1948, a conference of 5,000 West
Bank notables,215 held in the West Bank town of Jericho, ac-
claimed Jordan's King 'abdallah as the sovereign of Arab Pales-
tine. King 'abdallah welcomed the proclamation, stating that
the Jericho Conference's statement was an expression of the
will of "the majority of the people in Palestine to unite the two
sister countries."216 Military rule continued until November 2,
1949, at which point the King assumed the powers of the Brit-
ish King and Mandate's High Commissioner. In 1950, general
elections conducted on both sides of the Jordan River sent dele-
gates to the Jordanian Parliament.217 This Parliament, with
representatives from both the West and East Banks, passed a
resolution endorsing the union, and on January 1, 1952, a Con-
stitution incorporating the two banks of the Jordan River was
passed.218 According to a citizenship law passed soon thereaf-
ter, persons from both the East and West Banks were to be citi-
zens of the kingdom. 21 9 Many of the Justice Ministers under
Jordanian rule were Palestinian. 220
There are many reasons to dispute Jordan's claim to title
over the West Bank under these circumstances. When a power
can station its army on the land of another and produce some of
the formal requirements for a transfer of sovereignty, and then
actually become the territory's sovereign, widespread abuse by
expansionist states will result. These fears are borne out by the
214 See GERSON, supra note 202, at 40-76.
215 The population of the West Bank at the time was around 465,000. See
MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLI-
CIES 2 (1984).
216 See GERSON, supra note 202, at 77 (quoting Policy Statement of the Govern-
ment of Trans-Jordan adopted by the Council of Ministers, Dec. 7, 1948, affd,
Trans-Jordan's Parliament, Dec. 13, 1948).
217 See id. at 79.
218 See id. at 76-78; al-'asali, supra note 212, at 1-2.
219 Jordanian Citizenship Law of 1954, 1171 A1-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah lil-
Mamlakah al-Urduniyyah al-Hashimiyyah [Jordanian Official Gazettel, Feb. 16,
1954.
220 Telephone interview with Dr. Ghassan Faramand, Associate Director,
Birzeit University Law Center, April 9, 1996.
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events leading to Jordan's annexation. For example, many dis-
pute the authenticity of the vote of support at the Jericho Con-
ference, seeing it rather as the outcome of coercion by Jordanian
forces. Additionally, even if one were to accept the genuineness
of this expression, it is unclear that 5,000 notables could decide
the fate of the West Bank, since post-World War II practice has
traditionally been to resolve questions of such import through
the use of countrywide referenda. Moreover, one can also dis-
pute the exact nature of the expression at the Conference. For
example, Gerson has argued that, in light of Arab League posi-
tions on the intervention in Palestine, the Conference's declara-
tion was probably not an expression of a desire to transfer
sovereignty wholly and permanently. 'What seems more prob-
able is that the intent was to cede sovereignty temporarily to
Jordan until such time as the indigenous population might find
it opportune to reassert control."221
It would perhaps be more prudent, both doctrinally and po-
litically, to consider Jordan's assertion of sovereignty over the
West Bank void ab initio, and to characterize its presence in the
West Bank as that of a belligerent occupation. Nevertheless,
under a Hague Regulations Article 43 analysis, it appears that
the changes that it had enacted to Palestinian water law can be
justified. Under that provision, Jordan has the duty to restore
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while
respecting, to the extent possible, existing law. It has the right
to change local laws if such change furthers these goals. 222
Jordanian water laws of the pre-1967 era, on their face, display
none of the features that would render them suspect under an
Article 43 analysis. In fact, its early water right registration
law of 1952 sought to provide a central registry (and thus pro-
tection under Jordanian law) for water rights that predated
Jordanian rule. Its 1966 law, which established the Natural
Resources Authority, enacted provisions that were also consis-
tent with the material well being of the Palestinian population.
It created a permit system for the digging of new wells, which
was essential for the protection of the quality of underground
aquifers. It created a Natural Resources Authority, which was
meant to assist municipalities in the provision of drinking and
221 GERSON, supra note 202 at 79.
222 See infra Part IV.B.
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irrigation water. Water production and distribution was to be
decentralized, with municipal utilities playing a major role at
the local level. Finally, provisions that barred out-of-basin
water transfers did not permit exploitation of the West Bank by
East Bank agriculturalists. On their face, at least, 1967-era
Jordanian water laws were consistent with the needs of the lo-
cal population of the time and with the need to provide some
sort of regulation of ever-expanding use of the region's under-
ground resources.
In addition to their substantive acceptability, Jordanian
laws passed during the time preceding Israeli occupation enjoy
a procedural pedigree that laws from few other belligerent occu-
pations can match. While no one can claim that Jordan, at the
time, was a liberal democracy, it is undeniable that Palestini-
ans gained citizenship in vast numbers and participated in
Jordanian non-royal government at the highest levels, such as
the position of Justice Minister. During the time of Jordanian
rule, "Jordan administered the West Bank peacefully, without
interruption and without protest, as an integral part of its king-
dom." 223 According to one political scientist, Palestinians ex-
tended Jordanians a "conditional legitimacy" and skilled
manpower in return for which the central authorities in Am-
man tended to place Palestinians in senior posts directly related
to West Bank problems and allowed Palestinians some opportu-
nities for movement and advancement in the economic and
political spheres. 224 The resultant input from the governed
gives Jordanian law some measure of legitimacy that no Israeli
military order, for example, can claim. 225 The procedural his-
tory of the unification of the two banks; the participation of
Palestinians in government; and the general application of
Jordanian laws to both sides of the Jordan River,226 while indi-
vidually not enough to legitimate the application of Jordanian
223 See GERSON, supra note 202, at 78.
224 See SHAUL MisHAL, EAST BANK/WEST BANK: THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN,
1949B67, at 8, 16, 22 (1978).
225 See id. at 22.
226 It is instructive to compare these facts with the West Bank's relationship
with its subsequent occupier. Israel never annexed the West Bank. Its rule was, by
Israel's own terms, military. Palestinians in the West Bank do not vote in Israeli
elections, and the military orders that Israel promulgates in the West Bank are
not applied in Israel.
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laws, culminate in a general acceptance of the legitimacy of
Jordanian legal regime in the West Bank. 227 As a result, promi-
nent West Bank Palestinian lawyers, legal academics, and
human rights activists respect them as the law of the land un-
critically and uncontroversially.22
Now that I have shown the legitimacy of Jordanian law, or
at least Jordanian water laws, I will proceed with an analysis of
the changes that Jordanian law brought to the West Bank legal
regime. The story of Jordan's regulation of water and water
rights is one of a transition from a regime in which water rights
were private and regulation was decentralized to one where
water rights were state-owned and management was central-
ized. In 1952, at the time of the passing of Law for the Settle-
ment of Titles to Land and Water,229 rights to water flowing
from wells or springs were considered attached to the land and
can be registered in a national register. At that time, there ex-
isted no centralized authority to manage Jordan's water re-
sources. By 1983, however, the Water Authority Law230
nationalized all water in Jordan, whether surface or subterra-
nean, and established a national and centralized water man-
agement authority. At the time of the occupation, Jordanian
law was still undergoing this transition. It is, therefore, impor-
tant for purposes of ascertaining local law, to know the nature
of water law and water-related institutions on June 7, 1967.
Prior to the Israeli occupation, water on a piece of land or
extractable through a spring or well located on that land was
the private property of that land's owner. This was simply the
law of the Majalla, which the Hashemite Kingdom continued to
227 See MIsHAL, supra note 223, at 22.
228 See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 64; al-'asali, supra note 212, at 1-2; Fara-
mand, supra note 219; Mona Rishmawi, The Administration of the West Bank, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 267,
270 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). Raja Shehadeh is a prominent Ramallah lawyer,
and one of the founders of A1-Haq/Law in the Service of Man, a leading West Bank
human rights organization that has long advocated for the rights of Palestinians.
Walid al-'asali is a former chief of the bureau of West Bank lawyers. Dr. Ghassan
Faramand is Associate Director of the Law Center of Birzeit University. Mona
Rishmawi is a human rights activist and former executive director of Al-Haq.
229 Qanun Taswiyat al-Aradi wal-Miyah [Law for the Settlement of Titles to
Land and Water], Law No. 40 of 1952, 1113 JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE 279,
June 16, 1952.
230 Qanun Sultat al-Miyah [Water Authority Law], Law No. 34 of 1983, 3194
JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 1983.
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enforce at the time of its independence. In 1952, Jordan
launched an attempt to create a centralized registry where title-
holders could register all rights to land and water in the King-
dom.231 This law directly recognized that there was a private
right to water that was captured on land and that these rights
came with the land.232 Water that was subject to registration
included:
rivers, streams, channels, pools, springs, lakes, springs, wells, wa-
terfalls, dams, or storage tanks, or any canal, ditch, drainage
channel, dry water bed, bank, bridge, or passage, any building to
control or divert water, well or other means to extract, lift, or
pump water, or auxiliary works of any kind employed to obtain,
lift, pump, and use water primarily for purposes of irrigation or
drainage. 233
Persons who owned irrigated land near a river had the right to
a part of the river's waters in proportion to the size of his or her
land. If, however, the portion that resulted exceeded that land-
owner's needs, then the surplus was distributed to the other ri-
parian's with the owner receiving compensation. 234 We see
quite clearly the Ottoman principles of ownership by capture;
the duty to release surplus water; and the non-ownership of free
water. Despite the efforts to register land and water rights, by
1967 only one-third of all land in the West Bank had been regis-
tered, and therefore approximately one-third of Palestinian
water use (which as we saw above constituted only a fraction of
total water flow from the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan
River) had been claimed.235
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were attempts to increase
regulation of the use of water. Law No. 31 of 1953 regulated the
initiation of irrigation schemes and required developers of such
schemes to obtain the permission of the manager of the Depart-
ment of Irrigation and Water. The Department routinely
granted such permission, except in cases where the use of water
for irrigation would cause damage to adjacent public or private
231 See Law for the Settlement of Titles to Land and Water, supra note 228.
232 See id. art. 17(1) (prohibiting separation of ownership interest in water on
land from ownership interest in land itself).
233 Id. art. 2. (emphasis added).
234 Id. art. 8(5).
235 See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 23.
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property. Law No. 51 of 1959 repealed all water legislation and
created the Central Water Authority.236 Law No. 11 of 1965 es-
tablished the Regional Jordanian Authority to Exploit the Wa-
ters of the Jordan River.
The 1960s saw the promulgation of laws reflecting the
growing awareness of the need for regional and national man-
agement of water resources. In 1966, the Jordanian govern-
ment again replaced the jurisdiction of the Central Water
Authority with that of the Natural Resources Authority. This
law charged the Authority with the design and operation of irri-
gation and drinking water projects (except in areas covered by
the Jordan River Authority), as well as the elaboration of a na-
tional water policy for consideration by the cabinet. The law
establishing this authority also declared natural resources to be
public property. However, the provision enacting this nationali-
zation failed to mention water in the list of resources that was
to be nationalized. 237 Order No. 88 of 1966, issued pursuant to
authority granted in the Natural Resources Law of 1966, main-
tained private rights to water pumped from an aquifer underly-
ing private land and regulated the procedure for obtaining a
license for drilling a new well, thus enlarging the scope of the
regulatory powers of the state. Water quotas used for irrigation
ran with the land, while water quotas for other purposes were
alienable. The Order gave the Deputy Chairman of the Natural
Resources Authority the power to restrict the water produced
from any given pump and to mandate the metering of these
pumps. Additionally, the Order required that the Chairman
register these restrictions. 238 Many of the functions related to
the management of irrigation and the provision of supplies to
municipalities rested with local authorities. 239
236 Law No. 51 of 1959, 1465 JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETrE 4, Jan. 2, 1960.
237 Qanun Tantheem Shu'un al-Masadir al-Tabi'iyyah al-Mu'aqqat [Provi-
sional Law on the Regulation of Natural Resources], Law No. 37 of 1966, arts. 3,
14(a), 30, 1931 JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE 1113, June 16, 1966 [hereinafter Nat-
ural Resources Law of 1966]. While not declaring underground or river waters to
be public property, it also did not declare them to be private property.
238 Nitham Muraqabat al-Miyah al-Jawfiyyah [Order for the Monitoring of Un-
derground Waters], Order No. 88 of 1966, arts. 8-15, 1943 JORDANIAN OFFICIAL
GAZErrE 1592 [hereinafter Order for the Supervision of Underground Water].
239 See Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the Occupied Pales-
tinian and Other Arab Territories: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR
Economic and Social Council, 39th Sess., Annex, 24, U.N. Doc. A/39/326 (1984)
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Thus, in 1967, the West Bank was characterized by a sys-
tem of decentralized management of water resources and pri-
vate ownership of water resources. It is critical to understand
that whether or not Jordanian law in general, or Jordanian
water laws specifically, were legitimate, this basic scheme was
in conformance with the principles of Ottoman and Mandate
law. In other words, whether one looks to the laws of the
Hashemite regime or to its predecessors for a basis, one must
endorse the de facto legitimacy of the operation of Jordanian
law. Another critical point is the fact that the relevant distinc-
tion under Ottoman (and thus Jordanian) water law is not be-
tween private and state water, but rather between private and
mubah water. According to the Majalla, unclaimed water in
streams, rivers and underground aquifer are not the property of
the Sultan or of the state (in other words, mulk waters) but
rather are "free to be used by all."240 These waters were, thus,
owned in common by all the members of the community. They
were, nonetheless, private in the sense that the owners were
private individuals and not the state.
Like the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, governed by an admin-
istrative unit of the Egyptian government, engaged in no signif-
icant changes to its water laws. In the Gaza Strip, no
generalized government-administered water permit system ex-
isted. 24 1 Gazan customary water law conferred the right to use
water upon the landowner and upon those needing it for basic
necessities (personal consumption and irrigation).242 Gazans
could freely enter into private arrangements for the purchase or
use of these water rights. 243
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General 1984]. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Law of 1966, supra note 136, 242, art. 14(f) (allocating responsibility to Jordanian
Natural Resources Authority to help villages and municipalities in provision of
water for domestic and municipal needs); Law for the Regulation of Drinking
Water for the District of Jerusalem, Law No. 9 of 1966, art. 3, 1954 JORDANIAN
OFFICIAL GAZETTE 284, Feb. 2, 1966 (establishing Jerusalem District Water Under-
taking responsible for provision of water for domestic and municipal uses).
240 MAJALLA, supra note 188, arts. 1234, 1238.
241 See Jeffrey D. Dillman, Water Rights in the Occupied Territories, J. PALES-
TINE STuD., Autumn 1989, at 46, 52.
242 See id. See also supra Part II.C (stating that sudden rise in Gaza's popula-
tion led to increase in well-digging and water pumping in Gaza and overuse of
aquifer); Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 238, at 17.
243 See Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 238, at 17.
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As I show below, Israel, by extending its internal water
legal regime to the OPTs, in some instances radically altered
this regime after the occupation. 24 In other areas, the Israelis
continued the operation of some aspects of Jordanian law,
though they used these provisions not as a means of serving the
needs of the local population, but rather as a means of tightly
controlling Palestinian consumption of water in order to privi-
lege the needs of Israel proper and of Jewish settlers.
D. Israeli Law
Israel, keenly aware of the aridity of historic Palestine,
early in its history adopted a holistic view of water resource
management. 245 In 1959, Israel passed its Water Law, a com-
244 See id. ("[tihe extension of such legislation to the occupied territories also
has brought an appreciable change in the legal character and economic and social
value of land ownership. . ").
245 Indeed, this keen attention dates to the early decades of the Zionist move-
ment. In 1919, Chaim Weizmann, a leader of the Zionist movement, wrote to the
prime minister of Britain, then the mandatory authority of Palestine, while he
attended the post-World War I Paris Peace Conference. In his letter, he set forth
his "requirements" for the creation of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine:
The whole economic future of Palestine is dependent upon its water sup-
ply for irrigation and for electric power, and the water supply must be
mainly be derived from the slopes of Mount Hermon, from the headwaters
of the Jordan and from the Litany [sic] river [in Lebanon]... [We consider
it essential that the Northern Frontier of Palestine should include the
Valley of the Litany, for a distance of about 25 miles above the bend, and
the Western and Southern slopes of Mount Hermon.
Dillman, supra note 240, at 48 (quoting Weizmann letter to Lloyd George, re-
printed in JEWISH OBSERVER AND MIDDLE EAST REV., Nov. 16, 1973, at 22). See
also Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 35 (detailing completion of "All Israel Plan"
for water within three years of establishment of state).
While the Zionist movement did not obtain quite as broad an expanse of terri-
tory from the European imperial powers, they were later able to increase their
access to regional water resources through military conquest. See Aaron Wolf, The
Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 919 (1992) (describing relationship between 1967 armistice lines and regional
water resources). Several scholars have put forth the theory of Israel's "hydraulic
imperative" to continue occupying lands in order to satisfy Israel's ever-expanding
water needs. See generally John Cooley, The War Over Water, 54 FOREIGN POLICY 3
(1984); Joe Stork, Water and Israel's Occupation Strategy, MERIP REPORTS, 1983, at
19; Thomas Stauffer, The Price of Peace, the Spoils of War, AMERICAN-ARAB AF-
FAIRS, 1982, at 43 (stating that half of Israeli water consumption consists of water
either diverted or preempted from Arab sources located outside 1967 borders). For
official Israeli positions on the value of the West Bank in Israel's national water
scheme, see Lea Levavi, Eitan: "We Must Control Territories Water Sources," JERU-
SALEM POST INT'L, Sept. 1, 1990, at 6 (detailing proposal by Agriculture Minister
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prehensive water-regulating statute.246 This and other laws
made all surface and underground water in Israel the property
of the state and expressly disassociated water rights from rights
to land.247 The law vested ultimate policy control over Israel's
water sector in the Minister of Agriculture, 248 and created the
position of Water Commissioner, to be filled by government ap-
pointment, to manage the state's water affairs. 249 Israeli water
legislation introduced
a very extensive system of central government control, whereby
both surface and underground water can be abstracted and used
only under a government permit and strictly for the indicated
purposes in the area concerned and within the limits of the alloca-
tion envisaged. Metering of groundwater abstracted from wells
and of surface water is also extensively practiced and strictly
enforced. 250
The law empowered national water administrators to make
decisions regarding the physical allotment of water to various
Rafael Eitan before Israeli cabinet to maintain control over West Bank water re-
gardless of political developments in the region); Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at
n. 56 (stating former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's view at time of
Camp David talks that one of three principles upon which autonomy for Palestine
must rest is full control of West Bank water resources). However, others, while not
disputing water as one of several factors in its expansion, challenges the claim that
it can independently motivate the expansion. See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at
57 (describing regional water as secondary but significant factor in Israel's territo-
rial expansion, serving to exacerbate already existing tensions); Thomas Stauffer,
Arab Waters in Israeli Calculations: The Benefits of War and the Costs of Peace,
ISRAEL AND ARAB WATER 75, 78-80 (Abdel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyeh eds.,
1985) (describing Israeli occupation of Litani River region of southern Lebanon
and topological barriers to Israeli exploitation of river).
246 See Water Law, 13 L.S.I. 173, §§ 1-159 (1959) (Isr.) [hereinafter Water
Law].
247 See id. at §§ 1-3.
248 See id at § 21. Other ministries had relatively marginal influence in the
water sector. See, e.g., id at § 49 (granting Ministry of Interior consultative role in
creation of regional water authority). See id. at § 140 (ordering Ministry of Justice
to establish tribunal or tribunals for water affairs).
249 See Water Law at § 138.
250 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 238, at 15. See also Water
Law § 21 ("[tlhe Minister of Agriculture may, after consultation with the Water
Board, prescribe [binding] norms for the quantity, quality, price, conditions of sup-
ply and use of water within the scope of the purpose thereof. . . "); Id. at §§ 23-24.
"A person shall not produce water from a water resource ... and shall not supply
water . . . [without] a license from the Water Commissioner .... A production
license shall indicate the quantity of water which the holder is permitted to pro-
duce and supply per hour, per day, per season or within any other period .... Id.
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regions of the country and to different use-sectors in Israel.25 1
The Ministry of Agriculture could empower corporations to be
the National Water Authority, charged with the operation of
the National Water System, and any regional water authorities
as may be required. 252 The Ministry of Agriculture had the
power to prescribe rules for the calculation of water charges 253
and of water tariffs. 25 4 The law also created an Adjustment
Fund to "reduce the differences between water charges in differ-
ent parts of the country ...,,25 Levies and contributions were
to be paid to the Fund from relatively privileged water users
and from "other sources," while subsidies were granted to differ-
ent classes of users. The Ministry of Agriculture determined the
levy and subsidy rates and targets, with input from the Water
Board and water consumers. 256 Jurisdiction over disputes con-
cerning administrative decisions lay with the Tribunal for
Water Affairs. 25 7
Given this public ownership regime for the Israel's water
resources, it is appropriate that Israel should have fashioned a
political apparatus to allow for the input, at the regional, local,
and users' levels, into the management of that water.258 This
political apparatus includes: the Water Board (including its re-
gional, agricultural, and water supply committees), 259 the re-
gional water authorities, 260 and others.
As public choice theorists would suggest, rent-seeking polit-
ical actors have captured this economic power over the water
sector. The farming caucus in the Israeli Knesset has tradition-
251 See Water Law at §§ 6, 21.
252 See id. at §§ 46, 48, 50.
253 See id. at § 111 ("[sluch rules shall be based on the actual expenses of the
production and supply of the water, including interest, depreciation and other
expenses").
254 See id. at § 112 (allowing application of tariffs generally or to a specific
area or class of consumers, and allowing variation of charges on basis of "Water
purposes, uses of water, other than agricultural uses, . . .and geographical, topo-
logical and other data, having regard to [system profitability and] to the financial
position of the persons consuming water... .
255 Id. at § 116.
256 See id. at §§ 117-24.
257 See id. at § 140.
258 See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 238, at 25-26.
259 See Water Law at § 116.
260 See id. at § 134.
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ally controlled the water committee, 26 1 and in this capacity has
set prices for water consumers in the agricultural sector. As
might be imagined, this caucus has obtained great subsidies for
the Israeli farming sector, leading to profligate consumption
and the creation of economically unfeasible crops. 262 This struc-
ture is unworkable in an arid region and has, in fact, created
the water crisis in Israel and Palestine. 263
However, it is possible that this caucus would not have
been so successful had there not been an endorsement of this
policy from the Israeli state as a whole. Israel has long consid-
ered the attraction of Jewish immigrants to the country and
their dispersion to settlements throughout the lands that it had
occupied a key strategic goal. 264 In this, it has been motivated
by a need to establish a de facto Jewish presence in as much of
the territory as possible in the hopes of countering historic Pal-
estinian claims to the land. In addition, these settlements serve
military and strategic goals. These settlements obviously need
water for domestic consumption, although in many cases "such
as those of the Naqab desert in the south" these have also been
accompanied by significant agricultural undertakings. Indeed,
the involvement of Jews in agriculture has assumed an almost
mystical quality, as many deem it a process of re-acquaintance
?61 See What to Do About Water, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 4, 1991, at 4; Kito
Schwartz, The Water Crisis: 25 Years of Bad Management, JERUSALEM POST, Jan.
3, 1991, at 8 (summarizing report by the Israeli State Comptroller strongly criticiz-
ing Agriculture Ministry's management of Israeli water sector) [hereinafter Israeli
State Comptroller Report].
262 See Israeli State Comptroller Report, supra note 260 (criticizing water sub-
sidies and resultant phenomenon of "exporting water at a loss").
263 See id. ("[tihe water crisis is not the result of natural causes; it is man-
made"). There have been calls for a change in this structure, in particular getting
control over water pricing out of the hands of the Agriculture Ministry or the
Water Commission and into the jurisdiction of a "professional and impartial gov-
ernment body" which would set prices with consideration for the needs of the econ-
omy as well as for the quality of drinking water for domestic consumption. Id. See
also What to Do About Water, supra note 260, at 4.
264 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 51-52 (describing role of policy of dispersion and
its centrality in Israeli national policy). See also Report of the Secretary-General
1984, supra note 238, at 11 & n. 3 (quoting Israeli Water Commissioner as stat-
ing in 1978 that to "divert water from production to domestic consumption in an
amount that is equivalent to one third of the water consumed by agriculture today
will entail ... an injury to the policy of population dispersion"); What to Do About
Water, supra note 260, at 4 (quoting former Israeli Agriculture Minister Avraham
Katz-Oz describing Zionist agricultural policies as a "national, political and secur-
ity policy matter").
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and spiritual investment in the land.265 All of this means a
large demand for water and the need to control the limited re-
sources that exist in the area of historic Palestine in order to
divert as great a part of it as possible to these policies. These
goals in particular have implications for the future of Palestin-
ian water resources in the West Bank, since these provide about
a third of total Israeli water consumption. 266 This ideology has
been subject to criticism even within Israel because of its disas-
trous impact on local water policy, 267 although the Israeli public
seems unaware or unconcerned about the implications for the
Palestinian water sector.
E. Administrative Structure of Water Management
As mentioned above, Israel had a highly centralized water
management system,268 with overall responsibility resting with
the Ministry of Agriculture. 26 9 The Water Commission was
charged with the implementation of water law. It was responsi-
ble for the planning, management, and supervision of all water-
related matters. Within the commission, different divisions
were responsible for different functions such as allocation, li-
265 See also What to Do About Water, supra note 260, at 4 ("[t]he development
of agriculture and the subsidization of farming settlements have always been sa-
cred cows, a sine qua non of Zionism").
266 In commenting on the importance of OPTs to Israel, Jehoshua Schwarz, a
water resources engineer with TAHAL Consulting Engineers, wrote in May 1980:
"One of the major problems in cutting these [Occupied Palestinian areas] from the
other parts of the country is that of water resources." J. Schwarz, Water Resources
in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, in JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA: VIEWS ON
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 81 (Daniel J. Eleazar ed., 1982).
267 See What to Do About Water, supra note 260, at 4 ("[wlhile 'redemption of
the land' and 'dunam here and dunam there' were constructive and vital slogans in
the days of the British Mandate, they are irrelevant in a sovereign state .... For
the taxpayer to subsidize farm products which sell for less than the cost of the
water used to irrigate them is not a national duty but economic nonsense, and
indeed suicide").
268 For a general overview of Israeli policymaking in the water sector, see
Itzhak Galnoor, Water Policymaking in Israel, 4 POL'y ANAL. 339 (1978).
269 In July 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu's government announced the formation
of the Ministry of National Infrastructures with extensive authority in the water
and sewage spheres. This Ministry has authority over supply of nonagricultural
water, as well as the powers of the Water Commission, the Lake Kinneret Admin-
istration, and the National Sewage Administration. Authority over the conduct of
negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and neighboring states also rested
with that Ministry. Critically, control over the bulk of Israel's water "that con-
sumed in agriculture" remained with the Ministry of Agriculture.
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censing, data collection and management, and efficient utiliza-
tion. The National Water Council, two-thirds of which was
composed of representatives of the general public and the other
third from the government, advised the minister of Agricul-
ture.27 0 Two other important bodies were the Mekorot Water
Co. Ltd.271 and the Water Planning for Israel Company
(Tahal).272 Mekorot was responsible for the construction of irri-
gation and water supply projects as well as overall construction,
operation and maintenance of water systems, and Tahal for the
overall planning and design of Israeli water development
projects.27 3 They carried out these functions in the OPTs as
well. These parastatal firms were owned by the Israeli state,
the General Federation of Workers in Eretz Israel (Histradut),
the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish National Fund.2 7 4 The lat-
ter two firms were commanded by their respective constitu-
tions, however, to serve the interests of Jews, and not of Israelis
or of persons under the jurisdiction of Israel.275 This has led to
a situation where "the companies which plan, design, and con-
struct water projects [in the OPTs] are controlled by groups
which serve only [Israeli] people."276
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMANTARLA.N LAW
The OPTs came under Israeli occupation during the Six-
Day War of June 1967. As a result, the inhabitants of these
territories are entitled to the protection provided under interna-
tional humanitarian law for civilian populations under occupa-
270 See Schwarz, supra note 18, at 132.
271 See Water Law § 46 (granting the Minister of Agriculture the ability to
empower a corporation to the be the National Water Authority).
272 See Schwarz, supra note 18, at 132.
273 See id. at 132.
274 See Water Law § 46 (mandating that a majority of the shares of the Na-
tional Water Authority (Mekorot) be held by the State of Israel and by the World
Zionist Organization).
275 See Dillman, supra note 240, at 54. One of the functions of the Jewish
Agency is the promotion of agricultural colonization based on Jewish labor. The
function of the Jewish National Fund is "to purchase, acquire on lease or in ex-
change, or receive on lease or otherwise, lands, forests, rights of possession, ease-
ments and any similar rights ... for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands and
properties." Uri Davis et al., Israel's Water Policies, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter
1980, at 1, 13-14 (quoting Jewish National Fund Memorandum of Association, art.
3(a)).
276 Dillman, supra note 240, at 54.
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tion.277 The main sources of international humanitarian laws
protecting civilians in occupied territories, the Regulations An-
nexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land 278 and the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 279
endow the belligerent occupant with a limited set of rights2 0
and a well-defined set of duties. These obligations include re-
spect for public281 and nonpublic (including municipal)28 2 prop-
erty in occupied territories, breaches of which give rise to
compensation. 28 3 International humanitarian law also provides
protection for the regime of local laws that predated the occupa-
tion.28 4 Both the protection of property and the preservation of
local law have implications for the regulation of Palestinian
water.
Israel admits that the Hague Regulations constitute cus-
tomary international law. 28 5 In addition, Israel is a party to the
277 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, pmbl.
278 See id.
279 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
280 In particular, in relation to immovable state property, the occupant has the
powers of administrator and usufruct. See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art.
55.
281 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 53-56.
282 Id. arts. 23(g), 46-53, 56; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 278, art.
53.
283 The remedy for breaches of provisions of the Hague Regulations are pro-
vided for in the Convention to which they are attached. See Hague Regulations,
supra note 10, pmbl. More generally, however, it is a firmly established principle
in international law that where there is a right there is a remedy. See, e.g., Perma-
nent Court of International Justice, Judgment No. 13 (Indemnity) (Sept. 13, 1928),
reprinted in 1 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 664 ("[iut is a principle
of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparations").
284 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43. See Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 278, art. 64.
285 Indeed, they have been widely considered as codifying customary interna-
tional law at least since the time of the NUrnberg Trials. See The Nuremberg
Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946) ("[b]y 1939 these rules [of land warfare] laid down in the
[Fourth 1907 Hague] convention were recognized by all civilized nations"). See
also G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64IAdd. 1, at 188 (1947) (affirming
"the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nirnberg Tri-
bunal and the judgment of the Tribunal").
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Fourth Geneva Convention. 28 6 However, both the Israeli gov-
ernment and the Israeli Supreme Court dispute, in different
ways, the applicability of international humanitarian law to the
OPTs.
Since 1971, the government has denied the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to Occupied Palestine,28 7 adopting in-
stead a "territory-based"288 approach to the Fourth Geneva
Convention. Israel argues that the Convention only applies to
occupations of the territories of other High Contracting Parties,
and since no party to the Convention had valid legal title to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip at the time of their occupation, the
Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply.28 9 As for the appli-
cability of the Hague Regulations, the non-judicial branches of
286 Israel ratified the four Geneva Conventions on July 6, 1951. See 1 KTvEI
AMANAH [TREATY SERIES] 559 (Hebrew).
287 This denial began in 1971 when Meir Shamgar, then Attorney-General of
Israel, declared that Israel decided to leave open the question of whether the
Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the Occupied Territories. This position later
changed to an outright denial of the applicability of the Convention. See ESTHER
COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: 1967-82, at 44
(1985).
288 This interpretation, in addition to the contrasting, "people-oriented" view of
the Convention, were first developed by Stephen M. Boyd. See Stephen M. Boyd,
The Applicability of International Law to the Occupied Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. INT'L
L. 258, 260 (1971). Boyd himself concluded that "the Fourth Geneva Convention
... should be interpreted as a people-oriented Convention, and not a territory-
oriented Convention." Id.
289 The basis for this position is a provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention
which states that: "The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party." Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 278, art. 2(2). For early defenses of this position, see Yehuda
Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3
ISR. L. REV. 279, 293 (1968) ("[tlhis assumption of the concurrent existence in re-
spect of the same territory of both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a belligerent
occupant lies at the root of [the rules of international law governing belligerent
occupation] . .. "). An early statement on this matter by the Israeli attorney gen-
eral cited Blum's analysis in concluding that the Fourth Geneva Convention does
not apply to the OPTs. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the
Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 262, 266 (1971). See also Mem-
orandum from Office of the Legal Adviser of the Israeli Foreign Ministry (Sept. 12,
1984), reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS ET AL., ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER ISRAELI MILI-
TARY OCCUPATION 80 (1984) [hereinafter Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Memo-
randum] (reiterating Israeli government position denying applicability of Geneva
Conventions to the OPTs de jure). But see Memorandum from Israeli Ministry of
Justice (May 24, 1994) (on file with author) (justifying administrative detention of
al-Haq fieldworker Sha'wan Jabarin on basis of Article 78 of Fourth Geneva
Convention).
53
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Israeli government have taken inconsistent positions. 290 The
Israeli government has also directed a broader, theoretical at-
tack on the applicability of humanitarian law in general to the
OPTs, arguing that the long duration of the Israeli occupation
undermines the applicability of provisions of humanitarian law,
which had been drafted under the assumption of a relatively
short period of occupation.291
The Israeli Supreme Court has taken a slightly different
view. It acknowledges the status of Israel as a belligerent occu-
pant of the OPTs; 292 accordingly, it applies the provisions of the
Hague Regulations to cases regarding the behavior of Israeli
armed forces in the OPTs.293 It also views the Fourth Geneva
Convention as applicable. 294 However, it also considers the Ge-
neva Conventions to be non-self-executing treaties, and would
not apply its provisions to the comportment of the Israeli Mili-
tary Government in the absence of implementing legislation. 295
Interestingly, the Court often refers to the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention to justify challenged actions of the Military Govern-
ment's actions. 296
In its denial of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention and Hague Regulations, Israel stands in a minority of
one within the international community. International organi-
zations 297 and all states, including Israel's strongest allies, 298
concur that the Israeli Military Government's actions ought to
290 Compare Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Memorandum, supra note 288, at
81 (stating Israel's de facto adherence to the humanitarian provisions of the Hague
Regulations "without entering into the academic question of the legal applicability
of [that] document") with COHEN, supra note 286, at 43 (quoting General Staff of
the Israeli Defense Forces Order to show that "[tihe official Israeli position is that
these [Hague] Regulations are applicable to the Israeli-occupied territories").
Despite its denial of the applicability of these bodies of law de jure, Israel
claims that it applies de facto the humanitarian provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions and Fourth Geneva Convention. See Shamgar, supra note 288, at 266
(Fourth Geneva Convention only); Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Memorandum,
supra note 288, at 81.
291 See Memorandum of Law, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 432-33 (1978).
292 See Dweikat v. Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1, 13 (1979), reprinted in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 345 (1980) (English translation).
293 See cases cited in COHEN, supra note 286, at 58 n. 50.
294 See Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territo-
ries, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (1994).
295 See id.
296 See id. at 20-21 & nn. 100-02 (1994).
297 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 58, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/43/904, Part B.
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be governed by those two conventions. In the face of the often
"artful" defenses of Israeli government positions, 299 many inter-
national legal scholars have argued for the applicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention in particular, and of humanitarian
law in general, in the OPTs. 300 Given the overwhelming prepon-
derance of the opinion and the strengths of the legal arguments,
I will assume below that the Hague Regulations and the Fourth
Geneva Convention applied to the OPTs.3°1
298 See, e.g., Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of Interna-
tional Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of
the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 143 (1991) ("[iut is not merely the Arab coun-
tries, the Islamic world, or even the Third World generally, but the entire United
Nations-excepting Israel" that resists Israel's arguments [for the inapplicability
of international humanitarian law to the OPTs]"); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 1477, 1480-81
(1991).
299 See Falk & Weston, supra note 297, at 137. Falk & Weston cite Prof.
Blum's "missing reversioner" thesis. See Blum, supra note 184. For Prof. Eugene
Rostow's "continuing mandate" argument, see Falk & Weston, supra note 297, at
139. See also Eugene V. Rostow, Palestinian Self-Determination: Possible Futures
for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 147 (1979) (arguing that failure to resolve conclusively status of
OPTs gives rise to continuing vitality of British Mandate over Palestine and there-
fore of mandatory law). For Prof. Gerson's "trustee-occupant" theory, see Falk &
Weston, supra note 297, at 139. See also GERSON, supra note 202, at 78-82 (argu-
ing that prolonged duration of occupation gives rise to Israel's status as a "trustee-
occupant").
300 See, e.g., Falk & Weston, supra note 297, at 140-44 (refuting Blum, Rostow,
and Gerson theses and arguing that any forcible occupation of territory beyond a
state's boundaries amounts to belligerent occupation). See also Antonio Cassese,
Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural Resources, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 419, 419-
20 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992) (rejecting hypothesis of emergence of new law of pro-
longed belligerent occupation on empirical and internal grounds). See Gerhard von
Glahn, Taxation Under Belligerent Occupation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 299, at 341, 346-47 (argu-
ing against modification of customary rules of international humanitarian laws in
cases of prolonged belligerent occupation).
301 The question naturally arises whether, under the new, post-Oslo phase of
the relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, Israel's
status in the territories can continue to be considered that of a belligerent occu-
pant. While the Palestinian Authority and Israel are not only no longer engaged in
hostilities, but have meetings at all official levels on a regular basis and sit on a
number of joint committees regulating various areas of joint concern (including
water management), many aspects of Israel's occupation can still be characterized
as belligerent. Most importantly, by keeping the status of the OPTs open until
permanent status negotiations, Israel affirmatively, at least for the present time,
disavows title to the land that it is occupying. This is consistent with its own past
positions, which considered the OPTs as "administered territories." See, e.g., Legal
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Two aspects of international humanitarian law are rele-
vant to Palestinian water rights. The first is the relationship
between Israel, the belligerent occupant, and Palestinian prop-
erty. In particular, Israel, as occupant, gains limited, tightly cir-
cumscribed, and well-defined rights to Palestinian water, while
also taking on considerable responsibilities to respect the preex-
isting regime of property rights. As shall be seen below, these
rights and duties are tightly linked. Second, as a belligerent
occupant, Israel has the duty to respect, to the extent permitted
by its own security and military needs, the local law in exist-
ence at the time of the occupation. This would suggest that the
regimes of Jordanian and customary water rights law in force in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively, which were in
existence at the time of the Israeli occupation, ought not be al-
tered to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by the occupying
power.
A. The Belligerent's Right to Property in Occupied Territories
and the Belligerent's Duty to Protect Public and
Private Property
1. The State of the Law
It was once a rule of international law that belligerents
could appropriate all public and private property found in occu-
pied territory.30 2 This rule, which lasted until the 19th century,
was firmly supplanted at the time of the drafting of the 1907
Hague Conventions. The Conventions and annexed Regula-
tions have earned wide recognition since the time of the Niirn-
berg Judgment as a codification of customary international law.
The new rule prescribes different rights and duties to the occu-
pant, depending on whether the property is movable or immova-
Advisor Memorandum, supra note 288, at 81 ("[als has been stated officially, since
1967, the areas are being administered by Israel pending the final settlement of
their status through a peace process between the Parties concerned").
Furthermore, Israel and its military government still retain exclusive author-
ity in such areas as settlements, jurisdiction over Israelis, borders and foreign re-
lations. See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1)(a). The Israeli army does
not withdraw from the OPTs, but merely re-deploys. See id. art. 10. A1-Haq's posi-
tion is that Israel remains a belligerent occupier of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
under the Interim Agreement.
302 See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE § 133 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1952).
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ble, public or private. In addition to regulating the modalities of
the taking of title and possession of property in the occupied
territory, the Regulations strictly limit the uses to which that
property may be put.
In regards to public immovable property, the Regulations
grant the occupying power the rights of a usufruct. In
particular:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricul-
tural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the
occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these proper-
ties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of
usufruct.
3 0 3
Writing in 1952, Lauterpacht interpreted this provision as giv-
ing broad powers to the occupant. 30 4 Such an occupant may
"sell the crops from public land, cut and sell timber in the public
forests" and make other uses of the "fruit" of local public prop-
erty.30 5 Such use is limited only by the prohibition against ex-
ercising the right in a wasteful or negligent way so as to
decrease the value of the stock and plant.30 6 In addition, title to
these goods does not pass to the occupying power.3
0 7
A belligerent may take possession of (though not title to)
public movable property only if such property can be directly or
indirectly used for military operations. 308 The kinds of property
that may be taken include cash, funds, realizable securities, de-
pots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies.30 9 In ad-
303 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 55.
304 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 134.
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 The produce of the property of municipalities may not be appropriated, nor
those of properties set aside by the state for religious, charitable, or cultural pur-
poses. These are to be treated as private property. Hague Regulations, supra note
10, art. 55. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 135. An occupant may also
make use of the public buildings of the occupied state as the necessities of war
demand. Id. § 136. Finally, the occupant may also seize or destroy submarine
cables connecting the occupied state to a neutral country in cases of "absolute ne-
cessity." Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 54.
308 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 53.
309 Id. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, §§ 137-39. See also Cassese, supra
note 299, at 427-28 (arguing that contemporary, restrictive view of belligerent oc-
cupant's powers disallow occupant seizure of property with merely "potential" mili-
tary use).
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dition to this protection, the Fourth Geneva Convention
prohibits the destruction of public property except for reasons of
military necessity.3 10
Generally speaking, the belligerent's rights to private prop-
erty are more circumscribed than its rights to public property.
Under the Hague Regulations, private property "must be
respected" and "cannot be confiscated." Furthermore, the Regu-
lations prohibit pillage. 311 It has been stated that the Regula-
tions strictly forbade the appropriation of private immovable
property, though they created an exception for the "temporary
use of private land and buildings for all kinds of purposes de-
manded by the necessities of war."312 A belligerent occupant
may seize and use movable private property that may serve as
war material and all appliances which are suited for the trans-
mission of news or for the transportation of persons and
goods. 31 3 However, the occupant must restore them at the con-
clusion of peace, and must make compensation.31 4 The occupy-
ing power may raise revenue in a fashion similar to that of the
ousted state to defray the costs of administration. Above and
beyond this prewar revenue raising, the occupant may levy
money contributions, but only for the needs of the army or of the
administration of the occupied territory, and only according to
certain rules. The occupant may also request requisitions in
kind and services from municipalities and inhabitants, again
only for the needs of the army of occupation and according to
certain rules. 315 The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the
occupant from destroying private property for any reason other
than for military necessity.316
310 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 278, art. 53.
311 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 53.
312 OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 140.
313 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 53.
314 See id. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 141. Furthermore, the Reg-
ulations also prohibit the seizure of works of art and science, and of historical mon-
uments. See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 56.
315 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 48-52.
316 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 278, art. 53. See also COM-
MENTAIRE SUR (IV) LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE RELATIVE A LA PROTECTION DES PER-
SONNES CIVILES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE 323-25 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1956) (detailing
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As concerns the use to which enemy property may be put,
one key principle pervades the Hague Regulations: The occu-
pant may only take enemy property, whether public or private,
movable or immovable, to defray the expenses of the occupa-
tion317 or if the property may be used against it militarily. In
1946, the International Military Tribunal at Nirnberg reem-
phasized this principle by stating that "under the rules of war,
the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear
the expenses of the occupation, and these should not be greater
than the economy of the country can reasonably bear."318 Fur-
thermore, given the appearance of new factors on the interna-
tional scene which differ significantly from those apparent at
the time of the signing of the Hague Regulations (such as long-
lasting belligerent occupations, increased state intervention in
the economy, and others), it has been argued that the spirit of
the protection of enemy property which pervades the Hague
Regulations leads to a "strict approach to the rights of belliger-
ent occupants." In particular, this view rejects the expansive
view of many international scholars as regards the rights of a
belligerent occupant to the fruits of immovable public
property. 31 9
2. Classification of Palestinian Water
International law provides a four-quadrant legal scheme
for the protection of enemy property, with differing rules de-
pending on whether the property is public or private, movable
or immovable. From a general standpoint, the belligerent occu-
pant's rights are meant to be construed strictly, in light of the
overall requirements that any seizure or takings of property be
for military or administrative purposes only, and only insofar as
the local economy can bear. The next task, of course, is to deter-
mine the quadrant, or quadrants, into which Palestinian water
falls. The following analysis will focus on the two most impor-
317 Cassese has interpreted this to include only the following: (1) meeting the
occupant's own military or security needs (i.e., the exigencies posed by the conduct
of its military operations in the occupied territories); (2) defraying the expenses
involved in the belligerent occupation; and (3) protecting the interests and the
well-being of the inhabitants. See Cassese, supra note 299, at 422.
318 Id. at 430.
319 These scholars include Gerard von Glahn, Myres McDougal and F.P. Felici-
ano. Allan Gerson. and Yoram Dinstein. See Cassese. supra note 299. at 428 n.22.
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tant sources of water in the OPTs: water from wells located on
private and municipal property; and water in major basins (the
Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer). I show below that the
former category is a form of movable private property. Israel
may neither use nor interfere with the enjoyment of this water
unless the water is directly useable for military purposes or is
intended to help in the administration of the occupation. The
latter is a form of immovable private property. Thus, Israel
may temporarily seize the production of the water basins, but
only for purposes demanded by the necessities of war.
I propose to determine whether property is movable or im-
movable by referring to the examples of immovable property
listed in Article 55 of the Hague Regulations ("public buildings,
real estate, forests, and agricultural estates"), the civil law con-
cept of usufruct in immovable property, and the examples of
movable property listed in Article 53 ("cash, funds,... means of
transport, stores and supplies"). I further propose to determine
whether property is public or private by referring to local law.
Public v. private. Under local law, water drawn from wells
or captured from springs located on private property, or drawn
from a river onto private land, is private (more specifically,
mulk) property in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.320 This is
the scheme of the Ottoman Majalla, which codified customary
water law in all of Palestine during the Ottoman era.321 Subse-
quent lawmakers did not disrupt this rule in either Gaza or the
West Bank, and it remained the law at the time of the occupa-
tion. Private production from Gaza wells exceeds the replenish-
ment of the Gaza Aquifer; thus all Gazan groundwater
constitutes private property. As for the West Bank, captured
output from wells and springs has hovered around 100 mcm/yr
since the time of the occupation.
The second category is the uncaptured water of the Moun-
tain Aquifer and the Jordan River. Waters in major basins are,
under the water law of the Ottoman Majalla, mubah property.
Something is mubah if anyone in the community has the right
to capture it, and it remains free property until individuals or
320 See MAJALLA, supra note 189, arts. 1234-35, 1238-39, 1248, 1250. See also
supra Part III.A.
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corporations invest in capturing it.322 Thus, communal rights
to water were the primary ownership interest, whereas individ-
ual or corporate interests were merely secondary. At the time of
the end of the Ottoman era, whatever water was not drawn
from the Mountain Aquifer or from the Jordan River was the
property of the community.3 23 Mandate law did not change
this. Jordanian law, which in the 1960's was already moving in
the direction of increased regulation and ultimately nationaliza-
tion of all water, did not by 1967 disturb this basic communal-
private distinction.
The mubah concept, a feature of Islamic jurisprudence,
must then be translated into the private-public property classi-
fication scheme of the Hague Regulations. Of the two catego-
ries, mubah property is closest to the private property category.
Under the Regulations, "public" property is property whose title
is held by the State. Only property owned by the sovereign falls
into the category of public property. Even the property of mu-
nicipalities, in other words, of public institutions presumably
chartered by the state, is to be treated as private property.324
Under the Majalla, the category of property owned by the State
or by the Sultan was mulk, not mubah, property.325 While mulk
property would probably be considered public property under
the Hague Regulations, mubah property, which could be exer-
322 See MAJALLA, supra note 189, arts. 1234-35, 1238-39, 1248, 1250; supra
Part III.A.
323 The Natural Resources Regulation Law of 1966 nationalized mineral re-
sources but failed to do so for underground water. Order No. 88, issued pursuant
to this law, imposed a strict permit system for exploitation of underground water.
This order excluded from its operation water captured in manmade structures
designed to hold water. Any extraction of underground water had to be done with
a permit from the Deputy Chairman of the Natural Resources Authority which
specified, inter alia, the quantity of water allowed to be pumped. Permit holders
held title only to the amount of underground water the permit allowed to be
pumped and this allotted quantity could be curtailed or eliminated for cause. See
Order for the Supervision of Underground Water, supra note 238, arts. 2(d), 3, 11-
14. This created a system whereby a national institution controlled access to a
natural resource and where private entities could obtain conditional and provi-
sional title to the resource only by permission of the Authority. However, by refus-
ing to nationalize the underground water resources, the state, in the creation of
the license system, was merely exercising its general police powers in protecting
communal water resources, an especially critical function where a "tragedy of the
commons" situation may arise. See id.
324 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 56.
325 See, e.g., SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 23.
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cised by any individual within the community, is more akin to
the Regulations' conception of private property.
Movable v. immovable. The difficulty in determining
whether these two categories of water are movable or immova-
ble lies in the fact that water itself is liquid and movable,
whereas the channels and geological formations which give the
watercourses form and produce the water from year to year are
fixed in the ground. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which
establishes the usufructuary and administrative rights of the
occupant, lists as examples of immovable property "real estate,
forests, and agricultural estates," and, therefore, does not pro-
vide a direct answer.326 Given the civil law origins of the con-
cept of usufruct, one should look to civil law classifications of
water in order to help determine whether they are movable or
immovable. In this regard, many civil law countries (such as
France, Belgium, and Italy) consider water usable for drinking
or irrigation still in water sources (such as rivers, wells, and
springs) to be immovable property, like all appurtenances to
real estate.327 Contemporary interpretations of Article 55 have
also determined that another liquid subterranean in occupied
territory, namely oil in the Sinai and Gulf of Suez, constitutes
immovable property.328
On the other hand, water that has been captured and put
into irrigation canals or pipes constitutes movable property. It
is a good that is no longer fixed in the ground and can be trans-
ported and sold. Thus all Palestinian water is private property,
some of it movable and some immovable. As such, all of it is
entitled to a high level of protection. The following section ana-
lyzes infringements on this right by Israelis.
3. Israeli Violations of Palestinian Property Rights
Israeli infringements on Palestinian property are of several
kinds. First, it appropriated vast amounts of Palestinian water
for improper uses (consumption in Israel proper and in settle-
ments). Second, it enacted a military order, which sought to
hamper the registration of private water rights, and to interfere
326 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 55.
327 See CODE CIVL [C. civ.] art. 2119 (Fr.); Cassese, supra note 300, at 431.
328 See United States Department of State, Memorandum of Law (Oct. 1,
1976), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 733, 735 (1977).
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with the proof of legal title to water. Third, it limited Palestin-
ian access to water in various ways, both directly (through
physical seizure and consumption of water or the imposition of
limitations on the digging of new wells or on pumping) and indi-
rectly (through the construction of deep bore wells for settle-
ments which caused nearby Palestinian wells to dry up or to
salinate). Fourth, Israeli overconsumption has caused damage
to the actual geological structures that produce water (the Gaza
Aquifer, the Mountain Aquifer, and Lake Tiberias). These vio-
lations have been substantial and sustained.329
A violation of a right gives rise to a right to a remedy. In
view of the different kinds of violations, several different reme-
dies suggest themselves. First, the quantities of water that
Israel took and put to improper, nonmilitary uses ought to be
compensated at the bulk price which Israel charges Palestini-
ans for water (around U.S. $0.50/M3). Second, Israel must allow
the registration of water rights to continue. Third, Israel must
immediately halt the future misappropriation of Palestinian
water or enter into an agreement with the Palestinians for the
purchase of this water. Fourth, Israel must make some repara-
tions for the damage it has caused to the geological and geo-
graphic formations which produce water, and immediately
begin using these resources in a manner consistent with their
long-term viability.
a. Interference With Access to Water: Quantity and Quality
As is indicated in Tables 2 and 3 and in Part II.C, Israel
currently consumes significant portions of the Gaza Aquifer,
Jordan River, and the Western, Northeastern, and Eastern Ba-
329 In fact, they arguably amounted to "extensive destruction and appropria-
tion of property, [of persons protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention] not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly," and thus, a
grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 279, art. 147. Persons such as Rafael Vardi, the military commander of
the West Bank and the promulgator of the Military Order 291 (which directly in-
terfered with the process of registration of individual Palestinian water rights), as
well as persons in the Israeli government involved with the design and implemen-
tation of Israel's massive water appropriation policy in the OPTs, may be liable for
violations of international criminal law. Furthermore, under the universal juris-
diction provisions of the Geneva Conventions, these persons may be tried in any
national court with personal jurisdiction over them. See id. art. 146. A full discus-
sion of this liability is beyond the scone of this article.
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sins of the Mountain Aquifer. All of these are either endoge-
nous Palestinian water sources (in the case of the Gaza Aquifer
and the Eastern Basin) or joint water sources (in the case of the
Jordan River and the Western and Northeastern Basins of the
Mountain Aquifer). 330 Any Israeli nonmilitary or non-adminis-
trative use of the endogenous sources is an impermissible inter-
ference with Palestinian private property.331 A significant
portion of Israeli consumption of the joint sources is consump-
tion of Palestinian water. This is apparent given the highly
skewed current distribution of water consumption 332 and the
strong Palestinian customary and equitable claims to these
water sources. 333
Israel has enforced this inequitable distribution of water
through strict controls on Palestinian pumping. It required the
metering of wells, set quotas on the production, implemented
constant monitoring, and imposed severe fines for overproduc-
tion. It also prevented the construction of new wells without a
permit, which was rarely granted. While public powers had the
power to limit the digging of new wells in both Gaza and the
West Bank, Israel used its ban on Palestinian well construction
330 There are also water basins that straddle the border between Gaza and
Israel. These include Wadi Gaza and parts of the Gaza aquifer. See ELMUSA,
supra note 4, at 7. These water basins are very small in comparison to the bodies
of water that flow alongside or underneath the West Bank. However, the dire
water situation in Gaza render these sources of great importance to the inhabit-
ants of Gaza. Given the extremely low per capita levels of water consumption in
Gaza, the rapid deterioration in water quality, the mounting damage to the Gaza
aquifer, and Palestinians' prior use of the water, it seems undeniable, under
widely accepted principles of international water law, that Palestinians should
continue to have sole access to these small sources. Unfortunately, Israel has dug
wells upstream of the Gaza aquifer and has constructed dams and diversion wells
in Wadi Gaza. While these are in Israel, they directly infringe upon Palestinian
private property. They are especially problematic since Israel built many, if not
all, of these structures after Israel's occupation of Gaza; in other words, at a time
Palestinians, when Gazans, living under Israeli military occupation, had no formal
way of controlling their water resources or objecting to infringements upon these
sources. As with Palestinian water in the Jordan River, Israel should compensate
for past overconsumption, compensate for the damage which it contributed to the
aquifer in Gaza, and either release the water or negotiate the purchase of it with
its owners.
331 See id at 7. Furthermore, in the case of immovable private property, water
is not the kind of property that has a direct military use and thus, may not be
seized by the occupant.
332 Israel consumes over 85% of joint Israeli-Palestinian water resources.
333 See infra Part VI.
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not to protect the aquifer but rather to make the water avail-
able for Jewish and Israeli consumption. As for the water of the
Jordan River, Israel declared the Jordan River a Closed Mili-
tary Area in the aftermath of June 1967, and thereby blocked
Palestinian access to that river.334 In the process, Israel de-
stroyed 140 Palestinian pumps. The reconstruction of this lost
water infrastructure will require significant investment.335 The
closing of the area is probably permissible under the rubric of
international humanitarian law, since it is at least in part moti-
vated by military necessity. However, it is not clear how the
water itself would be used for military purposes, thus rendering
its seizure illegal. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which
requires the occupant to respect private property, suggests that
affected Palestinians ought to receive either some alternative
means of access to water or compensation. 336 In particular,
they could receive waters from the Upper Jordan River, from
which Israel consumes Palestine's quota of West Bank water.
No such alternative arrangement was or has been provided.
In addition to the quantities taken, Israel is causing deteri-
oration in the quality of water remaining for Palestinians, and
in some cases is contributing to the deterioration of under-
ground aquifers. Israel, in exploiting the Eastern Basin, dug up
to forty deep-bore wells, some reaching 700 meters in depth and
extracted the water with high-power pumps. 337 Palestinians, in
contrast, exploit the aquifer through the use primarily of natu-
rally occurring springs in the Jordan Valley. Israel placed the
wells in parts of the aquifer where the water is especially low in
salinity, and have pumped at a rate far exceeding the flow of
nearby Palestinian springs. 338 The result has been the drying-
up of nearby Palestinian springs, most notably the one near the
Jericho village of Al Auja, and also at the villages of Bardala
334 As of the mid-1980's, about 25% of the West Bank was closed to Palestini-
ans for military or security reasons. See Ibrahim Matar, Exploitation of Land and
Water Resources for Jewish Colonies in the Occupied Territories, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 228, at 443,
447.
335 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, WATER CONSERVATION IN PAL-
ESTINE: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TOWARDS PALESTINIAN WATER RESOURCES MAN-
AGEMENT 36 (1994).
336 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 46.
337 See Matar, supra note 334, at 453. See also Part II.A.
338 See id.
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and 'Ain al-Baida. 339 In the case of the village of El Auja, dam-
ages to crops resulting from a sudden, Israeli-induced dry-up of
the village spring amounted to approximately $3 million in the
winter of 1988 alone.340 In other instances, springs draining
the same basin tapped by Israeli wells have experienced in-
creases in salinity. In some limited instances Mekorot has of-
fered to supply the villages with replacement water. 341 This
situation is not a sufficient remedy, as Palestinians have been
converted from owners to renters of their own natural re-
source. 342 This is precisely the scenario that the Hague Regula-
tions prohibit.
Furthermore, Israel's excessive pumping of the other ba-
sins of the Mountain Aquifer is causing a steady increase in sa-
linity. Israel's skimming of the least saline waters in the Upper
Jordan River and the diversion of some of the most saline
spring water in the Upper Jordan River Valley into the lower
Jordan, have rendered Jordan River water so brackish as to be
largely unusable for agriculture. In addition, during the 1990
drought, Israel for the first time allowed the water level in the
Mountain Aquifer to drop below the "Red Line," the level below
which the Lake suffers long-term ecological damage. In Gaza,
the continuing deterioration in water quality, caused in part by
the pumping of Gaza settlements, 343 has led to a halt in agricul-
ture in some areas due to high salinity levels in some wells or
springs, and a general deterioration in health because of the
heightened concentration of nitrates, sodium, microorganisms,
and other pollutants. 344
b. Legitimate and Illegitimate End Uses
Under the Hague Regulations, any water use by Israeli mil-
itary and administrative installations, used pursuant to their
reasonable military and administrative needs for example,
"water consumption by soldiers at a military base in the OPTs"
339 See id.
340 See id. at 453-54.
341 See id. at 453.
342 See Matar, supra note 334, at 453-54.
343 Palestinian consumption alone is in excess of the annual recharge and thus,
would cause a deterioration of the aquifer even without consumption by the Gaza
settlements.
344 See supra Parts IIA-C; infra Part V.C.5.
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is legitimate. However, this constitutes a very small part of the
local consumption of water. As Part II details, the major Israeli
uses of West Bank and Gaza water are for agriculture and do-
mestic consumption.
An interesting legal question is presented by the Nahal set-
tlements, which were propagated in the West Bank and Gaza
up to the early 1980's. The Nahal is "[a] unit of the IDF [Israel
Defense Forces] in which, as part of their military service,
soldiers, mostly members of pioneering youth movements, work
on kibbutzim and settlements considered sensitive from the se-
curity point of view."345 In the early years of the occupation,
soldiers from this unit occupied remote outposts in the OPTs for
purposes of preparing them for conversion into civilian settle-
ments. 346 These outposts often cultivated areas in the vicinity
of the settlements, which not only served to provide the settle-
ments with nourishment, but also prepared the way for more
extensive agricultural development once the civilian character
of the settlement came to dominate. Often, the soldiers would
reside in these settlements with their families and stay there
after leaving military service.
The lifetime of these settlements can be divided, for analyt-
ical purposes, into the period during which the military charac-
ter predominates and that during which the civilian character
predominates. The transition point is often ascertainable as the
date at which the settlement changed its legal form to a kibbutz,
moshav, or other legal form.
As for the military period, while some of the agricultural
production and related water consumption serve military pur-
poses, the intention of creating a civilian agricultural settle-
ment undoubtedly pushed levels of water consumption beyond
that of a purely military installation. It is clear that the place-
ment of settlements in militarily strategic points served the Is-
raeli Defense Force's military purposes; the cultivation of food
at the locations in which soldiers were located undoubtedly pro-
vided a level of self-sufficiency that would be critical should the
installation be surrounded in the course of an armed attack on
the region. However, this analysis must consider the fact that
345 MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK HANDBOOK: A POLITICAL LEXICON 157
(1986).
346 See id. at 157-58.
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the Allon and subsequent governments, which built these set-
tlements, always intended to convert them into civilian settle-
ments. Furthermore, the Nahal settlements were a small part
of the larger settlement movement, which sought to assert a
Jewish civilian presence in the OPTs. As with the population
dispersal policy that drove Jewish population patterns inside
Israel, "Labor-Zionist settlement ideology" pervaded the drive
to create settlements in the OPTs and led to the creation of
many agricultural settlements of nonmilitary character. 347 Had
there been no intent to convert the settlement for civilian pur-
poses, the agricultural exploitation and water consumption
would undoubtedly have been less. This "incremental consump-
tion" of the military period of the Nahal settlements is legally
suspect.
While the Nahal settlements pose an interesting legal ques-
tion, they are of limited empirical importance. In October 1983,
the Israeli Ministry of Defense decided to halt the use of Nahal
soldiers to populate new military installations in the OPTs. At
this time, there were a total of sixteen Nahal settlements in the
West Bank.348 Even in 1982, at the height of their presence in
the West Bank, these settlements accounted for 15 of the 98 set-
tlements in the West Bank and only 75 of the 5,130 settler fami-
lies. In the Jordan River Valley, a concentrated area, they
accounted for 13 of the 40 settlements and 75 of the 987 fami-
lies.349 A generous estimate of West Bank Nahal water con-
sumption for military purposes at the peak of Nahal military
settlement activity is 4 mcm/yr. 350 Similarly, in Gaza, several
347 See MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF
ISRAEL'S POLICIES 51 (1984) (stating that Allon government established 21 civilian
settlements "14 moshavim and 6 kibbutzim" and only 2 Nahal settlements in Jor-
dan River Valley). See generally id. at 51-60 (detailing three phases of settlement
activity in the West Bank).
348 See BENVENISTI, supra note 345, at 158.
349 See BENVENISTI, supra note 215, at 5, tbl. 13.
350 In 1982, Nahal settlements in the Jordan River Valley contained 75 of the
747 families living in rural semi-urban or paramilitary (i.e., Nahal) settlements.
There were 13 Nahal settlements; assuming an average of around 6 families per
settlement, and considering that there were 16 such settlements at the end of the
Nahal settlement policy, there were 96 Nahal settlement families. Counterfactu-
ally, concentrating these in the high water-consumption Jordan River Valley,
these families constituted 96 out of 750, or 13% of the families. Given that in 1987,
settlement water consumption in the Jordan River Valley and North Dead sea set-
tlement areas was 31 mcnyr., West Bank Nahal military water consumption was
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Nahal settlements started in the 1970's, though by the mid-
1980s all of these had converted to moshavim, kibbutzim, and
non-cooperative or non-communal settlements.351 Also, as in
the West Bank, most settlements never had a Nahal stage,
starting instead as purely nonmilitary undertakings. As of
1986, the settlements that began as Nahals accounted for one-
third of the population of Gaza. 352 Again, using exceedingly
generous assumptions, Nahal military-related consumption at
its peak was in the area of 4 mcm/yr, and has ceased since 1983.
Water consumption by Nahal settlements during their ci-
vilian period, as well as that by the far more numerous settle-
ments of purely civilian character, is "in clear violation" of the
international law of belligerent occupation. 35 3 Not only did this
water support nonmilitary activities by an alien population, it
went to underwrite Israel's settlement policy, a widely con-
demned activity that is absolutely forbidden under humanita-
rian law.354 Presently, water consumption by settlers amounts
to 65 mcm/yr in the West Bank and between 18 and 33 mcm/yr
in Gaza. This water pumping must either halt immediately, or
Israelis must enter into an arms-length commercial agreement
with Palestine for the purchase of this property. Furthermore,
this use has been ongoing at increasing levels since the begin-
ning of settlement activity in the late 1960's, and Israelis must
pay Palestinians for all such misuse.
at most 4 mcm/yr. See KAHAN, supra note 184, at 102, 105. This estimate is gener-
ous for several reasons. First, the author assumed that all the Nahal settlements
were in the Jordan River Valley/North Dead Sea settlement groups, which were by
far the largest consumers of water. Second, the figure the author used for aggre-
gate water consumption is from a source published in 1987, a time during which
there were more settlements than in 1982 and thus, a time during which the global
consumption figures on the basis of which the author calculated per family con-
sumption were far higher than in 1982. Finally, the author assumed that water
consumption per family in a Nahal settlement is equivalent to that of a family in a
civilian settlement, which is probably not the case since a Nahal settlement con-
tains many on-duty soldiers who spend much of their time in nonagricultural mili-
tary activities.
351 See Roy, supra note 19, at 137-39.
352 See id. at 139-48.
353 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 143.
354 "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies." Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
279, art. 49(6).
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Similarly, Israeli consumption in Israel of Palestinian
water without compensation, is a per se violation of the Hague
Regulations. The Palestinian share of the Jordan River is
pumped into the National Water Carrier and taken to central
and southern Israel for domestic and agricultural production.
This use is not allowed. It is impossible to know the magnitude
of Palestine's share of Jordan River water without knowing the
quota allotted to the West Bank under the 1955 Johnston Plan;
estimates of this amount range between 50 and 200 mcm/yr.
Additionally, Israel takes water from the shared basins of the
Mountain Aquifer for domestic consumption in Israeli cities.
Again, it is difficult to know the magnitude of Palestine's share
of the shared basins of the Mountain Aquifer since that is to be
determined equitably by employing a factor analysis. However,
Israeli consumption from these sources amounts to 435 mcm/yr,
so the Palestinian share could easily run into the hundreds of
millions of cubic meters per year.
c. Interference With Legal Title
In addition to the physical misappropriation of Palestinian
water, Israel's military rule brought significant interferences
with the formal aspect of individual property rights to water.
By virtue of Military Order No. 291 of 1968, Israel halted the
operation of a Jordanian law, which sought to register all water
rights in a centralized national register. By the time of the oc-
cupation, only one-third of privately owned Palestinian lands
(and presumably a similar proportion of private water rights)
had been registered. This military order prevented any further
registration of water rights. Thus, Israel could incorporate ap-
proximately two-thirds of individually owned Palestinian
water, in addition to any waters not consumed from the aquifer
by 1968, into Israel's national pool. 355 This is because the mili-
tary order effectively prevented these property right holders
from earning legal recognition of their property rights. Israel
must at once restrict the reach of its national water laws so as
not to interfere with Palestinian title to its underground water.
355 See Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 239, 14.
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B. The Belligerent's Duty to Preserve Local Law
1. The State of the Law
An occupant must, to a great extent, respect the laws in
effect at the time of the occupation. Such an occupant has the
right to modify local law for certain specified reasons. However,
in no case shall the occupant make the changes for reasons of
its own economic advantage. Israel's appropriation through na-
tionalization of former private property; its separation of con-
trol of water from control of the land; and its incorporation of
Palestinian water resources into the national Israeli water con-
trol apparatus all created a radical shift in the property rights
and economic activity of Palestinians. Far from undertaking
this activity in order to ensure some sort of rough equality be-
tween Palestinians or Israelis, or to safeguard the integrity of
the Mountain Aquifer, or to respond in some direct way to a
military threat, Israel has appropriated Palestinian water in or-
der to impose strict limitations on its use so as not to harm Is-
raeli and settler water use. These restrictions would be
consistent with Jordanian law, for example, were the Israeli
and settler use legitimate in and of itself or in its amount. How-
ever, Israel controls Palestinian consumption and seeks to leave
as much water as possible for the Israeli agricultural sector and
for settlements. Therefore, this change in regimes was done in
order to subjugate the Palestinian water sector to the needs of
Israel. This is an impermissible interference with the local law
regime.
The local law doctrine is embodied in Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the meas-
ures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country. 3 56
356 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43. The bracketed words appear in
the semi-official English translation as "safety." "Safety" is the translation of the
official, French term "vie publique," which literally means public life. Given its
interpretation at the time of its first appearance in the Convention of Brussels, the
best translation for "vie publique" is probably "civil life." See Edmund H. Schwenk,
Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations,
54 YALE L.J. 393, 393 n.1 (1945).
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The Fourth Geneva Convention contains no analogous provision
relating to civilian matters. 357
This provision implies a number of things about the powers
of the occupant. The provision insists that the legislative power
has "in fact," and not in law, passed into the hands of the occu-
pant. While this clause seems to deny the occupant the power
to change local laws, the rest of the article is illogical if an occu-
pant is absolutely disallowed from making any change whatso-
ever. The question then becomes, under which circumstances
an occupant may bring about changes in the local legal regime.
An examination of the history of the Article may provide
the answer. This was the result of the combination of two arti-
cles of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874. The first article, Ar-
ticle 2, commanded the occupant to "take all measures in his
power to restore and ensure, as far as is possible, public order
and civil life." The second article commanded the occupant to
preserve the laws in force at the time of the peace, and not to
modify, suspend or replace them except in the case of "neces-
sity."358 One interpretation of the new, merged Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations is that the occupant has a duty to ensure
public order and civil life, and thus may change legislation in
pursuit of this end as long as it is absolutely necessary. In addi-
tion, the occupant has the power to change legislation in other
areas, although any changes in these areas are governed by a
different, higher standard, possibly those posed by war usage,
morals and humanity. In any case, there is "an established gen-
eral principle that the local civil and criminal law should be
respected by the occupant."359 Furthermore, there exists the
principle of respecting the institutions of the occupied territory,
which, in the case of the post-World War II era for example,
would prevent an occupant from transforming a liberal economy
into a fascist or communist one. This prohibition is qualified by
the power of the occupant to change laws in cases of military
necessity, for example, when these institutions constitute a per-
manent threat to the maintenance and safety of the military
357 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 279, art. 64 (regulating penal
laws).
358 Schwenk, supra note 356, at 396 (quoting HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CON-
FERENCE 723 (1909)).
359 Id. at 406.
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forces of the occupant. 360 In particular, the force of this prohibi-
tion extends to the extraterritorial prescriptions of law emanat-
ing from the occupant's own national institutions, such as the
legislature, the government, administrative agencies, and the
courts.
2. Israeli Violations of Its Duty to Preserve the Regime of
Local Law
When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, it encoun-
tered, as described above, a preexisting regime of water owner-
ship, regulation, and distribution. In the West Bank, Jordanian
law prescribed a regime of private rights to captured water in-
uring to the landowner, and initiated a process of centralized
registration of these rights. Authority over the regulation of the
Kingdom's water resources was in the hands of the Authority
for Natural Resources. The digging of new wells required the
permission of the Authority, and the Authority could restrict
the amount of pumping from any given well. The Authority
oversaw a system of communal ownership of groundwater and
river water, and provisional private rights to the production of
these resources. Gaza's water was regulated by customary law
that was based largely on pre-existing shari'a law, which recog-
nized private and alienable rights to captured water, and recog-
nized the right to water for those needing it for basic
necessities. No regional water authority existed in Gaza. In
both the West Bank and Gaza, the provision of drinking and
irrigation water was often handled at the local level by
municipalities.3 61
In the post occupation era, Israel radically altered the pre-
existing legal and institutional aspects of water control. It ini-
tially preserved the powers existing in Jordanian law that
allowed the central authority to restrict water use, while remov-
ing some of the formal checks on the exercise of this control. It
also preserved some of the existing Jordanian governmental
water institutions, though it subjugated these institutions to
the authority of the Israeli Civil Administration (an arm of the
military government), which itself was under the control of an
Israeli inter-ministerial committee. The Civil Administration
360 See id. at 407.
361 See supra Parts III.A-C.
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thus became a device to project Israeli national water policies
throughout the OPTs. These preexisting institutions were unre-
sponsive instruments serving the interests of the Israeli water
sector, not those of the residents of the OPTs. The facade of the
continuation of preexisting institutions broke down in 1982
when Mekorot, Israel's National Water Company, was en-
trusted with the management of Palestinian water, while the
Civilian Administration was left with administrative duties
such as bill collection and the monitoring of meters. Israeli mil-
itary government also led to the curtailment of preexisting pri-
vate property rights to water, and to the introduction of Israeli
water institutions (such as the National Water Company,
Mekorot). In the final analysis, however, it is difficult to see
how either military necessity, or the related requirements of the
establishment of public order and civil life, could have moti-
vated these changes in the legal regime.
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were two distinct mili-
tary areas; therefore, different orders apply to the two. I will
consider the changes effected in these two areas in turn.
Within weeks of the occupation, the authority of the
Jordanian Natural Resources Authority (which was within the
West Bank and not in Gaza) was centralized in the hands of an
"Officer in Charge" whom the Military Commander of the West
Bank appointed by virtue of Military Order 92. The Officer in
Charge had all the powers granted under water-related legisla-
tion in the West Bank at the date of occupation. The order an-
nulled all rights deriving under Jordanian law, unless extended
by this Officer in Charge. The Officer in Charge also had the
right to order the operation of existing "Water Entities" (i.e., in-
stitutions allowed to operate by virtue of water-related laws) to
cease, to allow them to continue, or to revive them after having
halted their operations. 362 The order lacked any provision of
appeal; this is in contrast to Jordanian law, which placed au-
thority over the Natural Resources Authority in an eight-person
committee and gave a three-person committee jurisdiction over
compensation for infringement of land or water rights caused by
362 See Israel Defense Forces, Orders Concerning Powers for the Purpose of the
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the Committee.363 This effectively centralized all powers deriv-
ing from existing Jordanian water-related institutions in the
hands of the Officer in Charge; any continuation of prior rights
were purely within the discretion of this Officer, and his discre-
tion was unguided. These changes alone amounted to a radical
change in the local water-related legal regime. It is difficult to
see how military necessity could justify these steps, since the
only concern was the regulation of an underground resource
used primarily for agriculture and not military purposes. Simi-
larly, it is unlikely that the ensuring of public order and civil
life could justify these steps since they came, shortly after the
beginning of the occupation, and therefore before there could
have been a radical change in the needs for the regulation of
underground water rights.
In case anyone doubted the power of the Officer in Charge
to control the operation of new water installations, Military Or-
der 158 gave the Officer the powers of the Minister of Public
Works to approve new irrigation-related water installations.
These powers came from a then-repealed Jordanian law. The
military legislation also expanded these powers so that this ap-
proval power covered "any construction or building intended for
the production of surface water or ground water, including drill-
ing or the diversion of water from any water source whatso-
ever." This presumably also included smaller-scale wells used
for domestic purposes. Again, the Officer's powers were wholly
discretionary and unappealable. 364 Whereas the Jordanian
363 See Natural Resources Law of 1966, supra note 237, arts. 9, 19; Special
Report: Sovereignty Over Water Resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 5 PAL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 348-49 n.1 (1989). It was not until 1972 that Military Order No. 457
created the Competent Authority and vested it with the power to decide the value
of land and water allocations resulting from application of the powers of the
Jordanian Natural Resources Authority and to assess damages from activities of
the Natural Resources Authority. In this latter power, the Competent Authority
replaced a three-person Objections Committee comprised of one judge and two ex-
perts in the relevant area. The Israeli Committee, formed under Military Order
No. 172 of January 22, 1968, had jurisdiction over disputes arising from decisions
of this competent authority. This committee had no rules of procedure or evidence
and could merely make recommendations to the Military Commander, who had
final authority. See id. at 357 n.3.
364 Military Order No. 158 of 1967, 91 2, 4. This Order had the odd result of re-
instituting an old Jordanian law-Jordanian law no. 31 of 1953-that a subse-
quent law, Law No. 51 of 1959, had abolished in order to grant the Officer powers
that he presumably already had inherited by operation of the Order for the Sunr-
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Minister of Public Works could only refuse to grant a license for
reasons specified in law, the authority of the Officer in Charge
was unconstrained in law and guided in fact by a policy to favor
the needs of Israel and Jewish settlements. Thus, the Officer in
Charge granted Palestinians few permits for new wells during
the occupation. 365 In contrast, West Bank settlers have been
able to dig new wells with a combined output approaching 50%
of that of all Palestinian West Bank wells.
In addition to the abrogation of Jordanian institutions, the
Military Government also infringed on existing property rights.
Military Order No. 291 of 1968 suspended the effectiveness of
any post occupation order issued pursuant to the Law for the
Settlement of Titles to Land and Water of 1952. This Law
sought to settle disputes and all matters relating to rights to
land and water and to create a comprehensive register for land
and water rights in Jordan (which at that time included the
West Bank within its territory). At the time of the occupation,
only about one-third of West Bank land had been registered.
Thus, the water rights connected to about two-thirds of Pales-
tinian lands. These rights were based on Ottoman or British
certificates of registration or registration in tax registers, and
could not be affirmed. In addition, of the lands that were regis-
tered, the Israeli government considered lands (and thus con-
nected water rights) that were owned in common by
municipalities, as well as lands owned by the Jordanian state
(the latter category alone amounting to 13% of all West Bank
lands), as subject to confiscation by the state of Israel. 366 This,
and subsequent orders, resulted in a transfer of land registra-
tion responsibility from the Jordanian Natural Resources Au-
vision of Underground Water and Military Order No. 92. This reinstitution of the
old law in and of itself is a clear case of unjustified tampering with old law.
365 According to relatively recent figures, the Military Government has granted
permits for 20 new wells intended for domestic use and three new wells intended
for agricultural use, in addition to permits for wells to replace three old domestic
use wells and 10 agricultural wells. See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING,
supra note 335, at 26. The Israeli Military Government has used this as a tactic to
force Palestinian bulk purchasers, such as municipalities, to purchase their water
from Mekorot, the Israeli National Water Company. A system of bald price dis-
crimination exists in the West Bank, where Palestinians pay 50% more per volume
of water than do Israelis. See id. at 30. In other words, Palestinians were required
to subsidize Israeli encroachments on Palestinian water rights.
366 See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 22-34.
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thority to the Israeli authorities, 367 which, given Israeli policies
towards the confiscation of Palestinian lands, are, in effect, a
recipe for the appropriation of water.
The Gaza Strip, unlike the West Bank, had no centralized
system for the control of water resources until the Military Gov-
ernment imposed one. In any case, the Military Commander for
the Gaza Strip promulgated military orders, which resulted in
many of the same restrictions that were imposed on the West
Bank. Notably, even though the water situation was already
far more critical in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip restrictions were longer in coming. This is probably
because Gaza had far less water to offer and was either discon-
nected from water basins within Israel or downstream from
them, and therefore was of less importance than the West
Bank. In 1974, the Military Commander of the Gaza Strip is-
sued Military Order No. 498, entitled Order Concerning Water,
which was motivated by the "danger of water resources in the
Area running short, and for the protection of water sources."
368
This purpose, if authentic, would be consonant with a belliger-
ent occupant's duty to safeguard the public order and civil life of
an occupied territory. Unfortunately, as in the West Bank,
these military orders served to further the interests of settlers.
The Order allowed the Competent Authority in charge of carry-
ing out the order to require the installation of water measure-
ment devices by producers, suppliers, and consumers.369 It also
created a system whereby the Competent Authority could re-
quire a permit for the production, supply, or consumption of
water. This permit could include an allowed quantity of water
use, and was not allowed to be freely traded. The drilling of any
new wells also required a permit. Other provisions imposed
criminal sanctions and civil fines for violations of a permit or
provision issued pursuant to the Order, and allowed the Compe-
tent Authority to reverse unilaterally any such permit, license,
or endorsement.370 In Gaza, like in the West Bank, the respon-
sibility for the recording of water rights was transferred to the
367 See Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 239, 22.
368 Israel Defense Forces, Order Concerning Water (No. 498), Apr. 11, 1974,
reprinted in 5 PAL Y.B. INT'L L. 359 (1989).
369 See id. at 360.
370 See id. arts. 13, 16, 22, 24, 30-31, 35, 40.
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Israeli authorities. This power was thus taken from municipali-
ties and other local authorities. 371
While Military Order 498, on its face, seemed consonant
with a legal regime protective of the water needs of Gazans, the
selective application and interpretation of the Order has led to a
situation of utter inequity between Gazans and Jewish settlers
in Gaza. For example, whereas during the 1980's there was a
virtual freeze on the issuance of new permits for Palestinian
water use in the Gaza Strip,372 Jewish settlers were able to dig
thirty-five to forty new wells.37 3 As a result of this discrimina-
tory policy, settlers "use of water is much more than that of
Gazans."374 As in the West Bank, restrictive water laws, which
in truth are necessary in a region where water is scarce, are
applied selectively by an occupying power to the subjects of the
occupation.
The concentration of the power to regulate and manage
water resources that fell into the hands of the Officer in Charge
(in the case of the West Bank) and the Competent Authority (in
the case of the Gaza Strip), however, was only part of the story.
The second part involved how this military officer fit into the
overall legal regime of the occupying state. Soon after its occu-
pation, Israel put together a system of administration, which
allowed for Israeli national policies to be effected in the OPTs.
In prescribing policies for the OPTs, the military government
and the national government interacted and coordinated their
policies via the mechanism of the Staff Officers of the Area Com-
mander. While the IDF Area Commander for an occupied area
was the supreme authority in that area and held exclusive for-
mal authority, the various civil activities in the area were con-
ducted by the appropriate governmental offices. These
ministries acted through their representatives in the area, who
coordinated their activities with the Area Commander and
served as his Staff Officers. The larger policies for the adminis-
tration of the occupied territories were determined by a ministe-
rial committee chaired by the Prime Minister, which enforced
its decisions via the Defense Minister.
371 See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
372 See KAHAN, supra note 184, at 19.
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In 1981, this structure was lightly modified by operation of
Military Order No. 947, which reasserted the role of the Civil-
ian Administration, the branch of the Israeli military govern-
ment in the OPTs which handled civilian issues in the
administration of the OPTs. 375 In the West Bank, for example,
responsibility for the management of water resources was lo-
cated in the Water Office of the Interior Branch, which was one
of the three administrative branches of the Civilian Administra-
tion.3 7 6 The powers of this office included the powers given the
Jordanian Natural Resources Authority, which the Commander
of the Area had vested in an Officer in Charge.3 7 7 Given the
Israeli emphasis on national-level management of water re-
sources, it was highly probable that the Israeli Ministry of Agri-
culture's water-related bureaucracy directed and controlled the
work of this Water Office, making it a tool of national Israeli
water policy. In 1982, Mekorot, Israel's National Water Com-
pany, was entrusted with the management of Palestinian
water, while the Civilian Administration was left with adminis-
trative duties like bill collection and the monitoring of me-
ters.378 This made the incorporation of Palestinian water into
Israeli national planning more direct and transparent.
All of these structures produced a situation where "deci-
sions concerning the administration of the West Bank [were] in
fact in the hands of Israeli cabinet ministers and government
sub-committees." 379 Furthermore, in making these changes to
the prior administrative regime, "Israel . . . effectively denied
the Palestinian population any participation at the decision-
375 See Mona Rishmawi, The Administration of the West Bank Under Israeli
Rule, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
supra note 228, at 275-76.
376 See id. at 267, 271-75. See also Joel Singer, The Establishment of a Civil
Administration in the Areas Administered by Israel, 12 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 259
(1982).
377 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 27-28.
378 See Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to In-
ternational Water Law: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Waters, 35 NAT. RES. J.
223, 225 (1995). It is these limited powers of the Civil Administration that the
Palestinian Authority assumed as a result of the Interim Agreement. See Interim
Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, art. 40, 4.
379 Rishmawi, supra note 375, at 267. The introduction of the new Ministry of
National Infrastructures, to which several of the powers of the old Ministry of Ag-
riculture were transferred, does not change the basic picture of generalized Israeli
government control over the water resources of the OPTs.
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making level while simultaneously allowing Jewish parties to
participate in the governance of the West Bank."380 What was
true of the West Bank in this case was also true of the Gaza
Strip. Thus, whenever the military government created or con-
tinued a water-related institution within the OPTs, they merely
added to the implementation or enforcement mechanisms of the
Israeli Ministry of Agriculture. In other words, even when the
military government putatively respected local law and local in-
stitutions, it merely reinforced the predatory and colonizing
agenda of the Israeli water sector, and thus effectively under-
mined the preexisting local regime.
The manifestations of this reality were manifold. As dis-
cussed above, the combination of these laws created a regime
whereby Palestinian institutions were severely restricted in the
running, maintenance, management or development of water
services or resources. 38 ' In the majority of cases, this meant
that localities were not able to dig local wells to supply their
own needs. To make up for the deficit, they had to turn to
Mekorot, the Israeli National Water Company. Purchases by
Palestinian institutions from Mekorot are 50% more expensive
than purchases by Israeli entities, which meant that Israel
forced Palestinians to subsidize the appropriation of their own
water by Israel and by Jewish settlers.38 2 In addition, the high
cost of this water, combined with the relatively lower income
level of Palestinians, meant that Palestinian water utilities had
a low rate of return on revenue and on capital, and thus were
not able to finance maintenance, repair, and upgrades to their
water networks. Another manifestation of this control was the
granting to Mekorot of the right to manage water resources in
the OPTs. As already mentioned, the ownership structure and
institutional role of Mekorot was to respond to the needs of
Jews and Israelis, and not to Palestinians. 38 3 Mekorot's pene-
tration in the OPTs was such that it supplied up to 50% of Pal-
380 Id.
381 See supra Part IV.
382 In 1988, Benvenisti and Khayat stated that while Palestinian authorities
paid NIS .70 per cubic meter of water supplied by the Mekorot and charged its
consumers NIS 1-1.6 per cubic meter, Jewish settlers paid NIS .15 and .23 per
cubic meter for water used in domestic and agricultural applications, respectively.
See MERON BENVENISTI & S. KHAYAT, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ATLAS 26 (1988).
383 See supra Part IV.
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estinian domestic water needs by 1994.384 Mekorot, which
managed water resources under its control without regard to
the naturally occurring boundaries of watersheds, also engaged
in the transfer of water from one watershed to another,38 5 and
violated a provision of Jordanian law which prohibited such
transfers. 38 6 The potentially national-level planning capacity of
the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority in the West Bank
was denied to Palestinians, as the Civilian Administration did
not release information and did not include Palestinian munici-
palities and NGOs in any comprehensive planning for the West
Bank. Other manifestations of the near-total Israeli control
over Palestinian water are discussed below in Part V.C.
C. The Gaps Left by International Humanitarian Law
1. Thicker Protection for Civilian Populations Under
Belligerent Occupation
The so-called Martens Clause is a built-in mechanism by
which the Hague Regulations may adapt to changes in interna-
tional law:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in
cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the in-
habitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the uses established among civilized peoples, from the laws of hu-
manity, and from the dictates of the public conscience. 387
This clause emphasizes the need to reevaluate constantly the
content of the rule and principles of the law of nations and to
apply them to persons in occupied territories. Another clause of
the preamble emphasizes that this interpretation should under-
384 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 26-27.
385 For example, the main stem of the National Water Carrier carries water
from Lake Tiberias to the Naqab desert, located in two wholly unconnected water
basins.
386 See Natural Resources Regulation Law of 1966, supra note 323, art. 16(b)
("[it is not permitted to transfer water from one water basin to another."); art. 17
("[t]he [Natural Resources] Authority may not transfer water from one water area
to another within a basin without permission of the Council of Ministers; and only
after a study and consideration of the water needs of the area of the water source
as well as the benefits to be derived from that source.").
387 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, pmbl.
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score the humanitarian orientation of the Regulations and re-
flect the contracting parties' desire to serve "the interests of
humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization."
38 8
Any interpretation of the provisions of the Regulations, in par-
ticular Article 43, should make reference to these statements of
purpose and principles of interpretation. 38 9
The Israeli Supreme Court, in reviewing actions of the Mili-
tary Governor as the High Court of Justice, endorsed this evolv-
ing and progressive principle specifically in the context of the
interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. 390 Judge
Barak ruled that in interpreting Article 43 of the Hague Regu-
lations, the court ought to take account of changing interna-
tional norms:
[T]he concrete content that we shall give to Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations in regard to the occupant's duty to ensure
public life and order will not be that of public life and order in the
nineteenth century, but that of a modern and civilized State at
the end of the twentieth century.39 1
This statement has many implications for various aspects of
Palestinian economic and social life. The judgment, however,
has beneficial implications for the role of Israel in undertaking
investments in infrastructure for the benefit of the local
population:
Long-term fundamental investments [made by the occupant] in
an occupied area [in the course of prolonged occupation] bringing
388 Id.
389 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (stating that treaty's annexes and preambles
should guide its interpretation). The Vienna Convention is considered to represent
customary international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 3, introductory note (1986) (stating that substan-
tive provisions of the Vienna Convention codify international law). United States
courts, for example, routinely apply the Vienna Convention in the absence of U.S.
ratification thereof. See, e.g., Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, 113 S. Ct. 2549,
2569 (1993); Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995);
Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. den'd, 113
S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
390 See A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Saria Re-
gion v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Judea and Sumaria Region, reprinted
in 14 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 301 (1984) [hereinafter Cooperative Society].
391 Id. at 307.
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about permanent changes that may last beyond the period of the
military administration are permitted if required for the benefit of
the local population-provided there is nothing in these invest-
ments that might introduce an essential modification in the basic
institutions of the area. 39 2
In general, the implication of these statements "in light of
Israel's long-term occupation" is that a prolonged occupation
makes it increasingly necessary for an occupant to take into ac-
count the economic and social needs of the local population. 393
As always, the guiding principle for alterations to the local legal
regime should be the enhancement of the welfare of the inhabit-
ants of the occupied territories.394
Given the importance of economic and social needs within
the context of evolving international norms, it is natural to di-
rect one's attention to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).395 Drafted in 1966 as
part of the United Nations' efforts to give content and detail to
the hortatory and general provisions of the 1948 Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, 396 this document, due to the breadth
of its scope and status as an integral component of the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights, is the leading document regarding the du-
392 Id. at 310.
393 See Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 112 (1978); HC 337/71 The Christian
Society for the Holy Places v. The Minister of Defense, reprinted in 2 ISR. Y.B. ON
HuM. RTS. 354, 355 (1972).
394 It should be said in this regard, however, that while the Israeli High
Court's language has been quite progressive, it has in many cases referred to inter-
national humanitarian law in order to uphold actions by the Israeli military gov-
ernment that have involved quite severe incursions on the human rights of persons
living under Israeli occupation. See Simon, supra note 294, at 24 n.120 (listing
Israeli High Court decisions upholding two-year-long night curfew on Gaza Strip;
requisitioning private lands for Israeli military and civilian settlements; restrict-
ing international telephone communications to, and from, the OPTs; suspending
indefinitely elections to local councils; and others). In addition, in many areas, the
actual changes to the legal regime of the OPTs have caused the local residents
harm. See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF THE OCCU-
PIED TERRITORIES INTO ISRAEL 33 (1989) (stating that Israel's policy of integrating
OPT's economy into Israel's through changes in legal regime have resulted in
subordinate status for Palestinian economy).
395 G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
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ties of states in economic and social spheres. 397 Indeed, as
discussed below, the document contains many provisions which
bear directly on the various aspects of Israel's water policies in
the OPTs. While it is premature to consider all of the ICESCR
as a codification of customary international law, it is nonethe-
less relevant because Israel signed the Covenant in 1966 and
ratified it in 1991.398 In addition, at least some of its provi-
sions-particularly those regarding sovereignty over natural re-
sources and equal treatment under law-represent customary
international law. As discussed in Part V below, the ICESCR
gives us a rich lens through which to view Israel's water policies
in the West Bank, a lens which has to this point not been em-
ployed in the literature on Palestinian-Israeli water.
2. Determination of Palestinian Rights to the
Mountain Aquifer
As already discussed, the Hague Regulations provide pro-
tection to immovable private property, and this protection ex-
tends to water in natural basins not yet captured by humans. 399
Importantly, this means that the water of the Mountain Aquifer
that lies underneath the West Bank, and the water of the Jor-
dan River that belongs to the Palestinian people, receives the
protection of these Regulations. The next question is the physi-
cal dimensions of these shares. The difficulty is the fact that
these two basins are international water basins. In the case of
the Mountain Aquifer, Israel and Palestine share the Western
and Eastern Aquifers, with a total annual recharge of around
500 mcm/yr.400 This amounts to approximately double Pales-
tinian water consumption, and a little less than a third of total
Israeli consumption. The Jordan River and its tributaries flow
through Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. 40 1 This
river also contributes to a significant part of the Israeli water
consumption, though Palestinian access is severely restricted.
397 See id.
398 See id. at 39.
399 See supra Part IV.A.1.
400 See Joseph W. Dellapena, Water in the Jordan Valley: The Potential and
Limits of Law, 5 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 15, 20 (1989).
401 See id. at 19-28.
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A corpus of legal principles known as international water
law is increasingly recognized as a legitimate and fair means for
regulating the division of water in international water basins in
general, and of Palestinian-Israeli shared waters in particular.
A core principle of this corpus "a principle that has earned wide-
spread acceptance" is that all basin states have a right to the
water in the basin. The question of the quantity of water that
each party may use, on the other hand, is a deeply contested
issue. Earlier this century, the reigning, and conflicting, princi-
ples were the integrity of the river principle (suggesting the
need to govern the river as a whole), and the territorial sover-
eignty principle (stating that a state may do what it likes with
water on its territory, even if this use has a harmful impact on
downstream states).40 2 These two principles have been re-
placed with three interrelated principles: the duty to effect equi-
table and reasonable use of the watercourse; the duty not to
cause appreciable harm; and the general obligation to cooperate
in the attainment of optimal utilization and adequate protection
of international watercourses. 40 3 It is through the use of these
new principles of the division of international transboundary
water resources that a determination of the extent of Palestine's
rights to the basins must be made. After this determination,
only then can the extent of Israeli violations of Palestinian pri-
vate immovable property be evaluated.
V. INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW
In Part IV.C.1, I discussed how the Regulations Annexed to
the Fourth Hague Convention sought to incorporate standards
for the protection of civilians in times of occupation that could
develop after the signing of the Convention. It did so through
the so-called Martens Clause.40 4 I also discussed how the Israeli
Supreme Court itself, in its capacity as the High Court of Jus-
tice, specifically has ruled that the Martens Clause must inform
the elaboration of a military occupant's duties to the local popu-
lation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Specifically,
that the public life and order that must be provided for is not
402 See id. at 39.
403 See Awn Khassawneh, The International Law Commission and Middle
Eastern Waters, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 186, at 21, 23.
404 See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, pmbl.
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that of the nineteenth century, but rather "that of a modern and
civilized State at the end of the twentieth century."
40 5
Water is an element of central importance to human life in
many of its most important aspects. It is thus no surprise that
the ICESCR, perhaps the leading international human rights
instrument in the field of economic, social and cultural rights,
has a variety of provisions that depend directly on Palestinian
access to water.40 6 Since the ICESCR is a particularly rich lens
through which to ascertain the minimum level of public life and
order to be expected in the period of the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, it will also serve as a particularly rich
lens through which to view Israel's neglect of its obligations
under the humanitarian and human rights law.
A. Applicability of the ICESCR to the West Bank and Gaza
Israel has been a signatory to the ICESCR since 1966; it
ratified it in October 1991 without reservation.40 7 The Cove-
nant is silent on the question of its applicability to territories
under occupation. We must therefore attempt to ascertain the
Covenant's applicability to the OPTs.
In two separate works, a general framework was proposed
for considering the applicability of specific human rights instru-
ments to the OPTs. One of the works engaged in a three-part
inquiry.408 First, it was determined that while international
humanitarian law governed the behavior of belligerent occupa-
tions, "[in general it would seem that human rights documents
may complement the law of occupation especially in specific is-
sues which they treat in greater detail."40 9 Second, it was found
that, despite international humanitarian law's preference for
the preservation of the occupied territory's preexisting legal re-
gime, "occupants [generally] would be authorized to adopt
measures that conform with internationally accepted stan-
dards, measures that could only increase the well-being of the
405 Cooperative Society, supra note 390, at 301, 307.
406 See ICESCR, supra note 395.
407 Israel signed on December 19, 1966 and ratified on August 18, 1991. See
Eyal Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to
the Occupied Territories, 26 ISR. L. REV. 24, 24 n.3 (1992).
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occupied community.' 4 10 It was then concluded that a treaty-
specific inquiry into its territorial scope should be the last part
of the inquiry into a particular instrument's applicability.
411
This conclusion was based on the Vienna Convention, which
limits the effect of a party's obligations under a treaty to that
party's territory.412 This work concluded that the ICESCR does
not apply to the OPTs.
Using a different approach, another work put forth a taxon-
omy of the potential relationships between international human
rights law and international humanitarian law.41 3 Using the
International Court of Justice's rule for the determination of in-
ternational law,41 4 it concluded that the universal applicability
relationship is the "best reasoned rule,"415 relying upon state
practice, as evidenced by United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions and international treaties, judicial opinion from in-
ternational courts, and scholarly opinion. 416 This work con-
cluded that the ICESCR did apply to the OPTs.
41 7
410 Id. at 31-32.
411 See id. at 33 & n.36. Notably, Benvenisti argues that these treaties, with-
out executing statutes, benefit Israelis within Israel less than they do residents of
the OPTs. This disparity stems from the treatment of statutes under Israeli law as
ineffective unless incorporated. See id. at 25. Nevertheless, these conventions,
"legal meaning on the plane of international law," imply the creation of obligations
to the residents of the OPTs. Benvenisti, supra note 394, at 27.
412 See Vienna Convention, supra note 389, art. 29.
413 See LINDA BEVIS, THE APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES: THE CASE OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 12-13 (1994)
(listing six relationships: universal applicability of human rights; exclusive appli-
cability of human rights in time of peace; temporary displacement of human rights
law by humanitarian law in times of war; application of local law with changes to
make it conform with fundamental human rights norms; construing humanitarian
law in accordance with human rights provisions; and creeping applicability of
human rights as occupation becomes prolonged).
414 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
993.
415 BEVIS, supra note 413, at 13.
416 See id. at 14-24.
417 See id. at 72-74; cf Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Popula-
tions in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2675(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8178 (1970) ("[flundamental human rights, as accepted in
international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply
fully in situations of armed conflict"); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 61, at 12, U.N.
Doc. A/7720 (1969); G.A. Res. 2727, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (1969), reprinted in
1970 UNITED NATIONS Y.B. 526B27 (calling upon Israel to comply with Universal
Declaration of Human Rights); COHEN, supra note 287, at 9 (international human
87
PACE INT'L L. REV.
The Israeli government has contested the applicability of
human rights conventions in general, and the ICESCR in par-
ticular, to the occupied territories. Their argument is similar to
another argument denying the de jure applicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPTs: since no sovereign
state had legitimate title to the territories occupied by it in
1967, international law that presupposes the existence of an
ousted sovereign does not apply. 418 Also, since international
human rights law regulates the relation between states and in-
dividuals, it is of no relevance to the OPTs or to other situations
in which this relationship differs from that of democratic sys-
tems. 419 This argument misunderstands the theoretical context
of international human rights law, which assumes "a difference
in interest between a government and the population it con-
trols."420 Given human rights "provenance in individuals" sta-
tus as humans,421 as well as Israel's demonstrated systematic
violation of the human rights of Palestinians in the OPTs,422 it
seems apparent that it is precisely this lack of a democratic re-
lation between Palestinians and the Israeli military govern-
ment that militates in favor of the extension of the benefits of
rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural rights could "supplement the traditional law of belligerent occupation in
order to ensure for the civilian population the maximum human rights protection
in occupied territory during prolonged belligerent occupation."); FRANK NEWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS
688 (1990) (given "inconsistencies and gaps" between human rights and humanita-
rian law regimes, "the individual should be entitled to the most protective provi-
sions of applicable international, national, or local laws").
418 See, e.g., Shamgar, supra note 289, at 263-66.
419 See Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Memorandum, supra note 289, at 81.
420 John Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of
Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of
Assembly and Expression?, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
421 See ICESCR, supra note 395, pmbl. See also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 (recognizing that rights "derive from inherent dignity of
the human person") [hereinafter ICCPR].
422 For classic reports on Israeli human rights practices during the intifada,
see generally AL-HAQ, PROTECTION DENIED: CONTINUING ISRAELI HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, 1990 (1991); AL-HAQ, A
NATION UNDER SIEGE: AL-HAQ ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCU-
PIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, 1989 (1990); AL-HAQ, PUNISHING A NATION: HUMAN
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Israeli human rights treaty obligations to Palestinians in the
OPTs.
Arguments against the applicability of the ICESCR revolve
mainly around the lack of any geographic definitions of the ex-
tent of the obligation arising under the ICESCR.423 Since the
Palestinian residents of the OPTs are not citizens of the state
party (Israel), and given the general hesitancy in the extension
of the positive rights offered under the ICESCR, some have ar-
gued that the benefits of the ICESCR presumptively do not ac-
crue to non-nationals of the state party.424 The ICESCR's
silence on this matter is in contrast to the ICCPR, which ex-
tends the rights thereunder to persons within the state party's
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, 425 and would thus auto-
matically apply to Palestinians in the OPTs.
The textual silence argument, however, is undercut by the
very text of the ICESCR. Article 2, which applies to all the
rights provided for in the language of the document, states that
the "States Parties to the present Covenant [should] undertake
to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Cove-
nant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status."426 The
preamble of the ICESCR is suffused with notions of the univer-
sality of rights, and this should inform the interpretation of the
clauses. 427 The phrasing of the rights in the individual provi-
sions repeatedly describe their intended recipients as "every-
one."4 28 The only mention of non-nationals comes in Article 2,
423 The only exception to this silence is the provision on education, which re-
quires plans of action for the provision of free and compulsory primary education
in the "metropolitan territory or other territories under [the] jurisdiction" of the
state party. ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 14.
424 See BEVIS, supra note 413, at 28-29 (arguing that international human
rights instruments only protect nationals from nationals own state and do not pro-
tect populations of occupied territories (quoting Meyrowitz, Le droit de la guerre et
les droits de l'homme, 88 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN
FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 1059, 1079-89 )); Benvenisti, supra note 394, at 33 n.36
(stating that benefits of ICESCR do not accrue to Palestinians of OPTs).
425 See ICCPR, supra note 421, art. 2(1).
426 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
427 See Vienna Convention, supra note 389, art. 31(2) (stating that preamble of
treaty should be part of context for interpretation of treaty).
428 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 6(1) ("the right of everyone to the
OJJJJUI. bUlkiLy Lu gainilaan~' 1-- Ivv _4. r_.--__ - --1
499
89
PACE INT'L L. REV.
which allows developing countries to determine the degree to
which they would guarantee the Covenant's economic rights to
non-nationals "with due regard to human rights and [the devel-
oping country's] national economy."429 This clause would be su-
perfluous without a presumption that non-nationals enjoy
rights provided under the Covenant.
B. The Nature of the Obligation Under the ICESCR
Many consider economic, social, and cultural rights to be a
poor cousin of their civil and political counterparts. 430 This per-
ception stems in part from the nature of the guarantee of the
rights contained in the ICESCR:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures.431
This provision leaves substantial room for parties to shirk
their responsibilities. 432 The Covenant leaves undefined terms
such as "steps," "maximum of its available resources," "achiev-
ing progressively," and "full realization of the rights." It does
not specify the levels of material achievement to which these
ment of just and favourable conditions of work."); art. 11(1) ("the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including ... hous-
ing."); art. 2(1) ("the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health."). See also id. art. 1(1) ("All peoples have
the right of self-determination").
429 Id. art. 2(3).
430 See SCOTT LECKIE, FROM HOUSING NEEDS TO HOUSING RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 8B11 (1992) (dis-
cussing perception of the "lower status" of economic, social, and cultural rights in
human rights theory and practice). This is despite the official United Nations posi-
tion that the two bodies of rights are integrally related and indivisible. See G.A.
Res. 130, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess. (1977) ("[alll human rights and fundamental free-
doms are indivisible and interdependent"); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, HuMAN
RIGHTS CENTER, HuMAN RIGHTS FACT SHEET No. 16, THE COMMITTEE ON Eco-
NOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 8 (1991).
431 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
432 This may help explain, in part, why the ICESCR does not contain a deroga-
tion clause as does its sister document the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. See ICCPR, supra note 421, art. 4.
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rights correspond.433 It leaves undetermined the time during
which the rights enumerated within these provisions must be
supplied to the beneficiaries of this Covenant. Furthermore, it
does not require state parties to allocate any minimum level of
funding or of resources to the fulfillment of these rights. All of
these difficulties help explain why few countries, if any, have
implemented justiciable, constitutional guarantees of such
rights,434 why the literature and jurisprudence of these rights
are so much weaker than that of the guarantees under the
ICCPR,435 and why international human rights organizations
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch do
not monitor compliance with the ICESCR.436
These factors indicate in part why a claim that Israel vio-
lates the ESC rights of Palestinians, as they relate to water, is a
novel and inherently difficult one to make. Such a claim is pos-
sible, however, for several reasons. First of all, the Israeli
state's control over Palestinians' water resources and water-re-
lated infrastructure is vast.437 This is in contrast to most other
sectors in most other countries, where developments are often a
combination of public sector and private sector initiative. This
arrangement not only allocates to the Israeli state the tools to
ameliorate the water-related rights of Palestinians within its
jurisdiction, but also highlights its obligations under the
ICESCR to manage these resources to further the ESC rights of
persons within its jurisdiction.
433 See ICESCR, supra note 395, arts. 7(a), 7(b), 9, 11(1). For example, what
constitutes "safe and healthy working conditions," "fair wages," "social security,"
and an "adequate standard of living?" Id.
434 See Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justi-
ciable Guarantees: Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
435 There are some exceptions to this neglect. Leckie proposes to interpret the
obligations of states parties to the ICESCR to promote the right to housing as a
four-part duty: the duty to recognize or to respect; the duty to promote; the duty to
protect; and the duty to fulfill or ensure. See LECKIE, supra note 430, at 63-65.
Additionally, human rights scholars and representatives of several UN bodies
have developed the so-called Limburg principles to help inform the meaning of
ICESCR art. 2(1). See id. at 28.
436 Indeed, Human Rights Watch ("HRW'), a leading U.S. human rights organ-
ization, has long expressly excluded economic, social and cultural rights from its
mandate. HRW has since changed its position slightly, and has decided to con-
sider ESC rights on a limited manner and on a trial basis during 1997.
437 For a discussion of how Israel controls the distribution, pricing, use, trans-
portation, and monitoring of water use, see supra Part III.D.
91
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Second, the extent of Israeli management of Palestinian
water is a direct consequence of Israel's colonization of the
OPTs. During the period of occupation, Israel's legislative, eco-
nomic, and military energies were employed to deprive Pales-
tinians of their fair share of the region's water resources. 438
According to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, legislative measures
are important in the way a state party is required to pursue and
promote the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR. As dis-
cussed at length in Part IV.B above, the legislative and admin-
istrative revolution that Israel wrought on Palestine's water
sector served to diminish the fulfillment of their rights under
the Covenant. Thus, Israel failed to meet even the basic re-
quirement as a signatory not to undermine the objectives 439 of
the Covenant, and as such, has violated it.
Third, instead of a situation where the deterioration of
Palestinians' water-related ESC rights occurred in an environ-
ment of neglect, or where the shortchanging of the water sector
arose in the context of widespread poverty or budget cuts, Israel
spent substantial amounts of money to build water-related in-
frastructure, though in almost all cases, these were for settle-
ments. This is in violation of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which
requires parties to promote the rights contained in the Cove-
nant "to the maximum of [their] available resources."4 0 For ex-
ample, in 1983, the Israeli government spent $5.5 million for
water development projects in the West Bank, and between
1974 to 1983, the Jewish National Fund invested nearly $16
million in West Bank projects, all of which benefited Jewish set-
tlers exclusively.441 By 1987, the last year before the intifada,
Jewish settlements in the West Bank spent approximately $75-
80 million in infrastructure development for 65,000 settlers.442
Meanwhile, the Civilian Administration had allocated $28.5
million to the West Bank development budget serving 813,000
Palestinians, of which half, at most, was actually imple-
438 See ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 5(1) ("Nothing in the present Covenant
may be interpreted as implying for any State ... any right to engage in any activ-
ity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms
recognized herein . . ." ).
439 See Vienna Convention, supra note 389, art. 18(a).
440 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
441 See BENVENISTI, supra note 345, at 124, 134.
442 See ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
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mented.443 "It can be concluded that the Israeli authorities
have obstructed efforts to foment development in the Occupied
Territories. " 44 4 Not only are these settlements illegal under in-
ternational humanitarian law, but the expenditures in many
cases detrimentally affected Palestinian water use, as Israeli
deep bore wells caused the drying up or salinification of nearby
Palestinian wells. Thus, it is clear the situation that sur-
rounded the neglect of Palestinian infrastructure was not one of
a lack of funds, but rather a problem of priorities. Israel was
quite willing, throughout the period of its occupation, to spend
lavishly on infrastructure in the OPTs, but it did so only to ben-
efit Jewish settlers. These expenditures were illegal under in-
ternational humanitarian law, and in some cases served to
deprive Palestinians of their rights under the ICESCR.
Fourth, Israel blocked efforts by international agencies to
ameliorate the water infrastructure of the OPTs, in contraven-
tion of the directive to promote ESC rights "through interna-
tional assistance and cooperation." 445 It was reported that in
the mid-1980s the Israeli military authorities approved only
44% of proposals for U.S.-funded consumption-related public
works and only 33% of proposals for such projects aimed at eco-
nomic development. 446 Denials of permits were due to a
number of reasons: the punishment of a community for non-co-
operation with the Israeli occupation authorities; the limitation
of Palestinian water consumption in order to allow for consump-
tion by nearby settlements; the encouragement of reliance on
Mekorot, Israel's national water company, rather than on lo-
cally managed wells; and others.447
443 See MERON BENVENISTI, 1987 REPORT: DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL,
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK 29 (1987); Hisham Jabr,
Financial Administration of the Israeli-Occupied West Bank, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 228, at
377, 390-91; Rishmawi, supra note 375, at 267, 285.
444 Jabr, supra note 443, at 391.
445 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
446 See MERON BENVENISTI, U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDED PROJECTS IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA (1977B83) 13-14 (Working Paper No. 13 Jerusalem: West Bank
Data Base Project, 1984).
447 See, e.g., Turkkaya Ataov, The Israeli Use of Palestinian Waters, in PALES-
TINIAN RIGHTS: AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL 150, 153 (Medina Press, Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod ed., 1982) (reporting Israeli government's denial of an American volunteer
organization's offer to provide funds to replace open irrigation ditches with pipes in
Jiftlik. a Palestinian Jordan Valley-area tnwn); POI.Tc'v PRi.Apw- Twr .. ,nrn. nntp
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Finally, the results of these policies are large differences in
the quantity and quality of water and water-related infrastruc-
ture enjoyed by Israelis and settlers on the one hand, and by
Palestinians on the other.448 These differences evidence that
Israel is clearly capable of improvements in the water sector (at
least in the area of quantities supplied for personal and agricul-
tural consumption), and that its failures toward the Palestinian
sector are a function, not of global resource or financial con-
straints, but rather of misplaced priorities.
The specific question of the level of Israel's obligation mer-
its further analysis. Israel has been a party to the ICESCR only
since October 1991. For approximately twenty-five years, it was
merely a signatory. Therefore, its obligations under the treaty
for the pre-ratification period was that it not engage in any ac-
tivities that undermine the objectives of the treaty.449 In other
words, while before 1991 Israel was arguably not obliged to un-
dertake the positive steps required by the ICESCR, as a signa-
tory, it did not take any actions that undermined the rights
guaranteed in the Covenant. Of course, to the extent t hat any
of the provisions appearing in the Covenant represented cus-
tomary international law, Israel should be held to the standard
for observance to which ratifying parties are held.
C. The Water-Related Rights Under the ICESCR
Water is a critical component of human life and society. It
is thus no surprise that an analysis of Palestinian human rights
that require or implicate fair and adequate access to water are
so varied.450
3, app. 1, at 15B16 (reporting water-related projects halted or subverted because of
efforts by Jewish settlers to appropriate benefits of investments).
448 See infra Parts V.C.1, 4-5.
449 "A State is obliged to refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty" when it has signed it. Vienna Convention, supra note 389, art.
18(a).
450 Similarly, the fulfillment of the right to housing requires that many differ-
ent other human rights be addressed. See LECKIE, supra note 430, at 42 (linking
the right to housing to the right to freedom of movement, assembly and associa-
tion, an adequate standard of life, health, work, and others).
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1. ICESCR Article 1: Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources
The Covenant guarantees that "[aill people may, for their
own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
.... In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence."451 It also states that "[niothing in the present
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources. 452
The first article of the Covenant is a codification of the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty over a nation's natural re-
sources. This represented a customary norm of international
law at the time of the Israeli occupation, and thus Israel was
bound by it throughout the period of its occupation. 45
3
As earlier discussed, at the start of the Israeli occupation,
Palestinians already enjoyed a communal right to water re-
sources. 454 What a right to control natural resources adds is a
right for the Palestinian people as a whole to be engaged in the
management and development of its water resources. In other
words, while a private right to common property under the Ot-
toman mubah regime involves the right to draw upon the prop-
erty only to the extent that such use does not harm other users,
a people's permanent sovereignty over natural resources guar-
antees that people's exclusive right to manage the resource at
the national level; to create an integrated network for resource
production, transportation, and storage; to channel it to specific
451 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 1(2). See also ICCPR, supra note 421, art. 1.
452 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 25. See also ICCPR, supra note 421, art. 47.
453 See G.A. Res. 7/626 of 21 Dec. 1952 (declaring that "the right of peoples
freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their
sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter
of the United Nations"); G.A. Res. 1803, 17th Sess. (1962). See also Blaine Sloane,
Study of the Implications, under International Law, of the United Nations Resolu-
tions on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, on the Occupied Palestin-
ian and Other Arab Territories and on the Obligations of Israel Concerning its
Conduct in These Territories, U.N. Doc. A/38/265, E/1983/85, %% 3-12, June 21,
1983 (quoting General Assembly resolutions, international conventions, state
practice, and decisions of municipal courts and arbitral tribunals for conclusion
that "permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a generally accepted princi-
ple of international law"); Id. 16-18 (listing General Assembly resolutions on
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian and
other Arab territories).
454 See supra Part W.A.
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sectors; to enact pricing policies; to engage in or license explora-
tion; and to export it. Israel's military government and domes-
tic water sector suppressed all of these aspects of sovereignty
over natural resources during the occupation.
In order to accomplish any of these objectives, the people
utilizing the natural resource must, at a minimum, benefit from
a legal regime that recognizes those people's property rights to
its natural resources. Of the means the ICESCR suggests to
promote ESC rights, it emphasizes the priority of "legislative
measures."455 Israel passed a series of military orders applica-
ble to the OPTs after the 1967 war. 456 At the end of this legisla-
tive revolution, Israel held title (under Israeli law) to
Palestine's ground and surface water; determined the allocation
of water quantities to the OPTs; set the water prices; controlled
the pumping and distribution of water; physically integrated
Palestine's water networks into Israel's; and extended the insti-
tutional control of domestic water bodies into the OPTs.457
These actions resulted in extremely limited Palestinian control
over their agricultural sector. 458 They could not, for example,
transfer water from the relatively water-rich West Bank to the
Gaza Strip.
The effect of these changes was to deprive Palestinians
completely of any form of control over their water resources,
whether political, economic, or technical. Military Orders No.
291 of 1968459 and 450 and 451 of 1971 deprived Palestinians of
the right to dig new wells or to buy and sell water rights with-
out the approval of the military commander. 460 The military
commanders have rarely granted this permission since the issu-
ance of the Orders. 461 The assertion of water rights on an indi-
vidual level has been curtailed through Israeli control of the
455 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
456 See supra Part III.C.
457 See supra Part IV.B.
458 See infra Part V.C.3.
459 Quoted in Special Report: Sovereignty Over Water Resources in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, 5 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 346, 355-56.
460 See id. at 355.
461 See SHEHADEH, supra note 2, at 154 (only five permits for new wells were
granted in the first 16 years of military occupation; digging of deep Israeli wells led
to drying up of nearby spring used by Palestinian farmers); CENTER FOR ENGINEER-
rNG AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 26 (20 new wells for domestic uses and three
for agricultural uses). See also Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note
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registration of water-related records. The incorporation of the
OPTs into Israel's national water network has also resulted in
the stripping of Palestinian municipalities' preexisting powers
to levy and collect water rates and charges. 46 2
Whereas prior Jordanian water legislation specifically pro-
hibited the transfer of water from one basin to another, and
even required authorization from the Jordanian Council of Min-
isters to transfer water from one area to another even within
the same basin, Israeli law has abolished this basin-of-origin
protection.463 Indeed, Israel's National Water Carrier,46 4 which
is the backbone of Israel's water transportation system, spans
several basins, from the Lake Tiberias/Upper Jordan basin to
the north, to the coastal aquifer region in the middle of Israel, to
the desert-area basin in the Naqab desert in the south.465 Be-
cause of the connection of wells extracting water from the
Mountain Aquifer to Israel's National Water Carrier, Israeli
control over the Mountain Aquifer has enabled Israel to trans-
port at least some West Bank water to the various basins in
that country. At the very least, Israel's water planners directed
high-quality West Bank water to many of Israel's major cities
for domestic consumption. 466 Obviously, at least before the In-
terim Agreement, this extra-basin use was not with the permis-
sion of the Palestinians.
As discussed earlier, Israel unilaterally extended the juris-
diction of many of its public water-policy setting bodies, such as
the Water Board and the Planning Committee, to the OPTs. 467
In particular, the Civil Administration "subject to the control of
the inter-ministerial Committee of the Israeli national govern-
ment" was merely an extension of the Israeli Cabinet's author-
ity into the OPTs.468 The inclusion of Palestinians from the
OPTs on these bodies might have contributed somewhat to the
239, 19, 37 (stating that Mekorot dug 20 to 25 deep wells in Jordan Valley area
to supply nearby Jewish settlements and 30 wells overall).
462 See Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 239, 21-22, 24.
463 See id. 23.
464 See John D. Keenan, Technological Aspects of Water Resources Manage-
ment: Euphrates and Jordan, in COUNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT, supra note 18, at 41.
465 See Lowi, supra note 74, at 117, map 5.1.
466 See supra Part II.A., tbl. 2.
467 See supra Part LV.B.
468 See supra Part IV.B.
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alleviation of the Palestinians' complete lack of control over
water planning. However, no such inclusion has occurred. 469 In
addition, no Palestinians served on the administrative or other
tribunals that heard appeals against decisions by Israeli water
authorities. 470 It is not surprising, therefore, that the resulting
policies have been extremely detrimental to the Palestinian res-
idents of the OPTs. Even forgetting for a moment the larger
context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is not hard to imag-
ine that political bodies, engaged essentially in the allocation of
a critical natural resource and subsidies to different sectors of
the country, would penalize sectors not represented in these
bodies.
When Israel extended its water planning apparatus into
the OPTs, it encountered not an administrative vacuum but a
preexisting institutional structure. Instead of destroying Pales-
tinian institutions, Israel merely stripped them of many of their
powers and subjugated them to its authority. In 1982, in the
context of its creeping annexation of the West Bank, Israel
transferred management of Palestine's water resources to
Mekorot, Israel's national water company. 471 In doing so it
downgraded the functions of the existing Water Department
created during the Jordanian administration to low-level ad-
ministrative functions consisting of water meter monitoring
and bill collection. 472 All technical and planning positions,
which had been held by Palestinians, were eliminated, and
since the occupation, Israel has not hired a single Palestinian
469 One United Nations report summarized the effects of this political exclu-
sion as follows:
Since it appears that the benefit of public participation, at least in the
decentralized water management bodies, is not extended to local Arab
populations "even in those cases in which their legitimate water rights are
or might be affected" or where the water resources under consideration
are located in the occupied territories, Arab water consumers or users
have no say in the formulation of policies or in the decisions taken or ad-
vice given by the responsible bodies.
Report of the Secretary-General 1984, supra note 239, T 26.
470 See id. 30-31. Indeed, no Palestinians are even employed in significant
positions in Israeli water-related entities. See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 3.
471 See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DuALIsM (1989) (describing exten-
sion of jurisdiction of Israeli national institutions to the Occupied Territories as
part of process of annexation to Israel).
472 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 2-3
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hydrologist.4 7 3 The extension of Mekorot's control has also
meant an Israeli monopoly over data, and a consistent policy of
denying Palestinians access to data.474
In addition, the Palestinian water sector that remained 475
has operated under extremely difficult circumstances as Israeli
water institutions marginalized and weakened it. Some of the
problems these institutions face are: a dearth of engineering
staff; minimal in-service training programs; a lack of training in
the economics of water management; absence of Occupied-Ter-
ritories-wide water management schemes; minimal linkages be-
tween water authorities and small-scale, largely donor-funded
water and sanitation projects; minimal linkages between these
institutions and others involved in other sectors with a signifi-
cant impact on water, such as agriculture, health, and industry;
lack of capacity for water-quality testing; and scant resources
for repair and maintenance of water distribution and treatment
systems. There were only an estimated six to eight water and
sanitation engineers with a B.S. degree or higher in the Occu-
pied Territories in the early 1990s. 4 76 There was also a lack of
economic analyses of the water sector, which could have con-
tributed to an understanding of the role of market pricing in
promoting efficient allocation of water among competing
users. 477 Palestinian potable water and sanitation enterprises
are not always able to recuperate their operating and capital
costs (though Gazan municipalities fare somewhat better).4 78
This indicated that their services were under priced or under
subsidized, or that the municipalities paid too high a price for
their water, or a combination of these factors.47 9 "[U]nder cur-
rent political conditions, opportunities for large-scale assistance
in water and sanitation may appear to be limited .... [T]he
473 See id. at 3.
474 See id. at 2-3. See also CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note
335, at 27-28.
475 The pre-Oslo Palestinian institutional water sector consisted of four re-
gional utilities, municipal water departments, and village and local councils. In
addition, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency supplies water to approxi-
mately 20% of Gaza's refugees. See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING,
supra note 335, at 27-28.
476 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 18.
477 See id.
478 See id.
479 See id. at 17-18.
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system [I planning and management functions-vital to the
formulation of sound water and sanitation policies-are outside
the purview of Palestinian institutions and of donors which sup-
port them."480
The kind of water authority required to bring about a sub-
stantial improvement in the present water situation is one that
has the power to regulate and set prices. Such an authority
would require a qualified staff. Some of the most urgent tasks
would include the rehabilitation of springs and the creation of a
regional master plan for water resource management. The au-
thority would have exclusive control over Palestine's endoge-
nous aquifers, and would cooperate with Mekorot in the
utilization and preservation of the shared water resources. 48 '
Palestinian water sector professionals have also called for a
radical reorganization of the Palestinian water sector at a na-
tional level. 48 2
In addition to denying Palestinians access to their own nat-
ural resources, Israel may also be causing or contributing to
long-term damage to the Mountain and Gaza Aquifers and to
Lake Tiberias because of its overconsumption. In the case of
the aquifers, overproduction of water can lead to a lowering of
the water level of underground water levels, and consequently
the intrusion of brackish water from other, higher-pressure for-
mations. 483 This sort of damage can take years to reverse. The
Mountain Aquifer, which is used by Israel as its main fresh-
water reservoir, was in 1990 first allowed to drop below the so-
called "Red Line," or the water level below which serious dam-
age could occur.48 4 Even if Israel were to end its denials of Pal-
estinian access to, and control of, its water resources,
Palestinians would still have to contend with the long-term
damage caused in whole or in part by Israeli policies. 48 5
Far from fulfilling its obligations under customary interna-
tional law and as a signatory to the Covenant, Israel has ac-
tively undermined Palestinian sovereignty over its water
480 Id. at 1, 17-19.
481 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 14.
482 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 39-48.
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resources.48 6 Its military occupation brought about a legislative
and administrative revolution to the Palestinian water sector.
By the time the dust had settled, Israel had established com-
plete control of Palestine's water and subjugated it to Israel's
domestic water institutions. It also neglected the development
of a domestic water development and planning infrastructure,
preferring to keep all important decisions and activity regard-
ing this vital resource exclusively in Israeli hands. This not
only blocked the fulfillment of the right of sovereignty over nat-
ural resources, it also prevented the creation and maintenance
of the infrastructure necessary for the fulfillment of the other
water-related rights discussed below.
Ironically, Israel has used a method emphasized by the
ICESCR for implementation of ESC rights, "legislative
means,"48 7 not to promote the right of Palestinians to control
their natural resources, but rather to abolish it.
2. ICESCR Article 2: Nondiscrimination
The Covenant requires parties to guarantee that "the
rights enunciated in the ... Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status."488 Nondiscrimination, or at least
486 See supra Part IV.
487 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 2(1).
488 Id. art. 2(2).
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equality, is not only a customary norm of international law,4 89 it
is a critical component of the rule of law.49 0
Of course, it is not impermissible to treat persons differ-
ently under the law. One scholar discerned from a review of
various instruments a "composite conception" of discrimination:
This discrimination involves: (1) a difference in treatment; (2)
which is based on certain prohibited grounds; (3) and has a cer-
tain purpose or effect; (4) in selective fields.4 91 In American ju-
risprudence, for example, race as a category for discrimination
is "suspect," but not forbidden, and courts will allow such dis-
crimination if it is necessarily related to a compelling state in-
terest.4 92 In the case of the OPTs, Israel has justified its control
over Palestine's water resources by the need for control in order
to preserve the region's scarce water resources. If that is indeed
the case, then it is difficult to understand how Israeli policies
that discriminate in favor of Israelis and Jewish settlers are in
489 See, e.g., UDHR supra note 396, at art. 7, ("[NaIll are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declara-
tion and against any incitement to such discrimination."); ICCPR, supra note 421,
art. 26; International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, G.A. Res. 2106, art. 2, 21 GAOR, Supp. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 47, entered
into force, Jan. 4, 1969; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). Israel considers
concepts such as "justice and fairness" and "prevention of discrimination" to be a
part of the "basic principles of natural justice as derived from the system of law
existing in Israel." Shamgar, supra note 289, at 266-67. According to the Israeli
Attorney General at the time of the occupation, these basic principles were meant
to guide Israeli legal policy in the OPTs. See id. See also Meir Shamgar, Legal
Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government-The Initial Stage, in
MILITARY GovERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967B80, at
285, 303 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). Thus, Israel itself seems to recognize the ap-
plicability of the principle of nondiscrimination to the OPTs.
490 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 38, at 237 (1973).
491 See E. Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 996, 1001 (1966). This
construction found a response in the Human Rights Committee, which in its gen-
eral comment on Article 2(1) of the ICCPR stated that the term discrimination
"should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms."
General Comment No. 18(37), U.N. Doc. A/45/40, at 174, . 7, 45 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 40, 1990.
492 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
[Vol. 10:411
102http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/3
1998] NATURAL RESOURCES UNDER OCCUPATION 513
any way rationally related to this ostensibly legitimate interest.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of Israel's policies is the dep-
rivation of Palestinian domestic and agricultural consumers in
order to favor their Israeli and Jewish counterparts, then these
policies are illegal on their face. In both cases then, the unequal
treatment violates the principle of equality and
nondiscrimination.
Since the right to equality was a customary norm of inter-
national law throughout the period of Israel's occupation, Israel
had an obligation to promote equality in access to water and in
control over the nationalized water sector. Unfortunately,
Israel took affirmative steps to achieve precisely the opposite.
This is most evident in pricing levels, subsidization, quantities
distributed and control over the water sector.
Pricing and subsidization. Table 5 summarizes the prices
paid by consumers of water in the West Bank and Gaza as com-
pared to their Israeli counterparts:
TABLE 5. PRICES OF WATER TO CONSUMERS IN
WEST BANK AND GAZA.
4 9 3





Beit Hanoun 0.22 85
Rafah 0.52 200
Gaza average 0.37 142
Israeli domestic sector average 0.26 100
As discussed above, Mekorot played (and to this day plays)
a large role in the exploitation of West Bank water and the de-
livery of drinking water to Palestinian consumers. 494 It, along
with other Israeli entities such as the Jerusalem Municipality,
supplied 50% of Palestinian domestic water.495 While Mekorot
was (and is) responsible for the planning and operation of the
493 POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 16-17.
494 See supra Parts II-III.
495 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 30.
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water networks, the Civilian Administration was responsible
for bill collection. The procedure under occupation has been for
Mekorot or another Israeli bulk water supplier to issue invoices
for consumption by Palestinian water authorities and hand over
the invoices to the Civil Administration. The Civil Administra-
tion then added an extra 50% and presented the bill for collec-
tion.496 Palestinian bulk purchasers paid U.S. $0.60/m3 4 9 7,
compared to a delivered cost of water of U.S. $0.33/m3 (includ-
ing capital costs), 498 yielding a profit to Israel of almost 100%.
This high price resulted in the utilities' inability to cover their
operating expenses, let alone capital expenditures. Thus, mu-
nicipalities were unable to make the investments necessary to
reduce water wasted through leakage from underground pipes,
to improve quality control, or to effect other improvements in
service. This bald discrimination was especially objectionable
considering the relative poverty of Palestinians as compared to
Israelis. 499
Of course, given the initially higher cost of water, many
municipalities have passed the inflated price of water on to con-
sumers. This high price for water causes many Palestinians to
surreptitiously tap into drinking water networks and draw
water from municipal networks without paying for it, which
496 See id. The Jerusalem Municipality (an Israeli municipality) pays Mekorot
NIS 0.70/m3 and sells it to consumers for NIS 3.00/m3, a margin of 328%. By com-
parison, the Jerusalem Water Undertaking, a Palestinian municipality serving the
Ramallah area, pays the Jerusalem municipality NIS 1.92/M3 and sells at the
same average rate of NIS 3.00/M3, resulting in a margin of only 55%. See id. At
the time of this report, the exchange rate was approximately NIS 3.00 to U.S. $1.
See id.
497 See id.
498 See id. This is the calculation of Tahal, an Israeli water consulting firm.
Mekorot calculates the average variable cost of cubic meter of water, including
costs of lifting, to be 19.5 cents/m. See Shuval, supra note 16, at 73, 76. The
weighted average elevation of Israel's water resources is 82 meters below the
ground surfaces to which it must be delivered for irrigation and other uses, neces-
sitating massive pumping of almost all surface and ground water involved. Israel
in 1988 dedicated 12% of its total energy consumption to pumping this water. See
id. at 75.
499 In 1984, for example, per capita Palestinian GNP was approximately one-
fifth that of Israel. See KAHAN, supra note 184, at 68.
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leads to further stress on the municipalities that are already
inadequately funded. 500
In addition to the price inflation, Palestinians do not benefit
from the extensive subsidies, which Jewish settlers or Israeli
consumers enjoy. In particular, semiofficial agencies such as
the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund subsidize a
significant portion of Jewish settler consumption water.50 1 In
the final analysis, Palestinian farmers paid somewhere in the
neighborhood of three to four times the price paid by Jewish
settlers, while Israeli consumers, by operation of Israel's Water
Law, benefited from cross-subsidization of water consump-
tion.50 2
Quantities and quality. Israelis and Jewish settlers con-
sumed far more water per capita than did Palestinians. Table 4
illustrates the large disparities between the different groups'
water consumption.
TABLE 4. PER CAPITA ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN
WATER CONSUMPTION (M
3 /YR) 5 0 3
AGGREGATE DOMESTIC
West Bank Palestinian 125-30 25-35
Gaza Palestinian 100-83 23-38
Israel 450-500 >= 100
West Bank Settlers 580-650 90-120
Gaza Settlers >= 1400 ?
This discrimination has also occurred along the dimension
of quality. The placement of Gaza settlements has coincided
with the locations of plentiful 50 4 or non-saline water re-
500 These so-called "black losses" for areas serviced by the Jerusalem Water
Undertaking are in the neighborhood of 10% of total water consumption. See
CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 31-32.
501 See MERON BENVENISTI & S. KHAYAT, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ATLAS 26
(1988).
502 See supra Part III.B.
503 Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to
International Water Law: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Waters, 35 NAT. RES.
J. 223, 226, tbl. 2 (1995).
504 See Roy, supra note 19, at 144.
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sources. 50 5 This denied Palestinians access to their own re-
sources. Additionally, much of the Mekorot water production in
the Eastern Basin of the West Bank has been through deep bore
wells that are able to extract water from deeper, less contami-
nated layers or from upstream parts of underground basins.50 6
As described in Part III.B, water, as a public resource
under Israeli law, is the subject of public control through a vari-
ety of administrative bodies. This control apparatus exerted its
control over the water of the OPTs via the Civil Administration
and Mekorot, two Israeli institutions. Palestinians were com-
pletely excluded from representation on any Israeli public water
related institution. In comparison, Jewish settlers could par-
ticipate in the Civil Administration, and if they held Israeli citi-
zenship they could participate in the Israeli government and
public institutions. 50 7
For the Israeli state to have promoted the equal treatment
of Palestinians, it would have had to severely undermine the
basic objects of Israeli control over Palestinian water: the favor-
ing of Israeli uses over Palestinian uses. The promulgation of
nondiscrimination guidelines to protect Palestinians from un-
fair allocations and pricing would have been a very cheap and
effective way to promote equality, given the overwhelming pub-
lic control of water in Israel. This of course never came about
and is a prime example of Israel's violation of its obligations
under the ICESCR. 50
3. ICESCR Article 6: The Right to Earn a Living
The ICESCR states:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportu-
nity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or ac-
cepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be take by a State Party to the present Covenant
to achieve the full realization of this right shall include ...
505 In particular, the northwestern and southeastern corners of the Gaza Strip
have received the highest number of settlements. See id. at 140, tbl. 7.2 (map
portraying location of Israeli settlements in Gaza Strip); BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra
note 156, at 14 (map portraying salinity of aquifer throughout the Gaza Strip).
506 See Roy, supra note 19, at 144.
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policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and
cultural development and full and productive employment
509
This article, in conjunction with Article 2, imposes on parties
the obligation to take positive steps towards creating economic
conditions conducive to job creation. The directive to create
"steady economic, social and cultural development" imposes an
obligation upon parties to create conditions that facilitate eco-
nomic development and expansion. Naturally, the precise
means of achieving these goals requires a more specialized un-
derstanding of the needs and requirements of the main sectors
of a state's economy. It is unlikely that the right to earn a living
through work was, or is, a customary norm of international law.
Therefore, the standard that should apply to Israel during the
pre-ratification period is the noninterference standard; that
Israel not take steps "which would defeat the object and pur-
pose' of the ICESCR.510 However, Israel failed to meet this
standard and pursued actions and policies that actively stood in
the way of the full development of the Palestinian agricultural
sector. These actions and policies violate Palestinian rights as
guaranteed by the Covenant.5 1'
The pillar of the Palestinian economy was the agricultural
sector. Agriculture accounted for approximately 25% of Pales-
tinian GDP and employed about 20% of the labor force.512 The
bulk of it was found in the West Bank. By contrast, agriculture
in the Gaza Strip, while not as important, was a significant part
of the economy, employing in the mid-80's 18% of the labor force
509 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 6.
510 Vienna Convention, supra note 377, art. 18(a).
511 This is especially true since these policies affected people who could not
change location and work in the areas and economic sectors that benefited from
Israel's water policies. Israel took water from Palestinian agriculturalists to give
to Israeli agriculturalists. In a setting with free movement of labor and capital,
there would have been a move of Palestinian agriculturalists to the privileged
area. In the present case, long-standing Israeli curtailments on Palestinian resi-
dence and land ownership in the areas occupied in 1948, in addition to the limita-
tions on even transitory movement between the OPTs and Israel imposed since the
Gulf War, limit the possibility of Palestinians benefiting from growth in agricul-
ture inside the Green Line.
512 See HISHAM AwARTANI, AL-'ILAQAT AL-URDUNIYYAH-AL-FILASTINIYYAH FI AL-
MAJALAT AL-ZIRA 'WYAH: AL-'AwAMIL AL-MUHADDIDAH WA AL-'AFAQ AL-MuTAHa [Pal-
estinian-Jordanian Agricultural Relationships: Constraints and Prospects] tbl. 1
(Center for Palestinian Research and Studies 1994).
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and contributing 16% of the GDP.513 The aridity of the area
meant that the availability of water for irrigation had a very
large impact on the economic output of the sector. An institu-
tional regime that limited Palestinian farmers' access to water
is one that posed an important barrier to the expansion and de-
velopment of the agricultural sector, one of the economy's larg-
est employing sectors. The consequential decrease in the size of
the economy deprived persons who otherwise would have been
gainfully employed, the opportunity to earn a living. These bar-
riers also meant that those who were currently engaged in the
agricultural sector, as farmers or as agricultural workers, were
limited in the economic value of their investments and/or
work.514 In the end, such controls have led to a limitation on
the ability of breadwinners to provide for their families.
As discussed above, after the 1967 War, Israel declared the
Jordan River Valley, a rich agricultural region, to be a Closed
Military Area.51 5 In addition, "Israeli forces destroyed many
West Bank water sources, including numerous wells in Jiftlik
and Jericho, and scores of Jordan River water pumps in Tu-
bas."51 6 The digging of new wells and the repair of existing ones
both required permission of the Israeli military commander,
and the owners of these wells were, in most cases, not given
permission to rebuild them.51 7
The restrictions on water use soon affected all of the OPTs.
In the late 1970s, the Israeli Military Commander began asking
513 See Roy, supra note 19, at 31, 38. This relatively small size is a phenome-
non that accompanied the Israeli invasion. Until 1967, agriculture was "the larg-
est single economic activity in the Gaza Strip," though with the availability of
higher-paying employment in Israel combined with the economic strangulation of
the agricultural sector by the Israelis, the relative importance of the Gazan agri-
cultural sector has dropped. Id. at 38, 45-51.
514 See AwARTANI, supra note 512, tbl. 1. The Palestinian agricultural sector
now contributes to 19.4% of GDP, compared to 24.1% in 1972. This drop is due to
the overall increase in the Palestinian GDP along with the relatively slow growth
of the agricultural sector. Between 1972 and 1992, the volume output of Palestin-
ian agriculture grew by 2.2% per year, whereas the economic value grew by 8% per
year. However, the lost potential is indicated by the fact that irrigated land only
increased from 9.5% to 10.9% of the land. See id.
515 See supra Part III.
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Palestinian farmers to put meters on their wells.518 Soon there-
after, this was followed by the institution of a Military Order,
which limited water use by Palestinian agriculturalists to 110%
of 1977 levels. In the aggregate, the level of consumption by
West Bank farmers was frozen at 90B100 mcm/yr, an amount
which exceeded 1967 consumption levels by only 20%.519 This
was despite the explosion in population in the West Bank,
which has more than doubled since the occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza. 520 These limitations were enforced through
the imposition of fines for "excess" pumping; fines that
amounted to a per cubic meter charge of four times the base
price. 521
These restrictions on quantities have meant a handicap for
Palestinian agriculturalists as relative to their Israeli and Jew-
ish settler counterparts. As Palestine is an arid region, the in-
creased irrigation of agricultural lands led to higher output. As
an indication of the missed potential in Palestinian agricultural
production, only 97,350 dunums , or 6% of cultivated land in the
West Bank, is irrigated, a figure that has not changed since
1966.522 In Gaza, 60% (114,000 dunums) of all cultivated land
is irrigated. 523 The comparable figures for Israeli agricultural
lands are 43.5% (2,153,000 dunums).524 Overall irrigated land
518 See Interview with Jihad A-Haddad, President, Jericho Agricultural Mar-
keting Cooperative (Aug. 24, 1994).
519 See DRURY & WINN, supra note 515, at 60. More pessimistic estimates ex-
ist. See, e.g., CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 23 (stat-
ing that Palestinian farmers are limited to 90% of the 1970-73 level of
groundwater production).
520 I used here the estimate of 586,000 inhabitants for "Judea and Samaria" in
1967. See 15 CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAzA STATIS-
TICS (1985). 1,694,000 inhabitants for December 1992. See MUSTAFA BARGOUTHI &
IBRAHIM DAIBES, INFRASTRUCTURE AND HEALTH SERVICES IN THE WEST BANK:
GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH CARE PLANNING 17 (1993). Unfortunately, the latter
number can only be tentative, as no one has taken a census in the OPTs since
1967. See id. at 13.
521 See DRURY & WINN, supra note 516, at 60.
522 See KAHAN, supra note 184, at 114. Benvenisti states that Israel has im-
posed a quota on the Palestinian agricultural sector of 100,000 irrigated dunums.
See MERON BENVENISTI, 1986 REPORT: DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK 10, 21 (1986). One dunum = .23
acres.
523 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 4.
524 See KAHAN, supra note 184, at 114. Israeli Palestinians are somewhere in
the middle, in that Israel irrigates 22% of the total cultivated land owned by Is-
raeli Palestinians. See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 47.
519
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in Israel is ten times that of the OPTs, and four times in per
capita terms. Settlers have benefited greatly from Israeli poli-
cies, which cap Palestinian agricultural development. They
have been able to irrigate 47,000 dunums of confiscated Pales-
tinian land, or 69% of all land cultivated, while the area of Pal-
estinian irrigated land remained stagnant.525 These settlers
were allocated twice as much water per dunum than the Pales-
tinians. 526 In 1986, Benvenisti estimated water use by thirty
Israeli settlements at 60 mcmyr, and that of 400 Palestinian
villages at 100 mcm/yr.527 On a per capita basis, the distribu-
tion in Gaza is even more skewed.528
In addition to global quantity limitations, the particular
implementation of the caps on Palestinian water consumption
introduced barriers of different sorts to the Palestinian agricul-
tural sector. Many Palestinian farmers, fearing that water us-
age below the quota allotted by the military commander would
result in a decrease in the quota, would use more water than
was necessary during years with higher-than-average rainfall
to keep their usage as close to the allotted amount as possi-
ble.529 Thus, paradoxically, a system of water management
that sought to limit water consumption by the Palestinian agri-
cultural sector perversely led to water wastage. Not only could
the global amount of water use not increase, but it was highly
difficult to reallocate water quantities to different regions of the
West Bank in order to grow certain kinds of crops that were
more suitable for different areas. This was because Israeli mili-
tary authorities imposed water production quotas on every well,
and Israel maintained a hard policy against increasing Pales-
tinian agricultural water consumption.
Since water use was rationed, many farmers who received
their water from a common source were allowed access to the
water on a periodic basis. Thus, if a farmer's scheduled water
usage time fell during a curfew, then that farmer could either
risk arrest (or worse) by Israeli military authorities for dis-
obeying the curfew or forego some of his allotment. 530
525 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9; KAHAN, supra note 184, at 114.
526 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9; KAHAN, supra note 184, at 114.
527 See BENVENISTI, supra note 501, at 21.
528 See id. at 22.
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Palestinian agriculture also suffered from unfair pricing
policies that forced Palestinians to pay a higher price for lower
quality water than Israelis and settlers. Palestinian farmers
paid more than double the price paid by Jordanian farmers.531
Jewish settlers received subsidies from the government and the
World Zionist Organization 32 that resulted in a total cost to the
final consumer that was one-third that charged to Palestinian
farmers. 533 This meant that, all else being equal, Palestinian
agriculture was hampered by the far higher price it paid for
water, which was a critical input into that sector's production.
Israel's generous subsidies to the Israeli agricultural sector
encouraged the cultivation of water-hungry crops for export
which were not otherwise economically viable. This led to ex-
cessive water use, and to greater stress on water resources. The
Israeli water sector made sure that in the division of waters,
settlers received the highest quality water at the expense of the
Palestinians. Since Israeli wells in the OPTs tended to be much
deeper, wider, and equipped with more pumping power than ex-
isting Palestinian wells, Israeli wells were able to pump much
higher volumes than nearby Palestinian wells. When the
amount these new wells pumped was so great as to lead to sig-
nificant changes in the local water table, nearby Palestinian
wells dried up or salinated. 534 Local crops that depended on
water in general or on water with a certain level of salinity were
in some instances damaged or lost. Salinity levels were espe-
cially high in Gaza, as already discussed. 535 Wells in the West
Bank villages of AJ-Auja, Bardala, Tal-al-Baida, Bayt Dibs and
Toubas have dried up or diminished in flow due to nearby Is-
raeli pumping, while others in Jericho and Ayn-Sultan have ex-
perienced increased salinity.536 This increased salinity forced
changes in the kinds of crops grown or in a decrease in the
number of crop cycles possible per year.537 Often, this forced
531 See DRURY & WINN, supra note 515, at 60.
532 See MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF
ISRAEL'S POLICIES 51 (1984).
533 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9. This differential rises to one-fifth when one
considers relative income. Others estimate a greater disparity. See, e.g.,
BENVENISTI, supra note 501, at 21-22.
534 See DRURY & WINN, supra note 515, at 61.
535 See supra Part II.C.
536 See DRURY & WINN, supra note 515, at 61.
537 See A1-Haddad Interview, supra note 529.
111
PACE INT'L L. REV.
the farmers to cultivate crops that were not as profitable. 538 At-
tempts to obtain permission from the military commander to re-
pair these damaged wells by deepening them often ended in
failure. 539 Similar effects were observed in Gaza, where thirty-
five to forty new wells, dug in the mid-1980s to serve the needs
of Gazan settlers, contributed to the over pumping of the aqui-
fer and the increased salinification of the aquifer.540
Certainly, Israeli water policies placed severe obstacles in
the path of the Palestinian agricultural sector. But these were
only a few of many limiting policies to which Palestinian agri-
culture was subjected. Israel geared its agricultural policies in
the OPTs to limiting the output of Palestinian agriculture to
allow it to satisfy local needs that Israeli agriculture had not
targeted as an export market. For example, Palestinians were
long forbidden to export their produce to Israel or to the Euro-
pean market. 541 Some of the other forces were: land fragmenta-
tion; lack of capital accumulation; absence of agricultural credit
agencies; lack of access to markets; and the creation of closed
military areas along the Jordan River after the 1967 War. 542
Thus, while it is true that the agricultural sector saw large ad-
vances in volume output under Israeli occupation, this growth
occurred in spite of a highly unfavorable regulatory environ-
ment and was less than the growth rates of Israeli agriculture.
While there were other constraints, the water constraint was
real and undoubtedly had an impact on agricultural growth.
Further, the existence of the other constraints do not diminish
Israel's liability under Article 6 of the ICESCR, since many of
these (export bans, a lack of storage facilities, and a lack of
538 See, e.g., DRURY & WiNN, supra note 515, at 62 (stating that Palestinian
farmers whose wells have been adversely impacted by nearby Israeli superwells
are often forced to cultivate tomatoes and eggplants, salinity" resistant crops
which are already overabundant, or are forced away from growing more profitable,
water" intensive crops such as citrus fruits, avocados, kiwis, bananas and cotton).
539 See, e.g., id. at 61-62 (quoting cases from villages of Salfit and Ein El-Bida
where military authorities denied permission to alter or complete an existing well
to allow it to provide for needs of local cultivators).
540 See Roy, supra note 19, at 50-51.
541 See id. at 51 ("[tlhe water policies implemented by the Israeli government
inside the Strip . . . pose severe threats to the future of Palestinian production,
especially to citrus production").
542 See Al-Haddad interview, supra note 529.
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credit facilities) were a result of Israeli policies that disfavored
Palestinian agricultural production.
4. ICESCR Article 11(1): The Right to an Adequate Standard
of Living, Including Housing
The right to housing is "of central importance for the enjoy-
ment of all economic, social and cultural rights," and the inter-
national community has frequently reaffirmed the importance
of full respect for the right to adequate housing.543 The Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, recognizing the
multifaceted nature of housing, has elaborated different aspects
of this right.544 Importantly, for purposes of Palestinian water-
related rights, the Committee has stated that "[an adequate
house must contain certain facilities essential for health.., and
nutrition," and that a beneficiary of this right "should have sus-
tainable access to natural and common resources, potable
drinking water..., sanitation and washing facilities..., refuse
disposal, [and] site drainage. '545 The central importance of this
right is in part reflected by the fact that the first General Com-
ment issued by the Committee relates to the interpretation of
Article 11(1) of the Covenant. The right to adequate housing, or
aspects thereof, has been addressed in a variety of international
instruments and at least one national constitution.5 46
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to maintain that the right
to housing constitutes a customary norm of international law at
543 General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), adopted by
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 12 De-




546 See UDHR, supra note 488, art. 25(1); International Covenant on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(e)(iii), G.A. Res. 2106A, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., 660 U.N.T.S. 1950 (1965); International Covenant on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 14(2), G.A. Res. 180,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180; Declaration on Social Progress
and Development, art. 10, G.A. Res. 2542, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess. (1969); Vancou-
ver Declaration on Human Settlements 1976, pt. 3(8), Report of Habitat: United
Nations Conference on Human Settlements, U.N. Doc. AICONF.70/15 (1976). See
also NETH. CONST. art. 22(2).
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the present time, let alone in 1967. 54 7 Therefore, it is difficult to
hold Israel to the standard set out in Article 11(1) of the
ICESCR while it was merely a signatory (i.e., until 1991). How-
ever, as a treaty signatory, Israel was at least under an obliga-
tion not to impose unreasonable restrictions on the efforts of
outside organizations to donate drinking water or water dispo-
sal facilities to the Palestinians, although Israel reportedly did
do so. Furthermore, as a Palestinian Central Bureau of Statis-
tics (PCBS) survey published in 1995 shows, there were still
significant shortcomings in Palestinian water-related infra-
structure years after Israel's ratification of the ICESCR.5 48




REGION (No. OF PIPED WATER DRINKING COLLECTION WASTEWATER
LOCALITIES) SUPPLY WATER SERVICE COLLECTION
Jenin (81) 37 33 2 2
Tulkarem (60) 33 30 1 1
Qalqilya (32) 17 22 1 1
Nablus (56) 28 27 4 4
Ramallah (95) 82 61 3 3
Jerusalem (22) 22 18 10 10
Jericho (16) 15 12 0 0
Bethlehem (50) 47 44 2 2
Hebron (97) 53 38 3 3
No Answer 2 21 2 1
West Bank 334 285 26 26
(509)
Gaza (25) 23 5 9 8
No Answer 2 0 0 0
Palestine (534) 357 290 35 34
Connection to drinking water systems. As of 1990, approxi-
mately 180 West Bank villages with some 355,300 inhabitants
were not connected to a central water supply system, depending
instead on local wells and other sources for which protection
547 But see LECKIE, supra note 429, at 12-33 (discussing initiatives by various
international legal bodies to enunciate and define rights to housing).
548 See id.
549 This table was compiled from the data appendices of the PALESTINE
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, THE COMMUNITY SURVEY FOR 1994 85-150 (1995).
Only those entries with answers were counted.
114http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/3
1998] NATURAL RESOURCES UNDER OCCUPATION 525
from contamination was difficult.550 The Gaza Strip fared
somewhat better. By the early 1990s, 90% of the population in
the towns, 60% of the population in the villages, and 100% of
the population of the refugee camps were connected to a piped
water supply.551 Of Gaza households having connections, 75%
had connections right to the dwelling, while another 22% drew
their water from courtyard taps. 552
At the time of Israel's occupation of the OPTs, few popula-
tion centers outside of the major West Bank and Gaza Strip
towns had a piped water system. By 1995, approximately 357
of the 534 population centers counted by the PCBS had a drink-
ing water network.5 53 Many of these were in refugee camps (es-
pecially in Gaza), and thus supplied by the United Nations
Relief Works Agency, the organization serving the needs of Pal-
estinian refugees. While this is certainly an improvement, a
constructive comparison can be made to the villages in Jordan.
Had Israel not occupied the West Bank, it is reasonable to as-
sume that West Bank and East Bank villages would have
evolved similarly. Under Jordanian administration, nearly all
Jordanian villages have received a piped water system. Per
capita domestic consumption in Jordan is double that of the
Palestinians, despite the fact that the OPTs are richer in water
resources than is Jordan.554
In the absence of piped water, Palestinian residents of the
OPTs turned to other sources of drinking water. The most com-
mon were rain-fed cisterns, local springs, and, in some Jordan
River Valley villages, open-air irrigation canals. 555 Of course,
households without piped water also made provisions for stor-
ing water while in the home, and made use of a variety of stor-
age methods there.556 When water is not piped, there is a
higher risk of contamination by pollutants that exist in the sur-
550 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 11.
551 See Shuval, supra note 16, at 97
552 See id. In contrast, when asked about the sufficiency of domestic water
supply, a PCBS survey revealed that only five of Gaza's 25 population communities
(towns, villages, and refugee camps) reported satisfactory supply. See id.
553 See supra Part V.C.4, tbl. 6.
554 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9.
555 See CHRIS SMITH, WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION AND HEALTH IN THE WEST
BANK 3 (Birzeit University Communal Health Unit 1987).
556 See id. at 8.
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rounding ground. For example, while rain-fed cisterns in the
West Bank were able to provide reasonably safe drinking water,
preliminary data shows that the presence of farm animals in
the area of the cistern increases the presence of fecal coliforms
(microorganisms causing gastrointestinal infections), as does
the use of a bucket (as opposed to an electric pump) to extract
the water from the cistern. 557 Indeed, spot tests of various
sources in the West Bank have shown that piped water supplies
have the lowest concentration of organic pollutants, while open
irrigation canals predictably have the worst.558 While West
Bank residents benefited overall from clean water supplies and
low rates of gastrointestinal infections, 559 the situation in Gaza,
with a more severe wastewater collection problem, was appreci-
ably worse. 560
In addition to the inherent undesirability of non-piped
water supplies, the use of independent water sources prevented
any benefits from economies of scale in water treatment and
quality control. It is difficult to assure adequate and regular
quality monitoring when the sources of water are widespread,
numerous, and small-scale. Residents must rely on themselves
to test their wells or other water sources for quality with small,
personal kits.
Connection to wastewater collection systems. In 1995, of
507 Palestinian communities in the West Bank, only twenty-six
(primarily the major towns) had piped sewage collection sys-
tems. No other community had any sort of municipal sewage
collection system. Other communities had to cope with individ-
ual or communal septic tanks or with open-air sewage canals.
However, even in those localities with wastewater networks,
not all houses were connected. In the Jerusalem district, man-
aged by the Israeli municipality, only 85% of homes were con-
nected to the sewage system in 1992.561 The percentage of the
population in the following major West Bank towns that were
connected to a network were Ramallah/El-Bireh (75%); Nablus
(75%); and Hebron (65%).562 When not connected to a waste-
557 See id. at 9-13.
558 See id.
559 See id. at 3.
560 See SMITH, supra note 555, at 17-20.
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water system, excreta collection must occur either with the use
of pit, pour flush or automatic flush latrines connected to soak-
age pits. Also, the soakage pits may be permeable (in which
case the excreta will seep into the surrounding ground) or im-
permeable (requiring periodic pumping).5 63
The situation in Gaza was in some ways better, and in
others worse. Nine of the twenty-five localities (predominantly
the refugee camps) had sanitary waste collection services, 564
many of which in turn were connected to the Gaza City sewage
system. 565 In the absence of such services, households used
boreholes and tanks for their human waste collection needs. In
the refugee camps, most sinkholes overflowed because of over-
population and lack of maintenance. 566 In some cases, the was-
tewater from other domestic activities, such as cooking and
cleaning, flowed directly to open cesspools in low-lying areas of
the camps.5 6 7
The connection of households to sanitary wastewater collec-
tion services, and to piped sewage systems in particular, is an
important component of the right to housing, since these serv-
ices contribute greatly to the inhabitants' health 568 and to the
general quality of life in the homes. When wastewater is al-
lowed to sit in a permeable underground soakage pit, pollutants
in the water can seep into the surrounding ground and in turn
contaminate nearby inhabitants' drinking water. Additionally,
depending on the construction of the latrines and the availabil-
ity of water for automatic or hand flushing, these soakage pits
can be breeding places for insects carrying diseases and can
give off foul odors. If the pits are overtaxed or if there is a sud-
den rainfall, the contents can overflow and spill into surround-
ing areas, thus contributing to airborne disease and a general
degradation of the environment.
563 See SMITH, supra note 555, at 12-16.
564 See supra Part V.C.4, tbl. 6. This means that domestic wastewater either is
piped from homes to the main sewage lines or is stored temporarily in nearby la-
trines or septic tanks and periodically collected. These methods serviced 40% of
the Gaza Strip's homes. See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 13.
565 See BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 156, at 22.
566 See id.
567 See id.
568 See infra Part V.C.5.-
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The reason for the difficult situation in Gaza was the rela-
tively low level of investment generally by Israelis in infrastruc-
ture. In 1986, for example, the Israeli government's total
development/investment budget was $7.3 million. 569 Of this
amount, 0.6% went to "Planning and Infrastructure" and 19%
went to "Health."570 Local governments, using funds that were
largely locally raised, invested $6.9 million in the 1984/85 fiscal
year in local "establishments," though perhaps only a little over
a tenth of these expenditures were water-related. 571 Foreign
governments and private volunteer agencies had to intervene to
make up for these shortcomings, with their efforts focusing spe-
cifically in the area of water conservation and sewage treat-
ment.5 7 2 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency has also
contributed to some of this infrastructure. 573
Not only has Israel not affirmatively provided for the
water-related infrastructure needs of the Gaza Strip, it has also
hampered efforts by outside parties to fulfill such needs. While
a network of United States based or funded NGOs in Gaza con-
tinuously proposed projects to serve Gazans' needs, and while
Palestinian sources had offered substantial amounts for eco-
nomic development in the OPTs, proposed projects could not
proceed without the approval of the Israeli military authorities.
Approval was granted sparingly, and projects in the areas of
water and sewage control, owing to their sensitivity, were espe-
cially difficult to get approved. 574 Constraints on development
in the water sector included "[Civil Administration] delay and
disapproval of urgently required water and sanitation projects"
and "lack of access on the part of Palestinians, donors, [private
volunteer organizations] and others to critical information re-
quired for planning and managing water and sanitation
projects .... ,"575 This lack of data was due to the fact that Israel
considered much water-related data security-related and also
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because existing Palestinian institutions were incapable of ex-
tensive independent data-gathering.57 6
5. ICESCR Article 12: The Right to Health
The right to health is a basic right that is guaranteed in a
wide variety of human rights instruments. 577 In particular, the
ICESCR provides that:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Cov-
enant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include
those necessary for: * * *
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and in-
dustrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, en-
demic, occupational and other diseases .... 578
As with the right to earn a living, it is probably not the case
that the right to health is customary international law. There-
fore, the pre-1991 standard for Israel's adherence is noninter-
ference. After it ratified the Convention, it took on affirmative
responsibilities to safeguard public health in this area.
The water sector in the OPTs generally, and in the Gaza
Strip in particular, is in a crisis situation as far as public health
is concerned. The main dimensions of this crisis are the poor
and deteriorating quality of water used for domestic purposes,
as well as the small quantities consumed and the regularity of
576 See id. For a description of donor involvement and Israeli blockage in the
development of sanitation projects, and a description of problems related to the
execution of donor fmded projects, see id. at 15-16.
577 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 488, art. 25(1) ("[elveryone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services
.... "); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XI ("[elvery
person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and social
measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent per-
mitted by public and community resources"); European Social Charter, art. 1(11),
E.T.S. 35, entered into force Feb. 26, 1965 ("[elveryone has the right to benefit from
any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest possible standard of health attain-
able"); Africa [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 16(1), OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) ("[elvery individual shall have the
right to enjoy the best attainable standard of physical and mental health").
578 ICESCR, supra note 395, art. 12.
119
PACE INT'L L. REV.
consumption. The two primary causes of this crisis (aside from
the restrictive quantitative limitations on water consumption
imposed by the Israelis) were the deterioration of the Gaza Aq-
uifer, and the inadequate wastewater disposal and treatment
facilities in the OPTs.
The quality of water consumed is the most obvious determi-
nant to the health of water consumers. The World Health Or-
ganization has set several standards for the quality of water
that is consumed. Drinking water must not have more than a
certain level of salt, fluoride, nitrates, heavy metals, toxins from
pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, and organic micro-pollutants.
Excess consumption of these substances over prolonged periods
can lead to the disorders and diseases described in Table 7
below.
TABLE 7. IMPACT OF DRINKING WATER POLLUTANTS ON
HUMAN HEALTH
5 79
SUBSTANCE IMPACT ON HEALTH
Salt Increased probability of neurological disorders, kidney
insufficiency, edema, high blood pressure, and
congestive heath failure. In rare cases salt poisoning
can lead to death.
Fluoride Irritation of the lining of the stomach. Increased
probability of formation of ulcers, kidney failure, soft
tissue calcification, skeletal fluorosis (leading to bone
brittleness and deformity), and dental fluorosis
(leading to brown mottling of teeth).
Nitrates Contributes to anemia in newborn infants (blue
babies) and to spontaneous abortions in humans.
Heavy metals Poisoning leads to liver, kidney, and brain damage.
Pesticides, herbicides Skin absorption, inhaling, or swallowing pesticides
and fertilizers containing organophosphates can lead to paralysis,
heart failure, and delayed damage to the nervous
system
Organic micropollutants Suspected to cause cancer.
Gaza groundwater, the source for much of Gazans' drinking
water, exceeded the limits recommended by the World Health
Organization for the maximum allowable content of various
substances. This is illustrated in greater detail in Table 8.
579 See Anna Bellisari, Public Health and the Water Crisis in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, in J. PALESTINE STuD. 55-57 (Winter 1994).
[Vol. 10:411
120http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/3
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TABLE 8. POTABILITY OF GROUNDWATER IN THE GAZA STRIP
58 0
ACCEPTABLE GAZA CONCENTRATION
DISSOLVED SUBSTANCES CONCENTRATION (PPM) (PPM)










As the figures in Table 8 make clear, Palestinians did not bene-
fit from water treatment sufficient to counteract the pollution of
their drinking water.581
The quantity and regularity of the water supply had their
effects as well, as persons living in the hot, dry climates that
characterize the OPTs are especially dependent on water to re-
plenish that lost to perspiration. 58 2 Insufficient replenishment
of water to the body leads to a higher incidence of weakness and
lethargy, neurological symptoms, kidney dysfunctions and
sometimes kidney failure. 58 3 In addition, insufficient bathing
and a lack of personal hygiene that results from a shortage of
water leads to a higher incidence of ringworm and other fungal
skin infections, louse-born fever, and trachoma.58 4
Palestinian domestic water consumption was a meager 20-
30 m 3 per person per year, equivalent to about 15-20 gallons per
person per day.58 5 Residents of villages and refugee camps
580 See Hisham Zarour et al., Hydrochemical Indicators of the Severe Water
Crisis in the Gaza Strip, in FINAL REPORT ON THE PROJECT WATER RESOURCES IN
THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP: CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
(Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem 1994).
581 See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 28
("[wiater treatment is minimal and of dubious quality").
582 See Bellisari, supra note 579, at 55.
583 See id.
584 See id. at 59. Some Gaza water consumers received water only for a few
hours a day. See Roy, supra note 19, at 103.
585 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 7.
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sometimes only consumed one-third of this amount.58 6 This
was among the lowest consumption levels in the world. Israel's
per capita domestic consumption, on the other hand, was three
to four times as large. 58 7 A 1995 PCBS census indicates that of
509 West Bank communities, only 285 thought that their sup-
ply of drinking water was adequate; in Gaza, that number was
five out of twenty-five.588 This low number is due partly to the
fact that a large number of localities received water through
their piped networks only intermittently or seasonally. For ex-
ample, in the summer of 1994, a water crisis in the Southern
West Bank (i.e., primarily affecting the Bethlehem and Hebron
regions) led to repeated cutoffs to some parts of Hebron, the
Dheisha refugee camp, and other major population centers,
forcing people to purchase their water from tankers at elevated
prices. 589
A major issue affecting the quantity of water that reached
town-dwellers in the OPTs was that of leakage from existing
water networks. 590 Most of the systems now in existence are
several decades old. 591 When natural deterioration occurred
and combined with the general inability of the Palestinian
water distribution institutions to repair these networks, and
the widespread diversion of water from mains by many Pales-
tinian residents, a large amount of water destined for domestic
consumption became lost through leakage. 592
Another major cause of the poor quality of Gaza drinking
water was the inadequate disposal and treatment of waste-
water. The situation was bleak, as Palestinians' institutional
capacity to deal with the treatment of sewage was extremely
586 See id.
587 See supra Part V.C.2, tbl. 4.
588 See supra Part V.C.4, tbl. 6.
589 See MuHAmmAD JARADAT, THE WATER CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN WEST BANK
(Alternative Information Center, Jerusalem, 1993) (reporting repeated domestic
water shortages in summer months in Bethlehem, Hebron, and surrounding vil-
lages and refugee camps).
590 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 1.
591 See id.
592 See id. "[I]t has been estimated that more than half of the water supply
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limited. 593 Given the high population density and crowded con-
ditions of the Gaza Strip and most of the refugee camps in the
OPTs, the presence of improperly treated and/or open sewage
led to various respiratory diseases and intestinal infections
such as shigellosis, amoebic dysentery, brucellosis, cholera, and
giardiasis. 594 Open, untreated sewage also contributed to the
proliferation of airborne disease.595 Much of the wastewater
improperly disposed of was used by farmers for irrigation pur-
poses, a use which created significant health hazards for farm-
ers and consumers alike.596 The World Health Organization
reported case rates for amoebic dysentery of 246 out of 100,000
and 1,072 out of 100,000 in the West Bank and Gaza, respec-
tively.5 97 The figure for Gaza was more than three times that of
UNRWA refugees in Jordan. 598 Furthermore, the non-treat-
ment or disposal of human waste leads to increased health risks
for newborn babies.599
The West Bank had only one wastewater treatment plant,
located in Ramallah. 60 0 The plant, opened in the early 1970s,
has yet to be evaluated for wastewater characteristics or man-
agement efficiency. 60 1 Other West Bank sewage collection sys-
tems merely drained their contents in places that, in the best of
situations, were distant from population centers. 60 2 However,
even in such cases, the untreated water caused health
problems. 60 3 A study of the water sources of eight Jordan Val-
ley villages revealed unacceptable levels of organic micro-pollu-
593 "Sewage utilities have no clear responsibilities for operation and are char-
acterized by poor funding, inadequate training of operators, lack of adequate reve-
nue collection and enforcement, and no clear responsibility for the proper disposal
of sewage." CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra note 335, at 28.
594 See Bellisari, supra note 578, at 59.
595 See id.
596 See POLICY RESEARCH, INC., supra note 3, at 11.
597 See id. (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH CONDITIONS FOR
THE ARAB POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE
26 (1992)).
598 See id. at 13.
599 See BRUINS & TUINHOF, supra note 156, at 13.
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tants in all eight sources. 60 4 The contamination was in part the
result of an open sewer from Nablus (located in the central
mountainous spine of the West Bank) which fed directly into
the irrigation canal from which village residents drew their
water.605
As usual, while the lack of adequate wastewater treatment
facilities is an OPT-wide problem, the overcrowding and pov-
erty of the Gaza Strip rendered the impact of this shortage far
worse there. The Gaza City sewage system collected the waste
not only from Gaza City homes, but also from nearby localities
that had connected their sewage networks to Gaza City's. Most
wastewater was collected in lagoons south of the city, where it
evaporated or percolated into the water table; the rest drained
into the Mediterranean sea near the Al-Shati' camp. 60 6 When
this pool became especially taxed, it overflowed into surround-
ing agricultural lands, contributing to their contamination.
Other towns without sewage systems resorted to a system of
cesspits to deal with their water disposal needs, which through
irregular emptying can lead to seepage into the soil, the crea-
tion of obnoxious odors, and the provision of a breeding ground
for airborne diseases.607 In the past, such cesspits have caused
cholera outbreaks. 608 UNRWA camps fare the worst; there,
twenty-five years after their construction, most do not have
fully-functioning wastewater disposal systems.60 9 These in-
credibly overcrowded population centers placed an extraordi-
nary burden on the public and private latrines used to dispose
of their wastewater. 610 Consequently, these overflowed, creat-
ing streams and accumulations of raw, untreated wastewater
right in the middle of residential areas, posing a direct threat to
the local residents and seeping into the water table.611 It is
worth noting that one-third of all Gazans, about a quarter of a
million people, lived in these camps.
604 See CHIS SMITH, BACTERIAL QUALITY OF DRINKING-WATER IN EIGHT VIL-
LAGES IN THE JORDAN VALLEY 3 (Birzeit University Community Health Unit 1984).
605 See id.
606 See POLICY RESEARCH INC., supra note 3, at 13.
607 See Roy, supra note 19, at 102.
608 See id.





1998] NATURAL RESOURCES UNDER OCCUPATION 535
Aside from the improper treatment of sewage, the other
main contributor to the crisis in water quality was the struc-
tural damage caused to the Gaza Aquifer.612 This damage was
due to severe overpumping, which far exceeded recharge rates.
This caused a drop in pressure in the freshwater layers, which
caused seawater and other saline water intrusion from other
formations. 613 This brought about not only high salinity levels,
but also rapidly increasing salination. 61 4 A high percentage of
chlorine in drinking water leads to an increased probability of
neurological disorders, kidney insufficiency, edema, high blood
pressure, and congestive heath failure.61 5 In rare cases salt
poisoning can lead to death.61 6
It is difficult to characterize Israel's responsibility for the
deterioration of the Gaza Aquifer, since Palestinian overpump-
ing was the main cause of the deterioration of the quality of
water. (The presence of Jewish settlers, while a contributing
factor to the deteriorating quality of the Aquifer, was far less
significant in absolute terms). Israel, however, was quick to en-
gage in inter-basin transfers to benefit Israeli agriculture in the
Naqab, and was loath to supply adequate quantities of water to
Gaza even though Mekorot had connections to Gazan munici-
palities. In addition, Israel did not supply appropriate waste-
water systems to Gazans, and in some cases placed hurdles
before the efforts of outside private volunteer organizations to
supply them. These affirmatively handicapping measures are
examples where Israel has undermined the fulfillment of the
objectives of the ICESCR. As for the post-1991 era, there have
been no significant improvements either in the quality of the
Gaza Aquifer or in the provision of wastewater disposal
networks.
During Israeli occupation, a particularly pressing public
health situation regarding water consumption and disposal
arose in the Gaza Strip.61 7 While not completely absent in the
West Bank, the problem there remained less severe. 618 A lack
612 See supra Part II.C.
613 See id.
614 See id..
615 See supra Part V.C.5, tbl. 7.
616 See id..
617 See supra Part V.C.4.
618 See id.
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of investment in infrastructure came as Israel and parastatal
organizations like the World Zionist Organization spent hun-
dreds of millions on illegal settlements, which in the case of aq-
uifer depletion actually worsened the public health crisis in
Palestine. 619 Furthermore, some features of Israel's occupation
"complete institutional control, combined with a desire not to
release information on water to Palestinians" have caused it to
stand in the way and block many private volunteer organiza-
tions' offers to install some of the needed public health infra-
structure. 620 In this sense, Israel has again violated its
obligations not to undermine the health-promoting goals of the
ICESCR.
VI. LAW OF THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
A. The Relevance of International Water Law
As discussed in Part IV.C.2, the law of belligerent occupa-
tion protects the public and private property of residents of an
occupied territory and of an occupied people from appropriation
or misuse by the occupier. In particular, as regards private im-
movable property, an occupant may only use such property for
military purposes. In no circumstance may an occupant take
title to immovable private property.621
In the case of water, these clear imperatives are compli-
cated by the fact that much of Palestine's water resources are in
geological structures that span international borders. The main
two bodies are the Mountain Aquifer, which straddles the bor-
der between the West Bank and Israel, and the Jordan River,
whose system (including tributaries) flows through five coun-
tries in the region.622 Of the recharge (in the case of the aqui-
fer) and annual flow (in the case of the river), the difficult
question is: how much belongs to Palestinians?
A priori, there is no obvious way to allocate a fugitive trans-
boundary resource, which is partially or totally extractable from
any of the contiguous states, among those states. The Jordan
619 See id.
620 See id.
621 See supra Part IV.C.2.
622 See supra Part II.C.
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River, however, is subject to a tacit multilateral understanding,
which governs the allocations among the various riparians.
This arrangement is based on the Johnston Plan,623 developed
during the mid-1950's, and is still the basis for negotiations on
water between Israel and Jordan. While never formally
adopted by the riparians, 24 it has become the putative custom-
ary law of the basin.625 Because the West Ghor Canal (intended
for the West Bank though never actually built) was part of the
development project, which Johnston proposed, many assert
that the West Bank, after separation from Jordan, still should
receive that share intended for that canal. 626 However, there is
disagreement on the size of Palestine's share.627 Of this share,
623 See id.
624 The only exception to this general rule is the Israel-Jordan peace treaty,
which includes provisions as to the partition of the Jordan River between these
two riparian landowners alone. See Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan and the State of Israel, art. 6, Annex 2, reprinted in JORDAN TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1994, at 8. This treaty in effect restores to Jordan its share under the
Johnston Plan.
625 See supra Part II.C; Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 169.
626 In fact, in an interesting twist, Israel had advocated for the West Bank's
share of the Jordan River's waters arising under the Johnston Plan. This advocacy
came during the 1970s in response to Jordanian-Syrian plans to develop the
Yarmouk River. Since Israel occupied the West Bank, Israel felt that it had the
right to claim Jordan River water intended for the West Ghor Canal which would
irrigate West Bank agricultural lands. See Lowi, supra note 74, at 172.
627 One commentator reports that this allocation is at least 70 mcmlyr. See id.
Another commentator puts the West Bank share at 209 mcm/yr (181 mcm/yr from
the Jordan River and about 35 mcm/yr from wadis side). See Elmusa, supra note
133, at 71 & n.25 (employing relative irrigated areas of East and West Bank in
mid-1950s to allocate Jordanian share between them). See also Naff & Matson,
supra note 70, at 163-64 (stating that Palestinians have "significant claims to the
water of the river").
Even if there was no West Bank allocation, the customary rule of international
law provides that all riparian landowners have a right to the waters of the shared
water resources. It has been suggested that Palestinians should have a portion of
the river's waters. See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 5. Given their non-pres-
ence in the negotiations led by Johnston, it is questionable whether the resulting
agreement ought to bind the emerging Palestinian entity. According to one expert
who disputes the existence of an allocation for Palestinians, the riparian landown-
ers must enter into new negotiations in the case of Palestinian autonomy or inde-
pendence. See id. at 169. The purpose of these negotiations would be to determine
the Palestinian share and the means for transporting this share to the Palestini-
ans from parts less saline than the lower Jordan River. See id.
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Palestinians currently receive almost nothing. 628 If in fact the
Johnston proposal intended some water to go to the West Bank,
and if Israel has indeed appropriated this water for its own pur-
poses, then Israel has an obligation to compensate Palestinians
for this historical misuse and to restore to Palestine its rightful
flow.
Even if the West Bank's share was not broken out, its sta-
tus as a riparian to this river system still means that it should
receive a portion of its flow. Even if the other riparians had
concluded an agreement to the waters of the river system, their
exclusion of Palestine calls for a reconsideration of the shares
taken by the different parties. 629 The question then becomes
how much water Palestine should receive. The same question
applies to the Mountain Aquifer of the West Bank, for which
there is no partition agreement in place. These questions are
critical since the amount of water to be partitioned, at least
1600 mcmlyr, is considerable for the region.
B. The Development of the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses
International law has developed several principles by
which to manage the non-navigational uses of international
water resources. 630 Early principles such as the Harmon Doc-
trine (which emphasized a state's absolute right to do what it
wishes with water within its territory) and early definitions
(such as that of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 limiting the defi-
nition of an international river to the main stem and to the
tributaries forming a boundary or crossing several states)631
have given way to a recognition of the interconnectedness of dif-
ferent segments of the hydrological cycle, a broader definition of
628 Most experts believe that Palestinians receive none of the Jordan River's
waters, though Jehoshua Schwarz claims that Palestinians consume 10 mcmyr.
See Schwarz, supra note 35, at 81, 91.
629 This is especially so because by the time the waters flow through the West
Bank, all the useable flow of the Jordan River system is already consumed by
Israel, Jordan, and Syria. For a discussion of the duty to include riparians in any
system-wide negotiations, see 2 [1987] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, art. 5, at 30
(1987).
630 See generally J. BRuHAcs, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL WATERCOURSES (M. Zehery trans., 1992).
631 See Stephen McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Ap-
proach to Water Problems, 31 NAT. RES. J. 139, 143 & n.19.
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water basin, and an appreciation of the need to regulate water
basins or river systems as a whole without regard to political or
administrative borders. As bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments over the division of different transnational water systems
(such as the Nile and the Indus Rivers and the shared Mexican-
United States groundwater) have grown in number, different
international institutions have attempted to codify and to de-
velop general principles for the management of international
water basins. The two most notable efforts in this regard are
the work of the International Law Association (ILA) and the
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC).
1. A Bold First Step: The ILA's Helsinki Rules
The ILA is a non-governmental organization of legal schol-
ars; one of its functions is to conduct studies and to formulate
restatements of international law. Thus, while its rules and
recommendations are not legally binding on states, they enjoy a
wide degree of respect and regard as products of a geographi-
cally dispersed group of preeminent legal scholars. The ILA
adopted, at its 1966 Conference, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki Rules),632 repre-
senting "the first attempt by an international organization to
prepare a complete codification of the law of international
watercourses."6 33
Although the presence of the words "international rivers" in
the title would suggest that the agreement has relevance to only
the division of the waters of the Jordan River, the contents of
the rules and their subsequent development suggest and con-
firm, respectively, their applicability to shared aquifers and
groundwaters as well.634 Indeed, one of the advantages of the
632 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSINKI,
1966 at 477, 484 (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
633 McCaffrey, supra note 630, at 141.
634 While the International Law Association's (ILA) consideration of ground-
waters in preparation for the publication of the Helsinki Rules was by its own
reckoning "insufficient," the Rules arguably did cover groundwaters and aquifers.
See Robert Hayton, The Law of International Groundwater Resources, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, SEOUL, 1986
at 238 (1987). Thus, when the ILA adopted its restatement of the international
law of groundwaters, it began by confirming the applicability of the Helsinki Rules'
definition of international drainage basin to international aquifers whether or not
539
129
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 10:411
Helsinki Rules over previous attempts at the restatement of in-
ternational law is its more sophisticated treatment of water
drainage basins. The water systems that were the subject of
the rules were termed "international drainage basins."635
These are defined as the "geographical area extending over two
or more States determined by the watershed limits of the sys-
tem of waters, including surface and underground waters, flow-
ing into a common terminus."636 It is important to note that
nowhere in the definition does the word "river" appear. Also,
the word "terminus" must not be interpreted to mean river
alone; the commentary states that "an international drainage
basin is the entire area, known as the watershed, that contrib-
utes water . . . to the principal river, stream or lake or other
common terminus."637 If one considers an aquifer as an under-
ground terminus of waters from precipitation and seasonal riv-
ers or wadis, then the Helsinki Rules become applicable to
underground aquifers that either span an international border
or receive water from catchment areas that span an interna-
tional border.
The general principle upon which the division of waters
must occur under the Helsinki Rules is that of reasonable and
the aquifers were connected in some way to surface water bodies. See Rules on
International Groundwaters, in REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, SE-
oUL, 1986, supra, at 251. In 1986, the ILA adopted four articles which relate spe-
cifically to the regulation of international groundwaters. Article 1 extends the
Helsinki Rules definition of international basin to include underground aquifers
straddling an international border, whether or not the aquifer and its waters form
with surface waters a hydraulic system flowing into a common terminus. See id. at
252. Article 2 requires that basin States consider the hydraulic interdependence of
surface and groundwaters when exercising rights and fulfilling duties under inter-
national law. See id. at 259. Article 3 mandates that states undertake, both indi-
vidually and collectively, measures to protect groundwaters from pollution and
that they exchange information to this end. See id. at 268. Finally, Article 4 re-
quests states to consider the integrated management of international groundwa-
ters at the request of any of the basin States. See id. at 272. The last three articles
were written in recognition of an international movement favoring the integrated
management of national water resources that sought to discourage competitive
pumping and to avoid the problems associated with the use of common property by
creating administrative structures charged with managing the resource in a glob-
ally optimal manner. Interestingly, one of the countries cited as a leader in this
trend is Israel, which, since the 1950's, has considered all groundwater in Israel as
state property. See Hayton, supra, at 242-44.
635 Helsinki Rules, supra note 632, at 484.
636 Id. at 484-85.
637 Id. at 485.
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equitable use: "Each basin State is entitled, within its territory,
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the
waters of an international drainage basin."6 3s The elaboration
of these terms comes in Article V, which states:
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning
of Article IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant
factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are
not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the ex-
tent of the drainage area in the territory of each basin
State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the con-
tribution of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in
particular existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in
each basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying
the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of
waters of the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-
basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses;
and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be sat-
isfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin
State;
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors.
In determining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all
relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion
reached on the basis of the whole. 63 9
This "factor-analysis" approach is one of the major contri-
butions of the Helsinki Rules. According to two leading schol-
ars in the field, the duty of basin States to consider all the
638 Id. at 486.
639 Id. at 488.
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relevant factors when dividing the waters of shared water ba-
sins "has become accepted virtually universally since the adop-
tion by the ILA in 1966 of the Helsinki Rules."640 This
development bars the reliance on any one factor as the sole de-
termining criterion for the determination of shares of water. Of
particular relevance to the waters that are the subject of the
present Article, the ILA commentary states explicitly that "[ain
existing reasonable use is entitled to significant weight as a fac-
tor and, as indicated in Article V, consideration must be given
to protecting it. However, it is but one factor."641 Thus, the
Helsinki rules privileged the principle of fair and equitable use
over that of avoidance of appreciable harm.642
Other articles of particular relevance to the present com-
mon aquifers are Article VIII (restating the principle that the
continuation of present reasonable use is subject to the consid-
eration of the other factors stated in Article V,643 in particular,
the fact that one basin State lags behind another in terms of its
economic development should not mean that the underdevel-
oped basin State's share of the common aquifer should be di-
minished as a result of the other basin State's prior use);64 4
Article X (imposing on a basin State the obligations to prevent
water pollution causing substantial injury and to take steps to
diminish existing pollution where such pollution affects a co-ba-
sin State's water supply);645 Article XI (allowing for injunctive
and monetary damages in case of a violation of Article X);646
Article XXVII (imposing the duty to resolve disputes by peaceful
640 Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The
Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RES. J. 663, 699 (1989).
641 Helsinki Rules, supra note 632, at 490. While this particular quote bears
directly upon the case study of the division of waters in a hypothetical case in the
commentary, the principle it elaborates is clearly meant to be of general
applicability.
642 "Appreciable harm" means any significant interference with a riparian's ex-
isting uses of the international basin's water.
643 The article states in relevant part that "[a]n existing reasonable use may
continue in operation unless the factors justifying its continued existence are out-
weighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it be modified or termi-
nated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use." Helsinki Rules, supra
note 631, at 493.
644 See id. at 492.
645 See id. at 496-97.
646 See id. at 501.
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means);647 and Article XXIX (imposing on a basin State the
duty to exchange information related to the waters of a drain-
age basin within its territory and to give notice to co-basin
States of any proposed man-made alterations to the "regime of
the basin" in a legally significant manner).648
In summary, the Helsinki Rules represent the modern view
of international water law. It puts forth four principles that
have been identified as constituting rules generally applicable
to groundwater between States: the obligation not to cause ap-
preciable harm; the duty to avoid groundwater pollution; the re-
quirement of equitable and reasonable use; and the obligation
to give prior notice and to negotiate in cases of alteration to the
basin's characteristics. 649 Additionally, they consider the inter-
national water basin as the proper level at which to manage
water.
2. Hesitation and Partial Retreat: The ILC's Draft Articles
The International Law Commission is a United Nations
body, composed of thirty-four experts serving in their personal
capacity, dedicated to the codification of international law. In
1970, the General Assembly recommended that the ILC "take
up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of interna-
tional watercourses with a view to its progressive development
and codification."65 0
Unlike the ILA, the ILC, as a UN body, had to deal with the
political demands of UN member states in the formulation of its
codifications, as it was ultimately to submit its product to the
General Assembly. After distributing a questionnaire to mem-
ber states, the ILC quickly discovered that there was substan-
tial disagreement with the Helsinki Rules' international water
basin concept. It was not until 1980 that it was able to decide
on a provisional working hypothesis of "international water-
647 See id. at 517.
648 Helsinki Rules, supra note 631, at 518-19.
649 See Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Trans-
boundary Groundwater, 31 NAT. RES. J. 167 (1991).
650 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-
Second Session, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/35/10, reprinted in 2
[1980] YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION pt. 2, at 104 (1980)
[hereinafter 1980 ILC Report].
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course system," the very subject of its analysis. 651 This defini-
tion mirrors in many respects the Helsinki Rules' definition of
international water basin (while at the same time including
language to reassure the upstream states),652 and would in-
clude the Jordan River and Mountain Aquifer within its scope.
In addition to these political problems, four personnel changes
in the office of the Special Rapporteur caused considerable
delay.
Finally, in 1994, the ILC submitted a complete set of arti-
cles and a declaration on transboundary confined groundwater
to the General Assembly, with the recommendation that it or an
international conference elaborate a convention on the basis of
its draft. 653 This draft contained a definition in Article 2 of in-
ternational watercourse system: "a system of surface waters
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical rela-
tionship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common
terminus." Thus, while the Jordan River would undoubtedly be
included in this definition, the declaration on transboundary
confined groundwater, emphasizing that aquifers unconnected
to aboveground streams are not included in the definition of in-
ternational watercourse system, suggests that the Mountain
651 In essence, the upstream states, who wished to cede nothing to downstream
states, opposed the idea of promulgating, and vice versa. See McCaffrey, supra
note 630, at 151-53.
652 The definition reads as follows:
A watercourse system is formed of hydrographic components such as riv-
ers, lakes, canals, glaciers and groundwater constituting by virtue of their
physical relationship a unitary whole; thus, any use affecting waters in
one part of the system may affect waters in another part.
An "international watercourse system" is a watercourse system, compo-
nents of which are situated in two or more States.
To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by
or do not affect uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated
as being included in the international watercourse system. Thus, to the
extent that the uses of the waters of the system have an effect on one
another, to that extent the system is international, but only to that extent;
accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a relative, international charac-
ter of the watercourse.
1980 ILC Report, supra note 649, 90, at 108.
653 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts
Draft Articles in International Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395 (1995); Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N.
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Aquifer does not fall within the definition. However, when it
sent its draft to the General Assembly, the ILC recommended
that the same principles that apply to international water-
course systems also apply to confined groundwater.6 54
Another important feature of these draft articles is that the
no-appreciable-harm principle, which in the previous 1991 draft
of the articles was given primacy over the equitable-use princi-
ple, acquired a status of seeming parity with, if not inferiority
to, the latter principle. Article 7 provides that States have a
duty to exercise "due diligence to utilize an international water-
course in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other
watercourse States."65 5 If despite this due diligence significant
harm is caused, and if there is no agreement allowing for such
harm, then consultations between the harm-causing and the
harm-receiving party should ensue. These consultations should
focus on the extent to which this harm is equitable and reason-
able, and whether some other accommodation, including possi-
ble compensations, could be made.6 56 As discussed in the
commentary, this article is designed to "avoid [] significant
harm as much as possible while reaching an equitable result in
each case."65 7 While giving privilege to the equitable use princi-
ple, Article 7 does not excuse a watercourse State whose equita-
ble use causes harm to another watercourse State from the duty
to compensate. At a minimum, they must consult ways to miti-
gate the harm.658
The factors relevant to the determination of fair and equi-
table use are put forth in Article 5. These factors, which in
many ways are similar to the factors that the Helsinki Rules
incorporate, are as follows:
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological
and other factors of a natural character;
(b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States
concerned;
(c) the population dependent on the watercourse in each water-
course State;
654 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, at 326.
655 Id. at 236.
656 See id. art. 7, at 236.
657 Id. cmt. 1.
658 See McCaffrey, supra note 652, at 400-01.
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(d) the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one water-
course State on other watercourse States;
(e) existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of
the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of meas-
ures taken to that effect;
(g) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a
particular planned or existing use.659
These factors are not meant to be exclusive, and should be
weighed in accordance with the details of a specific
watercourse. 6
60
Part II of the draft articles sets out the General Principles
underlying the regime of international watercourses. 661 Among
other things, it imposes an obligation to cooperate and to en-
gage in a regular exchange of data and information. 662 Part III
of the draft articles regulates the implementation by water-
course States of projects, which may lead to a "significant ad-
verse effect" upon another State. 663  Part IV, entitled
"Protection, Preservation and Management" imposes, inter alia,
an obligation to preserve and protect the ecosystems of interna-
tional watercourses. 664 Article 21 addresses the pollution of in-
ternational watercourses and aims to prevent any "detrimental
alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an in-
ternational watercourse, which results directly or indirectly
from human conduct."665 Part V contains provisions related to
emergency situations. 66 6 Part VI contains Miscellaneous Provi-
sions. 667 These include Article 29, which reiterates that in
armed conflicts international watercourses and related installa-
tions, facilities and other works "shall enjoy the protection ac-
corded by the principles and rules of international law
applicable in international and internal armed conflict .... 66
Article 33 establishes a mechanism for the settlement of dis-
659 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 6, at 231.
660 See id. art. 5, cmt. 9, at 235.
661 See id. arts. 5-10, at 218-59.
662 See id. art. 9, at 249.
663 Id. art. 12, at 260.
664 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, at 280-309.
665 Id. art. 21(1), at 289.
666 See id. arts. 27-28, at 309-15.
667 See id. arts. 29-33, at 315-26.
668 Id. art. 29, at 315.
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putes and calls for the creation of a fact-finding commission
which will submit its report to the disputing states.669 If this
report does not lead to a negotiated settlement, arbitration or
judicial settlement may ensue if the parties so agree. 670
As already discussed, the ILC report represents in many
ways a reaffirmation (albeit with much delay) of many of the
principles set forth in the Helsinki Rules. Its scope is narrower
than that of the Rules (as evidenced by the relatively restrictive
definition of international watercourse), and in many areas it
recognizes the national interests of the General Assembly mem-
bers that must vote on the draft articles. 671 However, it is this
conservatism which emphasizes the importance of the princi-
ples that the draft articles do express. Indeed, the Chairman of
the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly recom-
mended that the General Assembly call for comments on the
draft articles from U.N. member states in preparation for a
Working Group to meet in October 1996 in order to elaborate a
framework convention on the law of non-navigational uses of
international watercourses on the basis of the ILC's draft
articles .672
C. Application of International Water Law Principles to
Shared Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources
In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli water dispute, the
law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses is of
primary importance in the determination of the amount of
water to which each side is entitled. This law specifies that eq-
uitable apportionment, and not the principle of no-appreciable
harm, should govern the partition of shared waters.673 In addi-
669 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 33, at 322.
670 See id. art. 33(c), at 323.
671 See, e.g., 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 31, at 318 (duty to exchange
information does not cover information vital to national defense or security).
672 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Sixth Session: Revised Draft Resolution Proposed by the Chairman, U.N. GAOR,
6th Comm., 49th Sess., Agenda Item 137, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/49/L.27/Rev.1.
673 According to the ILC draft articles, a reasonable new use may be legitimate
even though it causes appreciable harm. In such a case, however, the new user
may be required to mitigate some of the harm that results. See 1994 ILC Report,
supra note 652, art. 7, at 236. See also Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at
546-47 (presaging ILC's rejection of no appreciable harm rule as principal norm of
water apportionment).
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tion, this law prescribes other aspects of this relationship, such
as the duty to negotiate, to exchange information, and to notify
other watercourse states of planned significant uses of the
watercourse.
Since the division of the Jordan River is governed by cus-
tom, the application of the factor analysis approach will be re-
stricted to the Mountain Aquifer.
1. Quantitative Division of the Mountain Aquifer
In both the Helsinki Rules and ILC draft articles scheme,
the quantitative division of waters under the equitable use prin-
ciple is determined by a factor analysis test. Parties must ap-
portion water in light of all the relevant factors, especially, but
not exclusively, those listed in each of these two documents. In
particular, due to the generality of the scope of the codifications,
the factors have no priority amongst themselves a priori;
rather, their relative importance must be determined in the
context of the specific situation.674 As between prior uses and
new uses, the ILC draft articles list both as factors to consider
in determining equitable allocations 675 "[tlo emphasize that
neither is given priority, while recognizing that one or both fac-
tors may be relevant in a given case."676 Similarly, the Helsinki
Rules also list historic use as one of the factors determining eq-
uitable use, and states that any existing reasonable use may
continue until "[tihe factors justifying its continuance are out-
weighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it be
modified or terminated . *."..677 As between utter respect for
prior use, and the priority to new, more efficient enterprises, the
solution the Rules propose is to find a middle ground. However,
such new use may have to compensate the old, displaced use.6 7 8
674 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 6, cmt. 9, at 235 ("[tlhe weight to
be accorded to individual factors, as well as their very relevance, will vary with the
circumstances"); Helsinki Rules, supra note 631, art. 5(3), at 488 ("[tlhe weight to
be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with
that of other relevant factors"); id. art. 5, cmt., at 489 ("[n]o factor has a fixed
weight").
675 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 6, at 231.
676 Id. art. 6, cmt. 4, at 233.
677 Helsinki Rules, supra note 631, art. 8, at 493.
678 See id. arts. 5, 8 & cmt., at 488, 493-94 ("[a] modification or termination, to
be consistent with equitable utilization, may, in a particular case, require compen-
sation to the user."). Id. at 494.
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According to one summary, "[elquitable apportionment calls for
a balancing of the needs of the communities that share the com-
mon resource . . ." by finding "[a] proper balance between the
protection of existing uses and the initiation of new uses."679
This analysis does not produce any definite numbers on the
quantity of water given to each side. This is true of almost all
the discussion in the literature, which limits itself to a discus-
sion of the factors and does not propose results. 68 0 This is
partly a function of the structure of the factor-analysis system,
which serves to produce a set of factors which are considered
relevant to a partition but at the same time refuses to give
weight to the different factors.68 1 Nevertheless, one observer
concludes that, under a factor analysis, "Palestinians would be
entitled to a much larger share than Israel, and certainly much
larger than their presently imposed share."68 2
a. Natural Attributes of the Water Sources
As part of the analysis of the application of the Helsinki
Rules to Palestinian and Israeli waters, the Mountain Aquifer's
waters were divided between Palestine and Israel on the basis
of physical characteristics alone. 6 3 After rapidly dismissing
the legitimacy and wisdom of dividing the waters on this basis,
and especially on the basis of the relative sizes of the feeding
679 Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 546. In analyzing the equitable
allocation principle, the authors remark that two basic principles emerge from the
commentary surrounding it. "The first.., is that in order to determine the equita-
ble apportionment of the water of a basin, human conditions, that is, the actual
needs of the communities that depend on the water, take precedence over the anal-
ysis of the natural properties of the basin. The second proposition is that among
the human conditions, priority is given to past and existing uses, at the expense of
potential uses." Id. at 547-48. The author does not agree with this interpretation
of the equitable use principle. See supra Part VI.B.2. Benvenisti and Gvirtzman
are not the only Israelis who assert this preference for existing uses. One Palestin-
ian places this insistence, which is plainly contradicted by the text of the Helsinki
Rules and the ILC draft articles, within the context of Israel's longstanding insis-
tence on the presentation of faits accomplis. See Elmusa, supra note 4, at 10-11.
680 But see James Moore, Water-Sharing Regimes in Israel and the Occupied
Territories: A Technical Analysis (Canadian Department of National Defense, Ot-
tawa 1992).
681 Elmusa goes further and specifically rejects the specification of quantities
to be allocated to both sides because of the lack of shared data. See ELMUSA, supra
note 4, at 12.
682 Id.
683 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6. at 549-50.
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areas, 68 4 the results of this type of analysis were provided for
the division of the Mountain Aquifer.685 The first method was
based on the combined relative sizes of the feeding and storage
areas that lay within each country's territory (the feeding +
storage method).68 6 The second was based on the relative sizes
of the storage volume under each country's territory (the vol-
ume method).68 7 Thus the depth of each country's aquifer
played a role in determining its portion. The third method, in-
troduced and implemented on the basis of data provided by
Benvenisti and Gvirtzman, is on the basis of only the feeding
area. 688





METHOD VOLUME METHOD FEEDING AREA
Palestine 345 mcm/yr 290 mcm/yr 510 mcm/yr
Israel 255 mcm/yr 310 mcm/yr 90 mcm/yr
Under any of these three methods, proposed Palestinian use far
surpasses present use.
b. Social and Economic Needs
Israel's population is much larger than Palestine's. Israel's
five million residents require considerably more water than do
Palestine's two million residents. In terms of agricultural con-
sumption, Israel has about ten times as much irrigated agricul-
tural lands as do Palestinians. 690 However, it is not clear how
important this need is when compared to Palestinians' need for
their own agricultural development. The Palestinian and Is-
684 See id. at 556-57.
685 See id.
686 See id. at 557.
687 See id.
688 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 557.
689 The figures in Table 9 are based on data from Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, id.
at 556-57. In particular, the author used the Benvenisti and Gvirtzman
assumption of an annual useable recharge for the Mountain Aquifer of 600 mcm/
yr. See id. at 552.
690 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9.
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raeli economies are at different levels of development. Cur-
rently, the Palestinian economy is much more dependent on its
agricultural sector, which accounts for approximately 25% of
the GDP of the West Bank and a little under 20% of the GDP of
the Gaza Strip, as opposed to less than 5% in Israel.691 This is
despite the fact that the Israeli agricultural sector's consump-
tion of water is about seven and one-half times that of the Pal-
estinian sector, and despite the fact that Israel irrigates almost
all of its irrigable land-compared to only about 20-30% percent
of the West Bank and 55% of Gaza. 692 Since Israel has largely
passed the stage of its economic development where intensive
water usage is required, accommodations should be made to al-
low the Palestinian economy to develop through a stage where
water needs are high.693 Indeed, the Helsinki Rules' illustra-
tive example of a country whose existing use is overridden by
another's newer, more reasonable use, features a state whose
relatively advanced economy lessened its need for continued ex-
ploitation of an irrigated agricultural installation, and com-
pares such a state with a newer state's need for hydroelectric
power from the same source. 694
Alternatively, there is a basic needs approach. 695 The basic
needs approach specifies a minimum per capita amount for do-
mestic and agricultural needs, and calculates a minimum na-
tional amount on the basis of population projections. 696 As
implemented, this method awards Palestinians approximately
74% of the water resources they share with Israel. 697 This is
because Israel has greater endogenous resources (notably, the
Coastal Aquifer) with which it may satisfy its minimum basic
691 See id. at 10; supra Part V.C.3.
692 See Elmusa, supra note 502, at 226-30, tbls. 2-3.
693 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 11. This is especially true if one considers the
present configuration of the Palestinian economy. As demonstrated by different
scholars of the West Bank Data Base Project, Israel has since directed its economic
policies to create a situation of incorporation into the Israeli economy, but on a
lesser footing (i.e., the provision of cheap labor and an export market). See MERON
BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES
(1984); Roy, supra note 19.
694 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 631, art. 5, cmt., at 488-89.
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water needs, forcing Palestinians to resort to a greater share of
the shared water.698
It is argued that any equitable apportionment should ad-
dress domestic needs first.699 Agricultural needs are of second
priority. An assessment of needs for this sector should involve
not only the aggregate amount of arable land, but also popula-
tion growth, use of agricultural technology, efficiency of irriga-
tion, constraints on marketing, and others. Given that
Palestinian per capita water consumption is one-third that of
Israel's, it is suggested that equitable allocation for domestic
consumption would suggest a greater allocation to
Palestinians. 700
c. Availability of Alternate Resources
Israel subsidizes water for agriculture, and its use of water
is excessive and inefficient. The Israeli State Comptroller, in a
review of Israel's water sector, complained that this subsidiza-
tion leads to highly inefficient cropping patterns which in effect
cause Israel to pay Europeans and other consumers of its agri-
cultural production to consume local water (exported in the
form of oranges and other water-intensive crops).701 Palestin-
ian farmers, on the other hand, pay the market price for water
(if not more) and otherwise engage in agriculture that is eco-
nomically viable. The normalization of water prices to Israeli
agriculture would go a long way to diminishing Israel's outsized
demands on the region's shared resources, 70 2 and would thus
give rise to a significant new source of water. Palestinians can
698 See id.
699 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 561-62.
700 See id.
701 In other words, water subsidies allow Israeli farmers to sell their produce
on foreign markets at less than its economic cost. Subsidies are passed from the
taxpayer to the government to the agriculturalist, and then to the final consumer.
In the final analysis, relatively poor Israel is helping relatively affluent Europeans
pay for their consumption of the region's scarce water.
702 According to Jehoshua Schwarz of Tahal Consulting Engineers, fully 25%
of high-yield and 61% of low-yield farms use water inefficiently (i.e., the productive
value per unit of water used is less than the cost of the provision of that water).
Even with water subsidies, 8% of high-yield and 42% of low-yield farms use water
inefficiently, though they are still able to operate thanks to other subsidies accru-
ing to the agricultural sector. The expert concludes that these figures "raise ques-
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undertake many measures to save water or to consume it more
efficiently. 70 3 Again, since these savings would be out of a small
global consumption level, it is unlikely that they can undertake
the same absolute level of savings as can the Israeli agricultural
sector.
Furthermore, as compared to the Palestinians, Israel con-
tains more readily useable endogenous sources with which to
supply its own needs. For example, Israel has sole access to the
Coastal Aquifer, whose output roughly is a little less than that
of the Mountain Aquifer (around 400 mcm/yr).70 4 In addition,
because of its dominant military power and upstream position,
Israel captures a disproportionate share of the Jordan River.
This, in and of itself, argues for an increased Palestinian share
of other shared resources in order to make up for the shortfall in
access to Jordan River water. By comparison, Palestinian en-
dogenous resources are relatively modest: the Eastern Basin of
the Mountain Aquifer (providing 100 mcm/yr), the Eastern
Wadis of the West Bank, providing (30-40 mcm/yr), and the
Gaza Aquifer (50-70 mcm/yr).705
Another possibility for obtaining alternative resources is
desalination or the use of transborder pipelines to transfer
water from states richer in water to their relatively dry neigh-
bors.70 6 In both of these areas, Israel can more easily take ad-
vantage of these solutions.70 7 Israel exports desalination
technology. Its relatively rich economy 708 and long coastline
make this option far more attractive to the Israelis. 70 9 In con-
trast, the Palestinian economy is relatively low-tech and impov-
703 For a listing of possible projects which could bring water savings to the
Palestinians, see POLICY RESEARCH, INC., supra note 3, at 19-25.
704 See Elmusa, supra note 502, at 226, tbl. 1.
705 See id.
706 See id. at 237-38.
707 See id.
708 The Israeli economy is three to four times as large per capita, and twelve
times in absolute terms, than the Palestinian economy.
709 An estimate by a study group at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at
Tel Aviv concluded that replacing 100-200 mcm/yr of available water with
desalinated water would cost Israel $30-90 million. See Elmusa, supra note 502, at
240 (quoting JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIS STUDIES, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA:
ISRAEL'S OPTIONS FOR PEACE 219B20 (Jerusalem Post 1989). This translates into a
cost that is around $0.50/m3 . Currently, Palestinian municipalities paid the Civil-
ian Administration $0.60/m3 . See CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND PLANNING, supra
note 335, at 30.
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erished, and its access to the sea is limited to Gaza's 40 km
coastline. Israel also has far greater access to brackish water,
which can be mixed with fresh water for use in agricultural or
municipal uses. 710 One example is an extremely large brackish
water aquifer the Israelis have found in the Sinai.711 Similarly,
many plans have arisen to employ pipelines to bring water from
other countries in the region.71 2 Many states have resisted this
idea because it puts another nation's hand on the tap for a sig-
nificant source of domestic water consumption. For this propo-
sal to be viable, the recipient state needs to have significant
military or other power with which to retaliate against any ac-
tual or threatened disruption of water flow. Naturally, this is
more characteristic of Israel than of Palestine.
Another potential approach for solving the problem faced
by Palestinians and Israelis is to increase the total amount of
water available to these two countries by increasing their share
of the waters flowing in the Jordan River system. 713 Of the five
co-riparians,714 Israel, Palestine, and Jordan are the most
water-impoverished, and thereby should get a larger portion of
these waters, especially given the availability of alternative
water resources for Syria and Lebanon, the relatively water-
rich co-riparians. 715 The recent Jordan-Israeli peace agreement
seems to have put limitations on the amount of water that is
available for Palestinians and imposed an added set of con-
710 See Elmusa, supra note 502, at 238-39.
711 Elmusa reports that:
The Negev . . . sits on a tremendous aquifer, which, according to Is-
raeli scientists, could satisfy the needs of that region for a hundred years,
and could even be used to irrigate crops in the coastal area. The water is
brackish (or somewhat saline) to saline, but it can be desalinated at prices
competitive with current costs.
ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 12.
Palestinians could offer far less in the way of brackish water. See id. For a
discussion of various desalination and wastewater reuse options, see Keenan,
supra note 463, at 37, 42-47.
712 These include the proposed Peace Pipeline from Turkey and a pipeline from
the Nile River in Egypt.
713 For a description of the physical characteristics of the Jordan River system,
see supra Part II.B.
714 Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine.
715 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 563.
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straints on what should be a comprehensive and optimal re-
gional division of shared water resources. 716
Other alternative resources include making more efficient
use of the existing natural resources. Such measures could in-
clude better maintenance of the aquifers and headwaters that
supply much of the region's water.717 An ability to tap such re-
sources would depend to a large degree on the finding of a
peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not only
would a regional settlement allow the creation of international
water reclamation/conservation projects, but if Palestinians
were given a larger share of the region's resources, they would
have an added incentive to conserve the region's natural
resources.
718
d. Historical Use and Avoidance of Appreciable Harm
As can be seen from the tables in Part II detailing the use of
different water sources, Israel has long made disproportionate
use of the Mountain Aquifer and Jordan River water. It has
erected a significant agricultural sector (in terms of water use)
on the basis of the superexploitation of regional water. This
support of the agricultural sector was consonant not only with
Israeli national defense policies, but also with the Zionist ideo-
logical emphasis on work with the land.719 Israel has long
made extensive use of the Western Aquifer and the Northeast-
ern Aquifer through wells located on its side of the Green Line.
Also, its National Water Carrier carried significant amounts of
water from the Upper Jordan River and transported much of it
to agricultural installations in the Naqab desert.720 In contrast,
the Palestinian economy in 1967 was backwards and underde-
veloped, and did not make extensive use of water.721
Furthermore, the ability of Palestinians to establish uses of
water resources they shared was severely limited by Israeli mil-
itary occupation. Jordan's Natural Resources Regulation Law
of 1966, and Order No. 88 issued thereunder, created a national
716 See supra Part II.B. & note 151.
717 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 12-13.
718 See id.
719 See supra Part III.D.
720 See id.
721 See supra Part III.C.
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authority for the development of Jordanian agriculture (which
included West Bank agriculture) and groundwater resources,
while at the same time imposed strict regulations on the extrac-
tion of groundwater. These indicate that West Bank agricul-
ture, while targeted for economic development by the Jordanian
state, was increasingly pushing up against limits on local water
resources. Unfortunately, any attempts to increase their mod-
est use of the Mountain Aquifer came to an abrupt halt when
Palestinians lost sovereignty over their water resources at the
time of the Israeli occupation. 722 Israel has used this power
over Palestinian water to put ironclad constraints on any at-
tempt to increase the use of water in the agricultural sector, for
example, to increase the amount of irrigated farmlands. What
Israeli policies have instead encouraged are macroeconomic
trends or technological changes to limit Palestinian consump-
tion of water. These include policies to harm the general eco-
nomic viability of the Palestinian agricultural sector (such as by
reducing export markets for its products) or to introduce water-
saving irrigation techniques.
The use of water by Israeli settlements is by its very nature
illegal. It would thus be illogical to allow the prior use of these
waters by Jewish settlers to enjoy any sort of legitimacy or
weight in the factor analysis scheme. This use potentially
amounts to approximately 80 mcm/yr, a significant amount
when compared to annual Palestinian consumption of around
220 mcm/yr.
2. Allocation System Maintenance
The variables, which underlie the allocation of water be-
tween any two co-riparians are subject to change. Long-term
changes in population, the state of the agricultural sector, and
the discovery of new methods of water creation (such as
desalination or the mining of aquifers) will affect the factors re-
lating to the determination of equitable apportionment and may
lead to a change in the allocation of water. Short-term changes
such as drought or variation in rainfall can affect not only the
722 In the meantime, East Bankers have enjoyed the benefits of a government
which, while poor and undemocratic, has at least some desire to serve the needs of
its population. Jordanian per capita consumption of water is double that of the
OPTs. See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 9.
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total amount of water to be allocated, but also the relative
human needs of the co-riparians. In addition to a set of alloca-
tions which can serve as a guide to negotiations, co-riparians
need a set of apportionment guidelines or an algorithm which is
flexible enough to adapt to changes in the variables which effect
the factor-based equitable use analysis.723
The dynamic allocation algorithm cannot be self-executing;
it requires human agents to drive it. The creation of a joint
committee to manage the joint water resources is critical to the
salutory long-term management of the shared waterbasins.
The duties of this joint committee would include data exchange,
the regulation of the location of wells, the monitoring of water
quantities pumped, the prevention of pollutants, and others.724
3. The Duty to Cooperate
Both the ILC and the ILA include, as a principle of interna-
tional water law, the duty to cooperate in the resolution of
water disputes. This reflects a customary norm in international
law that requires peaceful resolution of disputes.
Unfortunately, peace has not characterized prior attempts
to solve the question of the partition and use of the Jordan
River and Mountain Aquifer. Rather, it has been marked by
intense hostility and armed conflict. Due to the generalized
state of the war that existed at that time, the round of negotia-
tions that ended in the formulation of the Johnston Plan for the
Jordan River occurred without face-to-face contact between
Israel and the Arab states. That round of negotiations col-
lapsed with the eruption of the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. Simi-
larly, Syrian and Jordanian attempts to develop the Yarmouk
River in the 1960's led to Israeli aggression and other tensions
which ultimately resulted in the 1967 War. That war gave
723 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 6, cmt. 2, at 232 (watercourse
states must take into account factors relevant to an equitable partition "in an
ongoing manner"). See also Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 565.
724 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 565-66. Precedents in this
area include the United States-Mexican International Boundary and Water Com-
mission, established in 1973, which deals with the management of transboundary
aquifers between the two North American states. Another North American model
is the US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC) which was established in
1977. France and Switzerland have managed the Lake Geneva Aquifer through a
joint commission since 1978. See id.
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Israel a tremendous advantage in the control of regional re-
sources since it resulted in Israel's occupation of most of the
headwaters of the Jordan River and of the feeding areas and
upstream pumps of the Mountain Aquifer.725
The political and diplomatic process that began with the
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in 1992 included within
its scope an attempt to come to some settlement of regional
water issues. This was first introduced by the initiation of a
Multilateral Working Group on Water and the Environment.
However, because of Israel's efforts to divide the Arab countries
to prevent them from combining their bargaining power, discus-
sion of this problem was moved to the bilateral talks. At the
present time, however, no real progress has been made except
for the Israel-Jordan treaty. The secret back-channel negotia-
tions between Arafat and the Israeli leadership in Oslo signaled
the end of the relevance of the Madrid bilateral talks between
the Palestinians and Israelis. According to Palestinians who
participated in these negotiations, the agreements that resulted
were disastrous, and were merely a reinstitution of the occupa-
tion-era water situation, albeit with official Palestinian ap-
proval. Israelis were able to exploit their information monopoly
on water issues, their generally overwhelming bargaining
power, and Arafat's unwillingness to properly delegate negotiat-
ing authority to technically sophisticated experts to dictate
terms to the Palestinians. Years of hard-fought bargaining by
Palestinian professionals, who have dedicated their lives to re-
search and advocacy on behalf of Palestinian water rights, were
disregarded by Arafat in last-minute deals which were con-
ducted hastily by a leader who was eager not to miss signing
ceremonies on the White House lawn.
The current inequitable interim agreement, Israel's contin-
ued unwillingness to exchange information with Palestinians,
and Israel's willingness to use its bargaining power to the ful-
lest extent do not bode well for future compliance with the duty
to cooperate. In all likelihood, cooperation will either be ignored
or will be implemented in hollow form by Israeli dictation of
terms to a Palestinian negotiating delegation too powerless to
resist.
725 See supra Part II.B.
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4. The Duty to Exchange Information
Both the ILC draft articles and the Helsinki Rules contain
provisions on the regular exchange of water-related data.726
Article 9 of the ILC draft calls on watercourse states "on a regu-
lar basis [to] exchange readily available data and information
on the condition of the watercourse, in particular that of a hy-
drological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological na-
ture, as well as related forecasts. ' 727 Under the view of the ILC,
this kind of exchange represents the minimum necessary for the
equitable and reasonable utilization of a watercourse, which re-
quires the consideration of all relevant factors. 728
Unfortunately, Israel has created and enforced a virtual
monopoly on the creation of raw data, on the raw data itself,
and on their interpretation. 729 Under the regime of Israeli mili-
tary orders, even the conducting of tests on water-related data
in the OPTs requires a permit from the military authorities.
Thus, it is very difficult for Palestinians to know the kinds of
data relevant to determine the Israeli and Palestinian reason-
able and equitable use, and also to know such basic information
as the total amount of water that is subject to dispute.
A long-term solution to the partition of shared Palestinian-
Israeli water will require the creation of an administrative
structure that can engage in regular data-collection and shar-
ing, and that can use that data in periodic recalculations of the
equitable apportionment of the Jordan River's waters. Many
international watercourses have such an international adminis-
trative structure to carry out these and other functions, which
are related to the long-term management of the watercourse. 730
726 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 9, at 249-50. See also, Helsinki
Rules, supra note 631, art. 29.
727 1994 ILC Report, supra note 652, art. 9(1), at 249.
728 See id. art. 9, cmt. 1, at 250.
729 See ELMUSA, supra note 4, at 2-3. "Independent Palestinian hydrologists,
researchers and practitioners are routinely denied access to data, especially raw
data that can be used for verification of Israel's published material, on their own
water resources. Israeli officials deny the existence of such a practice, but there is
overwhelming evidence supporting the Palestinian claim." Id. at 3. According to
members of the Palestinian water negotiating team, Israeli secretiveness on the
question of water data continued during the negotiations and in fact constituted a
major source of bargaining power for them.
730 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 565-66.
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VII. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT: ISRAELI CONTROL IN
A NEW GUISE
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement 731 and the Declaration of
Principles,732 the two main Israeli-Palestinian accords preced-
ing the Interim Agreement, both have provisions relating to
joint water management and use, although the Interim Agree-
ment supersedes them both.7 33
The water and sewage provisions of the Interim Agreement
are located in Article 40 of Appendix I to the Protocol Concern-
ing Civil Affairs (Annex III).734 This article contains language
which leaves the lay reader with the impression that progress
had been made in Palestinian access to and control over their
water resources. 735 In the first substantive provision of the ar-
ticle, "Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West
Bank."7 36 In paragraph 3, "both sides agree to coordinate the
management of water and sewage resources and systems in the
West Bank during the interim period .... ,,737 The Palestinians
assume all powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water
formerly held by the military government and the Civil Admin-
istration.738 Finally, and seeming most important, Israel recog-
nizes future West Bank Palestinian water needs of 70-80 mcm/
yr-a significant increase on occupation-era consumption levels
of around 120 mcm/yr.739 The Palestinians and the Israelis also
731 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, reprinted
in ISRAEL/PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION 1 (Israeli-Palestin-
ian Peace Documentation Series 1994) [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho Agreement].
732 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, reprinted in ISRAEL/PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION,
supra note 730.
733 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building
Measures), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Proto-
col will be superseded by this Agreement. See Interim Agreement, supra note 1,
pmbl. However, the Interim Agreement incorporates verbatim the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement's provisions concerning water resources and water and sewage systems
of the Gaza Strip. See id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 25.
734 See id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40.
735 See id.
736 Id. f7 1.
737 Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 3.
738 See id. 4.
739 See id. T 6.
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agree to cooperate in many other areas in the preservation and
development of the region's water resources.
740
From the standpoint of international law and the back-
ground of Israeli control of water, however, the advances made
in rectifying past injustices in the water field are marginal and
inadequate. The Interim Agreement still allows, through the
mechanism of the Joint Water Committee, for an Israeli veto on
practically all developments affecting water and sewage re-
sources in the West Bank, including over endogenous water ba-
sins which are properly subject to sole Palestinian control. 74 1
There is no provision for a Palestinian veto over Israeli actions
concerning water on its side of the Green Line, even where
these actions affect joint water resources.
While the agreement estimates a need for an additional 70-
80 mcm/yr for Palestinian West Bank water needs, 742 the great
majority of this water (58.4-68.4 mcmlyr) is to come from the
Eastern basin.743 Israel's recognition of Palestine's rights to
water is without legal significance, since these rights derive not
from Israel but from international transboundary water law. 744
Customary elements of this law recognize a state's general
rights to water resources within its borders. It is incongruous
that use of the endogenous Eastern basin is the subject of this
quasi-international agreement; the decision of what to do with
this body of water is Palestine's alone. The additional 11.6
mcm/yr Israel promised Palestine from shared water resources
does little to rectify the sharp imbalances in their respective
uses of transboundary watercourses. 745
The Interim Agreement is also notable for what it excluded.
No mention is made of Palestinian rights to the Jordan River.
Palestine is a watercourse state of the Jordan River system, and
as such is entitled to a share of its flow. Indeed, under the
Johnston Plan, the West Bank was to receive a share of the Jor-
dan River's water through the West Ghor Canal. Relatedly, the
Interim Agreement protects water consumption by settlements,
740 See id. 20.
741 See id. 11-15.
742 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 6.
743 See id. T 7(b)(6).
744 See id. 1 1.
745 See id. 6-10.
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the continuation of which constitutes violations of international
law. Finally, the provisions make no mention of compensation
for past Israeli confiscation of water. During the twenty-eight
years between the Six-Day War and the Interim Agreement,
Israel took billions of cubic meters of Palestinian water in viola-
tion of Palestinian rights to that water under international hu-
manitarian law. A basic norm of international law states that
where a state violates another's right, it has a duty to pay dam-
ages for that violation.
The Interim Agreement does very little to ameliorate the
badly skewed distribution of water from resources shared by
Palestinians and Israelis. Furthermore, by granting Israel con-
tinued authority to control developments in and exploit both
shared and endogenous Palestinian water resources, it rein-
forces the indicia of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. By
excluding mention of the Jordan River and of compensation for
past illegal Israeli water consumption, the Interim Agreement
comes dangerously close to abdicating a critical Palestinian nat-
ural resource and to denigrating Palestine's water rights and its
right to compensation. Taken together, these shortcomings add
weight to the arguments of the critics of the Oslo process who
describe it as a formalization of Palestinian subordination to Is-
raeli rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A. Mechanisms of Israeli Control Over the Mountain and
Gaza Aquifers
The Interim Agreement tightly circumscribes Palestinian
use of and control over its water resources. 746 In the case of the
Gaza Aquifer, the Interim Agreement continues the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement's strict limitations on the quantity con-
sumed from this source.747 As for the Mountain Aquifer, the
Interim Agreement allows for greater Palestinian use of shared
and endogenous water basins while establishing a new adminis-
trative structure, complete with enforcement mechanisms that
grant Israel veto power over practically all Palestinian develop-
746 See id. art. 40, scheds. 10-11.
747 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, scheds. 10-
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ment of the endogenous and shared basins within that
aquifer.748
Perhaps due to the small quantities of water at stake and
because of its poor quality, the provisions regulating Palestin-
ian access to the Gaza Aquifer are the most permissive. The
Agreement adopts verbatim the provisions of the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement. 749 While these provisions provide the new Pales-
tinian Council with the power to operate, manage, and develop
all water and sewage systems and resources in the Gaza Strip,
they also impose three important limitations.750 The Council's
operation, management, and development may not cause any
harm to the water resources. 751 The scope of the Palestinian
Council's authority in the Gaza Strip does not extend to settle-
ments or to any military installation areas that may be located
there. 752 Finally, the pumping from water sources within the
settlements may continue at preexisting levels, and the Council
may not diminish the consumption of water in these areas.
753
The Gaza Aquifer section also provides for the establishment of
a subcommittee to deal with issues of mutual interest, such as
the exchange of data relevant to the management and operation
of the water resources and systems, and the mutual prevention
of harm to the aquifer.754 However, this committee does not
have any power to limit or prevent any actions by either of the
parties within their respective spheres of power.
755
Because the Gaza Aquifer has already been pumped at a
rate exceeding that of its replenishment, the prohibition on the
harming of the aquifer, combined with the Council's inability to
diminish the consumption of water by the settlements, keeps
Palestinian use boxed within its inadequate, pre-Oslo levels.
While the Council does have the ability to take steps to improve
the quality of the aquifer, such as building sewage treatment
plants that will prevent the seepage of untreated human waste
748 See id.
749 See id. art. 40, $ 25.
750 See id. art. 40, sched. 11.
751 See id. 1.
752 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, sched. 11,
2.
753 See id. 3.
754 See id. 8.
755 See id.
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into the water aquifer or regulating the use of water in agricul-
ture, it may do nothing to limit the highly disproportionate
water consumption by settlers in Gaza. As an endogenous
source, the Gaza Aquifer is properly controlled only by Palestin-
ian authorities. The presence of Mekorot in the settlements and
its ability to act there without any control or oversight by the
Palestinian Council is in contradiction to this rule.
The provisions regulating control over the West Bank's
water, introduced in the Interim Agreement, provide for more
Israeli control than those regulating the use of the Gaza Aqui-
fer.756 In contrast to the powers granted to the Council in the
Gaza Strip, the Palestinian side must coordinate with the Is-
raeli side in practically all aspects of the management of the
natural and man-made water and sewage systems of the West
Bank.757 A Joint Water Committee (JWC) is given the power
"to deal with all water and sewage related issues in the West
Bank."758 These include the coordinated management of water
resources and of water and sewage systems, the exchange of
water-related information, oversight of the joint supervision
and enforcement mechanism, and others.7 59 The JWC's mem-
bership includes equal numbers of Palestinian and Israeli rep-
resentatives, and shall operate by consensus in all matters. 760
The powers of the Civil Administration, along with the manage-
ment of water and sewage systems serving only Palestinians,
are the only powers transferred wholesale to the Council.761
Both sides commit to "[mlaintaining existing quantities of utili-
zation from the resources ,",762 which protects the water con-
sumption of the settlements and the disproportionate use of
water by the Israelis living inside the Green Line.
Thus, with the exception of bill collection (the principle
function of the Civil Administration during the occupation) and
the management of local Palestinian water and sewage sys-
tems,7 63 Israel maintains, during the interim period, a veto
756 See id. art. 40.
757 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 11-15.
758 Id. 12.
759 See id.
760 See id. IT 11-15.
761 See id. I 4; art. 40, sched. 8, 2(a).
762 Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 3(a).
763 See id. art. 40, sched. 8, 2.
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power over all decisions of import in the use and development of
both the shared (Western and Northeastern) and the endoge-
nous (Eastern) basins of the Mountain Aquifer. 76 4 The acts over
which Israel maintains a veto include all licensing and drilling
of new wells, increased extraction from any water source, and
all development of water resources and systems. 76 5 The JWC
also ascertains compliance with the Interim Agreement and
with its own decisions through the use of Joint Supervision and
Enforcement Teams (JSETs).766 The Agreement requires these
teams to "monitor, supervise and enforce the implementa-
tion"767 of the water-related provisions of the Interim Agree-
ment and the decisions of the JWC, especially the extraction of
water, the drilling of wells, the development of new projects for
water supply, and the operation and maintenance of systems for
collection, treatment, disposal and reuse of domestic and indus-
trial sewage, of urban and agricultural runoff, and of urban and
agricultural drainage systems. 768 These teams are entitled to
unrestricted and secure access to all water and sewage facilities
and systems as well as limited enforcement powers. 769
The Interim Agreement's regulation of the shared Moun-
tain Aquifer is a reflection of Palestine's subordinated position
within the terms of Oslo. 770 Israel maintains authority and use
over endogenous Palestinian sources such as the Eastern ba-
sin.771 No provision is made for any form of Palestinian control
or access to endogenous Israeli sources. As for the shared ba-
sins, the Palestinians and Israelis have joint authority over
practically all aspects of their use and management, but only in
Palestinian territory.7 72 Despite the fact that Israel's actions
inside its territory can seriously affect the Western and North-
eastern basins, the JWC and the JSETs have no authority in-
side the Green Line. 773 In other words, whereas an Israeli
member of the JWC may veto any proposed Palestinian project
764 See id.
765 See id. art. 40, 4. See also id. art. 40, sched. 8, $ 1(a)-(b).




770 See id. art. 40, 20.
771 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, sched. 10.
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in the Eastern basin, there is no veto or other formal mecha-
nism for Palestinians to shape developments inside the Green
Line. Instead, Palestinians may only rely on vague promises of
cooperation in various areas of mutual concern as a channel
through which to voice their concerns about Israeli actions
within its borders. 774
B. Continued Imbalances in Distribution of Water from
Shared Resources
The Interim Agreement contains a set of provisions, which
permit the Palestinians to increase their use of their water re-
sources from various connection points and wells. The section
"Additional Water" announces at the outset: "Both sides have
agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West
Bank are estimated to be between 70-80 mcm/yr."775 This
amount is indeed significant in comparison to current Palestin-
ian consumption levels.
However, viewed another way, the addition of this amount
to the Palestinian water quota does little to ameliorate the wide
disparities in per capita water consumption between Palestin-
ian consumers on the one hand and Israeli and settler consum-
ers on the other. Furthermore, because the agreement specifies
that most of this additional water will come from the Eastern
Aquifer, an endogenous Palestinian water source, this new al-
lotment does little to remedy the highly unbalanced use of
water sources shared by Palestine and Israel.7 76
Of the 70-80 mcm/yr promised by the Interim Agreement,
6.6 mcm/yr is to come from existing shared water resources, 777 5
mcm/yr from a future Israeli desalinification project,7 78 and
58.4-68.4 mcm/yr from "the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed
sources in the West Bank."779 The sides agreed to cooperate to
increase Palestine's allocation by 28.6 mcm/yr during the in-
terim period, while the Palestinian side obtained permission to
increase its utilization of the Eastern Aquifer by 41.4-51.4 mcm/
774 See id. 20.
775 Id. 6.
776 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 7.
777 See id. I 7(a)(1)-(5), 7(b)(1).
778 See id. IT 7(a)(6), 7(b)(3).
779 Id. IT 7(b)(2), 7(b)(6).
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yr, presumably at a pace which it will decide.78 0 Given that the
West Bank's water sources must be managed so as to safeguard
existing utilization rates and to prevent the deterioration of
water resources, these "other agreed sources" must be a refer-
ence to sources not hydrologically connected to the fully ex-
ploited Western and Northeastern basins. In other words, it is
a reference to endogenous Palestinian water sources other than
the Eastern basin, possibly from undammed wadis and rainfall
capture projects.
At current levels, Palestinian per capita consumption
amounts to approximately 25% of Israeli consumption levels
(and even a smaller proportion of per capita settler consump-
tion).78 ' With the additional water promised by the Interim
Agreement, the per capita Palestinian share will rise to 35% of
the Israeli level.7 8 2 The 6.6 mcm/yr transfer of water from
shared resources from the Israeli to the Palestinian side is a
small portion of the volume of shared water resources in the
Mountain Aquifer and an even smaller portion of the global
amount of water shared by Palestine and Israel, which amounts
to over 1200 mcm/yr.78 3 Of the total amount of water shared,
Israel consumes 1140 mcmyr-over 90% of the total. Even
with the transfers under the Interim Agreement, this share re-
mains above 90%.
TABLE 10. PALESTINE'S SHARE OF COMMON MOUNTAIN AQUIFER
BASINS UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
7 8 4
PALESTINIAN PALESTINIAN
BASIN SHARE ISRAELI SHARE SHARE (%)
Western 22 mcm/yr 340 mcm/yr 6%
Northeastern 42 mcm/yr 103 mcm/yr 29%
Total 64 mcm/yr 443 mcm/yr 13%
780 See id. IT 7, 7(b)(6).
781 See supra Part V.C.2, tbl. 4.
782 See tbl. 10 in this Part.
783 This figure is comprised of 710 mcm/yr from the Jordan River, see supra
Part II.B, tbl. 3; 145 mcm/yr from the Northeastern basin, and 362 mcm/yr from
the Western basin. See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 3, app. 1, sched.
10.
784 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, ann. 3, app. 1, sched. 10.
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C. Non-recognition of Palestine's Rights to the Waters of the
Jordan River
As already mentioned, there are no provisions in the In-
terim Agreement for Palestinian control over, or access to, the
waters of the Jordan River. This omission is a significant loss
for Palestine. As a watercourse state, Palestine is entitled to a
share of the Jordan River. The Johnston Plan of the mid-1950s,
the putative customary law of the basin, included within its de-
velopment scheme a West Ghor Canal flowing through the West
Bank, which would receive waters from the Jordan River.78 5
Due to the occupation of the West Bank in the 1967 war, this
canal never materialized. 78 6 Experts have argued that in the
wake of the separation of ties between Jordan and the West
Bank, Palestine ought to receive this share, though there are
wide disparities in the estimates of the water destined for this
project.787 However, it is clear that the water lost by the omis-
sion of the Jordan River is significant when compared to pres-
ent Palestinian consumption amounting to 215-30 mcm/yr.
D. Non-declaration of Illegality of Water Use by
Jewish Settlements
The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits occupying powers
from deporting or transferring parts of its own civilian popula-
tion into the territory they occupy. 78 8 Under this rule, the Is-
raeli settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and the Gaza Strip are illegal. 78 9 Consequently, the use of
water by these settlements, which amounts to approximately 80
mcmyr, is also illegal. Despite this, the Interim Agreement is
silent on the legality of the settlements, and defers resolution of
the issue to the permanent status negotiations. 790 Further-
more, the agreement guarantees the settlements the right to
consume water at the same levels at which they consumed them
at the signing of the agreement, whether these settlements are
785 See supra Part II.B.
786 See id.
787 See id.
788 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 279, art. 49.
789 See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNuAL REPORT 1995,
at 231 (1996).
790 See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.
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located in the West Bank791 or the Gaza Strip.792 By the date of
this writing, and at the rate of consumption that existed at the
time of signing of the Interim Agreement, over 100 mcm of
water went illegally to settlements.
E. Non-compensation for Israeli Confiscation of
Palestinian Water
Another critical area in which the Interim Agreements falls
short of international legal standards is in the area of compen-
sation by Israel to Palestine for past Israeli overconsumption.
Throughout the years of occupation, Israel consumed water for
illegal purposes (such as for consumption by settlements), con-
sumed water from endogenous Palestinian sources from which
it was not legally entitled to consume, and/or consumed water
from shared sources to which it was entitled to consume, but at
a rate that exceeded its rightful share. The Hague Regulations
require that Palestinian water, as a form of private property,
"be respected."793 Palestine is legally entitled to some form of
compensation for this overconsumption, which may come in the
form of a financial transfer from the Israel to Palestine.
The Interim Agreement contains no mention of compensa-
tion for past overconsumption. International transboundary
water law considers states to have rights to consume water
from watercourses on their territory. 794 By contrast, in the ab-
sence of a specific agreement to the contrary, water basins lo-
cated wholly within the boundaries of one state are subject to
the sole control of that one state, since no other state has rights
to it.795 This is a consequence of sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity. While Israel occupied Palestine, it was never sovereign
power over Palestine, and consequently did not have all the
privileges and rights that sovereignty bestows, including the
791 See id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 40, 3(a) ("[bloth sides agree to coordinate the
management of water and sewage resources and systems in the West Bank during
the interim period, in accordance with the [principle ofl [M]aintaining existing
quantities of utilization from these resources .... ).
792 See id. sched. 11, 91 3 ("[all pumping from water resources in the Settle-
ments and the Military Installation Area shall be in accordance with existing
quantities of drinking water and agricultural water.").
793 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43. See also supra Part IV.A.
794 See supra Part VI.
795 See id.
159
PACE INT'L L. REV.
right to control and exploit these endogenous sources. 796 On the
basis of these principles, whether during the occupation or
before, Palestine had sole right of access to endogenous sources
such as the Gaza Aquifer and the Eastern basin of the Moun-
tain Aquifer. Consequently, in the absence of express Palestin-
ian approval to the contrary, all Israeli consumption from
endogenous Palestinian sources, except consumption for pur-
poses of military administration of the territories under occupa-
tion, was illegal.
In addition, Palestine had rights, in conjunction with its
neighbors, to consume water from sources which it shares with
its neighbors: the Jordan River and the Western and Northeast-
ern basins of the Mountain Aquifer. During the occupation,
Israel consumed from the shared sources as well; part of this
consumption was legitimate under international law because
Israel, as a watercourse state, had a right to a part of the water
from these sources. The question of the size of this share is an-
swered by two different legal regimes. In the case of the Jordan
River, the mid-century Johnston Plan, which never resulted in
a formal plan but nonetheless became the customary law of the
basin, allocated shares to Israel as well as to the West Bank.79 7
The actual plan never became public. However, at least two in-
dependent estimates of the size of the share exist, the lower of
the two being 70 mcm/yr. 798 The Six Day War allowed Israel to
capture this Palestinian share.7 99 It first physically blocked
Palestinian access to the river's water by destroying pumps in
the Jordan River Valley and declaring the valley a Closed Mili-
tary Area.800 Israel was able to increase its consumption of the
Jordan River system's waters so that its effective share ex-
ceeded that granted to it under the Johnston Plan by over 250
mcm/yr.S0 1 For these reasons, Israel must compensate the Pal-
estinian side for at least 70 mcm/yr of water since 1967.
Before the conclusion of the Interim Agreement, no treaty
specified the Palestinian and Israeli shares of the Western and
Northeastern basins of the Mountain Aquifer. International
796 See id.




801 See id. tbl. 3.
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watercourse law required that watercourse states cooperate to
employ their waters in an equitable and reasonable manner.80 2
Applications of this principle to the Mountain Aquifer by
Elmusa, Benvenisti and Gvirtzman suggest that Israel con-
sumes far more than what the factor analysis of the Helsinki
Rules and the 1994 ILC Report would propose as its rightful
share. s 3 In their simplified estimates of the Palestinian and
Israeli shares of the aquifer's waters on the basis of the feeding
areas and storage volumes located in each state, the largest
share suggested by Benvenisti and Gvirtzman was 310 mcm/
yr.8 0 4 This amount is significantly less than the consumption
levels promised Israel under the Interim Agreement.80 5
Conservative estimates show that Israel's debt to Palestine
for its past overconsumption runs, at the very least, into the
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, and is probably close to
U.S. $2 billion. This is a significant sum, given that 1996 Pales-
tinian GDP was approximately U.S. $3.2 billion.80 6 These cal-
culations point to Israel as a source of financing for much-
needed Palestinian infrastructure construction and economic
development.
F. Recommended Corrective Principles for the Permanent
Status Negotiations
Despite the severe shortcomings of the Interim Agreement
in the area of water, in principle, it is not yet too late for the
negotiators to fashion out of the permanent status negotiations
an agreement which is more faithful to the standards of inter-
national law. The agreement itself makes clear that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the out-
come of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted
pursuant to the DOP. Neither party shall be deemed, by virtue of
having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived
any of its existing rights, claims or positions.80 7
802 See supra Part VI.C.
803 See id.
804 See Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note 6, at 556-57.
805 See supra Part VII.B, tbl. 10.
806 See MILAN ZAVADJIL ET AL., RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS,
AND PROGRESS IN INSTITUTION BUILDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 5 (In-
ternational Monetary Fund 1997).
807 Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31, 6.
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With this in mind, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators must fol-
low certain guidelines when formulating the water-related ne-
gotiations in order not to repeat the gross shortcomings of the
Interim Agreement:
" Sole Palestinian control of endogenous water sources. Bodies of
water like the Gaza Aquifer and the Eastern basin, which are
completely within Palestine's borders, are not properly the sub-
ject of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and must be placed
under the sole control of the Palestinian side.
* True joint management of shared resources. Where negotia-
tions lead to the creation of structures like the JWC and the
JSETs, they must have equal authority only over shared re-
sources and they must have authority inside Israel as well as
inside Palestine.
" Equitable allocation of waters from shared resources. The
shares allocated to Palestine from the Northeastern and West-
ern basins of the Mountain Aquifer are significantly less than
what the factor analysis of international watercourse law
would suggest by several orders of magnitude. This division
must be consistent with the guidelines established in the 1994
ILC Report and must narrow or close the gap between the Is-
raeli and Palestinian per capita consumption.
* Palestine's rights to the Jordan River. Israel must recognize
and allow Palestine's use of its share of the Jordan River as
foreseen by the Johnston Plan.
* The illegality of water consumption by settlements. This con-
sumption must either cease or be compensated.
* Palestine's right to compensation for past illegal consumption.
During the years of occupation, Israel illegally took hundreds of
millions of cubic meters of Palestinian water. Israel owes Pal-
estine compensation for this illegal use and must compensate
Palestine as part of a permanent status accord.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When Israel occupied the OPTs in 1967, it consolidated its
control over all water sources available to Palestinians. Driven
by an ever-growing and water-intensive agricultural sector,
Israel immediately imposed a military legal structure that led
to significant and sustained interferences with Palestinian pri-
vate property rights. The legal right to well and spring water
that many Palestinians enjoyed under Jordanian rule was un-
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dermined in violation of Israel's treaty obligations under inter-
national humanitarian law. Israel imposed strict limitations on
Palestinians' ability to consume and regulate their water. It
maintained its lopsided use of shared water resources, which is
inequitable under evolving norms of international trans-
boundary water law. Israel was also able to greatly increase its
consumption of endogenous Palestinian water aquifers. In ad-
dition, Israel introduced settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza, which illegally drew upon scarce local groundwater. Fi-
nally, Israeli overpumping has caused, or helped cause, deterio-
ration in the quality of the Gaza Aquifer and is threatening the
Mountain Aquifer with long-term damage. Israeli overpumping
in the Upper Jordan Valley renders the downstream waters
very saline and unusable for agriculture.
Israel, to a degree perhaps unmatched anywhere else in the
world, has maintained firm public control over all aspects of do-
mestic water exploration, production, distribution, recycling,
and treatment. It has also completely excluded Palestinian ac-
tors or even market forces from any participation in this con-
trol. This control has also been accompanied with a systematic
neglect of Palestinian water-related human rights. It is thus
arguable that Israel has neglected its duties under the ICESCR
to Palestinians to control their natural resources; to equal pro-
tection and equal enjoyment of the rights provided for in the
ICESCR; to the right to earn a living in the agricultural sector,
for which water is critical; to the right to an adequate standard
of living, including water-related installations in housing units;
and to the right to health, which the poor public health infra-
structure in Palestine threatens.
This Article has sought to present a detailed analysis of
Palestinian water rights under international law. The absence
of a binding implementation mechanism for the bodies of inter-
national law here under consideration, suggests that law can-
not be the entire answer. The current political settlement,
despite all of its imperfections, must be the method, which de-
termines the permanent status of Palestinian and Israeli water
rights. However, as in other aspects of the extremely volatile
Palestine-Israel dispute, a solution that is durable and long
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lasting must be one that is just and equitable.808 Unfortu-
nately, the water provisions of the Interim Agreement are far
from fair. International law provides answers for the questions
of what an equitable partition of regional waters should be. The
participants in the current process of negotiations should heed
these prescriptions, at least in their own self-interest, if not out
of an intrinsic respect for the value and force of legal norms. An
arrangement in which both parties to the conflict make use of
water in a manner responsive to their respective needs, and to
the general situation of water scarcity, is one that is most likely
to serve the goals of peace and security in the region.
808 See Naff & Matson, supra note 70, at 5 (discussing that in the resolution of
Middle East water conflicts, law cannot provide all the answers but is nonetheless
"essential" to the search for legitimate answers).
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